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ABSTRACT
Most existing security decisions for both defending and attacking are made based on
some deterministic approaches that only give binary answers. Even though these ap-
proaches can achieve low false positive rate for decision making, they have high false
negative rates due to the lack of accommodations to new attack methods and defense
techniques. In this dissertation, I study how to discover and use patterns with uncer-
tainty and randomness to counter security challenges. By extracting and modeling
patterns in security events, I am able to handle previously unknown security events
with quantied condence, rather than simply making binary decisions. In partic-
ular, I cope with the following four real-world security challenges by modeling and
analyzing with pattern-based approaches: 1) How to detect and attribute previously
unknown shellcode? I propose instruction sequence abstraction that extracts coarse-
grained patterns from an instruction sequence and use Markov-chain-based model and
support vector machines to detect and attribute shellcode; 2) How to safely mitigate
routing attacks in mobile ad hoc networks? I identify routing table change patterns
caused by attacks, propose an extended Dempster-Shafer theory to measure the risk
of such changes, and use a risk-aware response mechanism to mitigate routing attacks;
3) How to model, understand, and guess human-chosen picture passwords? I ana-
lyze collected human-chosen picture passwords, propose selection function that mod-
els patterns in password selection, and design two algorithms to optimize password
guessing paths; and 4) How to identify inuential gures and events in underground
social networks? I analyze collected underground social network data, identify user
interaction patterns, and propose a suite of measures for systematically discovering
and mining adversarial evidence. By solving these four problems, I demonstrate that
discovering and using patterns could help deal with challenges in computer security,
network security, human-computer interaction security, and social network security.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Discovering and using patterns in data is the process of discovering regularities in
either a manual or an automatic way and using discovered regularities as supporting
evidence to assist decision making such as predicting the outcomes of available actions.
Patterns are everywhere, and the history of discovering and using patterns has been
successful long before the invention of computers. The most famous story about the
discovery of patterns in all times may be how Issac Newton dened the law of universal
gravitation which was inspired by the observations of falling apples. Unfortunately,
not all patterns can be described by a deterministic equation such as the equation of
the law of universal gravitation. Most patterns follow a skewed probability distribution
and their representations need the mathematical foundations of multiple theories.
After we entered the era of computers, algorithms have been designed to automate
the process of both discovering and using patterns with randomness and uncertainty.
The research elds to improve such algorithms are known as pattern recognition, data
mining, and machine learning which have achieved successes in many domains, such
as face recognition, voice control, and text search.
The typical workow of discovering patterns starts from observing the behaviors
of the targets, a process known as signal acquisition. After signals are collected, pre-
processing and feature extraction take place to remove redundant data and highlight
salient characteristics, respectively. Even though there exists some pure statistical
ways to do preprocessing and feature extraction, both of them require some domain
knowledge of the targets and their signals to obtain more reliable and explainable re-
sults. The next step, which requires domain knowledge as well, is to select and build
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models to best t the extracted features. The generated models are used for future
predictions and decision making, aka using patterns. Through the process of pattern
discovery and modeling, regularities are encoded as mathematical models which are
ready for using.
Security researchers and practitioners have been using two types of approaches to
discover and use patterns in security events to solve security problems for decades.
The rst type of approaches uses predetermined patterns. Commercially popular
anti-virus systems and intrusion detection systems are using malware signatures, a
predened sequence of bits, to tell if the captured samples are known malwares. Even
if such misuse-based systems could minimize the false positive rate of malware detec-
tion, they could not detect new malware variants that do not contain that predened
bit sequences; hence they introduce high false negative rate. The other type of ap-
proaches uses statistical patterns. The rst instance may be the intrusion detection
model Denning (1986) proposed in 1986 by Dorothy E. Denning who designed to
monitor a system's audit records and detect abnormal patterns of system usages with
statistical models. However, pure statistical approaches overlook the root cause of
the problems, and their results are usually inexplicable.
1.1 Proposed Pattern-based Approach Framework
In order to nd out stages where discovering and using patterns might be ap-
plicable and benecial in the security cycles, it is important to model the defense
and attack processes from defenders' and attackers' perspectives. As shown in Fig-
ure 1.1(a), we model the security cycle of defenders as three stages for simplicity:
protection, detection, and response. Protection is the stage where security policies are
enforced. Detection is used to check if the protection mechanisms are breached and
security policies are violated. When policy violations are conrmed, responses are
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Detection
(a) (b)
Reconnaissance
Figure 1.1: The Security Cycle (a) Defenders' Perspective (b) Attackers' Perspective
taken place to mitigate the threats. Obviously, patterns can be discovered and used
in the detection stage, which is the practice adopted in Denning (1986). In Chap-
ter 3, we show how to discover and use instruction patterns for shellcode detection
and attribution. In Chapter 4, we show that routing table change patterns can be
used to measure the risk of MANET attacks and guide response.
On the other hand, the security cycle of attackers consists of reconnaissance,
planning, and attack as shown in Figure 1.1(b). Reconnaissance is the process that
attackers gather information of potential targets and choose targets based on it. Plan-
ning is the stage where attack tactics and approaches are designed and prepared. The
actual attacks are then carried out on the targets for attackers' benets. Since direct
intelligence is not available in many cases, patterns in side channel information are
used to infer target intelligence in reconnaissance Al-Saleh and Crandall (2011). In
Chapter 5, we show that user-choice patterns in picture passwords can be used by
attackers for planning. In Chapter 6, we show that how to use social interaction
patterns in the underground dynamics for reconnaissance.
We propose a pattern-based approach framework as shown in Figure 1.2, whose
goal is to handle previously unknown security events by considering their root causes,
randomness and uncertainty and at the same time quantify the condence of decision
3
Signal Acquisition
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Model Building
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Basic Steps in Discovering and Using Patterns
Using Patterns
Discovering Patterns
• Collect samples from both benign and 
malicious sources
• Tackle the root cause of the security problem
• Extract features that are related to root causes
• Analyze inherent security-related regularities
• Mathematical Repository
• Weighted decision making based on security 
factors
Using Patterns
Discovering Patterns
My Approach to Discover and Use Patterns in Security Events
Figure 1.2: Proposed Pattern-based Approach Framework
making. Dierent from pre-determined pattern-based approaches, our approach does
not rely on xed bit sequences, but considers randomness and uncertainty. Thus, our
approach can cope with previously unknown security events. Dierent from statistical
pattern-based approaches that leave the feature discovery to statistical methods, our
pattern-based approaches focuses on using the domain knowledge in each security
problem to discover regularities and tackle root causes directly. Therefore, the reasons
for such regularities to occur are explainable and interpreted in a security-related way.
Our pattern-based approach framework has four major steps: i) signal acquisition, in
which we collect samples from both benign and malicious sources. The instances of
applying this step to solve dierent challenges can be found in Section 3.3, Section 4.5,
Section 5.3, and Section 6.2; ii) feature extraction, in which we extract the features
that are related to the root cause of each problem. The instances of applying this step
to solve dierent challenges can be found in Section 3.5.3, Section 4.5.1, Section 5.3,
and Section 6.3; iii) model building, in which we use the tools in our mathematical
repository to describe the discovered security-related regularities. The instances of
applying this step to solve dierent challenges can be found in Section 3.6, Section 4.3,
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Section 5.4.3, and Section 6.3.1; and iv) decision making, in which we design weighted
decision making to quantify our decision condence. The instances of applying this
step to solve dierent challenges can be found in Section 3.6, Section 4.6, Section 5.4.4,
and Section 6.3.3.
1.2 Contributions of This Dissertation
This dissertation studies and addresses four security challenges: i) how to detect
and attribute shellcode; ii) how to safely mitigate network routing attacks; iii) how
to guess picture passwords; and iv) how to discover underground social intelligence.
These four problems represent security challenges in four dierent domains: com-
puter security, network security, human-computer interaction security, and human
social network security. The common thread throughout the research on these dier-
ent problems is applying the techniques of discovering and using patterns to model,
analyze, and solve security-related issues. A brief introduction of each problem and
the contributions from this dissertation are summarized as follows:
Among the list of 2011 CWE/SANS most widespread and dangerous software
errors, fteen out of twenty-ve could lead to remote code injection and execution
attacks Mitre (2011). Among all kinds of code injection attacks, binary code injection
is the most destructive one. A successfully exploited system gives the direct control of
its CPU, the binary code interpreter, to the adversaries that have all the privileges of
the subverted processes One (1996). The malicious injected codes in this category is
also named shellcode since they used to return a command shell to the attackers. For
shellcode detection and attribution, we apply the proposed pattern-based approach
framework and make the following contributions:
 (Signal Acquisition) We collect benign and malicious binary code samples and
look into the instruction patterns shown in these sample.
5
 (Feature Extraction) We analyze the reason for such patterns and propose in-
struction sequence abstraction, a coarse-grained feature extraction method on
the instruction sequence that reduces the size of input data dimension, removes
confusing byte characteristics, and keeps distinguishable instruction features.
 (Model Building and Decision Making) We design a Markov-chain-based model
to capture the observed sequential patterns for shellcode detection. Our de-
tection approach is location-independent and length-independent, hence it sup-
ports on-line shellcode detection on suspicious data streams.
 (Model Building and Decision Making) We apply support vector machines to
capture distributional patterns shown in the instruction sequence abstraction
for understanding encoded shellcode attribution.
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are utilized to set up wireless communication
in improvised environments without a predened infrastructure or centralized ad-
ministration. The network topologies of MANET are frequently changed due to the
unpredictable mobility of nodes. Furthermore, each mobile node in MANET plays
a router role while transmitting data over the network. Hence, any compromised
nodes under an adversary's control could cause signicant damage to the functional-
ity and security of its network since the impact would propagate in performing routing
tasks. For mobile ad hoc network routing attack mitigation, we apply the proposed
pattern-based approach framework and make the following contributions:
 (Signal Acquisition) We look into the routing table change patterns when rout-
ing attacks happen in MANET environment.
 (Feature Extraction) We identify several categories of routing table change pat-
terns and measure the impact of each pattern category.
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 (Model Building) We propose an extended Dempster-Shafer evidence model
with importance factors and articulate expected properties for Dempster's rule
of combination with importance factors. Our Dempster's rule of combination
with importance factors is nonassociative and weighted.
 (Decision Making) We propose an adaptive risk-aware response mechanism with
the extended D-S evidence model, considering damages caused by both attacks
and countermeasures. The adaptiveness of our mechanism allows us to system-
atically cope with MANET routing attacks.
Picture Gesture Authentication Johnson (2012) has been recently introduced as
an alternative login experience to text-based password on such devices. In particular,
the new Microsoft Windows 8 operating system adopts such an alternative authenti-
cation to complement traditional text-based authentication. This new authentication
mechanism hit the market with miscellaneous computing devices including personal
computers and tablets Microsoft (2013). Consequently, it is imperative to examine
and explore potential attacks on picture gesture authentication in such a prevalent
operating system for further understanding user experiences and enhancing this com-
mercially popular picture password system. For picture gesture password guessing,
we apply the proposed pattern-based approach framework and make the following
contributions:
 (Signal Acquisition) We compile two datasets of PGA usage from user studies
and perform an empirical analysis on collected data to understand user choice
in background picture, gesture location, gesture order, and gesture type.
 (Feature Extraction) We identify the most popular user-choice patterns in ges-
ture location, gesture order, and gesture type.
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 (Model Building) We introduce the concept of selection function that abstracts
and models users' selection processes when selecting their picture passwords.
We demonstrate how selection functions can be automatically identied from
training datasets.
 (Decision Making) We propose a novel attack framework that is able to generate
ranked password dictionaries based on selection functions.
Existing research on net-centric attacks has focused on the detection of attack
events on network side and the removal of rogue programs from client side. However,
such approaches largely overlook the way on how attack tools and unwanted programs
are developed and distributed. Recent studies in underground economy reveal that
suspicious attackers heavily utilize online social networks to form special interest
groups and distribute malicious code. Consequently, examining social dynamics, as
a novel way to complement existing research eorts, is imperative to systematically
identify attackers and tactically cope with net-centric threats. For underground social
intelligence discovery, we apply the proposed pattern-based approach framework and
make the following contributions:
 (Signal Acquisition) We study the role of underground social dynamics in the
whole underground economy. We collect a dataset of user interactions of an
underground social network.
 (Feature Extraction and Model Building) We study the user interactions in
this dataset. And, we formulate an online underground social dynamics model
considering both social relationships and user-generated contents.
 (Model Building and Decision Making) We propose a suite of measures to sys-
tematically quantify social impacts of individuals and groups along with their
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online conversations which facilitate adversarial evidence acquisition and inves-
tigation.
1.3 Previous Publications
This dissertation incorporates materials from several of my previous conference
papers, a journal paper and a book chapter. The concepts and techniques of using
instruction patterns to detect and attribute shellcode in Chapter 3 were discussed in
conference papers:
 Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu. Automatic Extraction of Secrets
from Malware. In Proceedings of the 2011 Working Conference on Reverse
Engineering.
 Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn. Using Instruction Sequence Abstraction for Shell-
code Detection and Attribution. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Conference
on Communications and Network Security.
The ideas of using routing table change patterns to assess and mitigate routing
attack risks in Chapter 4 were discussed in a conference and a journal paper:
 Ziming Zhao, Hongxin Hu, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Ruoyu Wu. Risk-aware Re-
sponse for Mitigating MANET Routing Attacks. In Proceedings of the 2010
IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference.
 Ziming Zhao, Hongxin Hu, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Ruoyu Wu. Risk-Aware Miti-
gation for MANET Routing Attacks. In IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, 2012.
The ideas of using user choice patterns to guess picture passwords in Chapter 5
were presented in a conference paper:
9
 Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, Jeong-Jin Seo, and Hongxin Hu. On the Security
of Picture Gesture Authentication. In Proceedings of the 2013 USENIX Security
Symposium.
The ideas of using social interaction patterns to model underground social dynam-
ics and predict future cyber attacks in Chapter 6 were discussed in two conference
papers and a book chapter:
 Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu. Examining Social Dynamics
for Countering Botnet Attacks. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Global Com-
munications Conference.
 Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, Hongxin Hu, and Deepinder Mahi. SocialImpact:
Systematic Analysis of Underground Social Dynamics. In Proceedings of the
2012 European Symposium on Research in Computer Security.
 Ziming Zhao and Gail-Joon Ahn. Examining Social Dynamics and Malware
Secrets to Mitigate Net-centric Attacks in Hackers and Hacking: A Reference
Handbook, 2013.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we overview the
mathematical foundations of our research. In Chapter 3, we present how to detect and
attribute shellcode using patterns extracted from instruction sequences. In Chapter
4, we present how to mitigate MANET routing attacks using evidence collected and
combined from routing tables. In Chapter 5, we present how to guess picture gesture
passwords by modeling the user-choices patterns exhibited in collected passwords. In
Chapter 6, we present how to discover underground social intelligence using social
patterns. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
MATHEMATICAL PREREQUISITES
There are many theories to model and describe patterns with uncertainty and ran-
domness. This chapter is not meant to be a comprehensive introduction or summary
of all existing techniques of discovering and using patterns. For more comprehensive
coverage of existing techniques, please refer to Bishop and Nasrabadi (2006); Tan
et al. (2007); Theodoridis and Koutroumbas (2008). This chapter only introduces the
mathematical foundations for the techniques we will use and we will develop in this
dissertation.
2.1 Probability Theory
Probability theory uses the concept of random variable to describe a variable
whose value is subject to variations due to chance. A random variable can take on a
set of discrete or continuous values, each with an associated probability.
In this dissertation, we denote the probability that a random variable X will take
the value xi as Pr(X = xi) for discrete random variables. In the cases where two
discrete random variables are involved, we use Pr(X = xi; Y = yi) to denote the
probability that X will take the value xi and Y will take the value yi. Since this
probability describes multiple random variables, it is called joint probability of X
and Y . We use Pr(Y = yijX = xi) to denote the conditional probability that Y will
take yi given X takes xi.
Suppose X and Y are two random variables, the sum rule states that
Pr(X) =
X
Y
Pr(X; Y ) (2.1)
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Suppose X and Y are two random variables, the product rule states that
Pr(X; Y ) = Pr(Y jX)Pr(X) (2.2)
Since Pr(X;Y ) = Pr(Y;X), Bayes' theorem states that
Pr(Y jX) = Pr(XjY )Pr(Y )
Pr(X)
(2.3)
Probability theory uses the concept of mathematical expectation to denote the
value of a random variable one would expect to nd if one could repeat the random
variable process an innite number of times and take the average of the values ob-
tained. Obviously, the random variable could be some mathematical transformation
from other random variable represented as f(x). The expectation of f(x) denoted as
E[f ] under a discrete probability distribution Pr(X) is given by
E[f(x)] =
X
x
Pr(x)f(x) (2.4)
The variance of f(x) that provides a measure of how much variability there is in
f(x) around its expectation E[f ] is given by
var[f(x)] = E[(f(x)  E[f(x)])2] (2.5)
For two random variables, the covariance that expresses the extent to which two
variables vary together is dened by
cov[x; y] = Ex;y[(x  E[x])(y   E[y])] (2.6)
If X and Y are said to be independent of each other,
Pr(X;Y ) = Pr(X)Pr(Y ) (2.7)
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and
Pr(Y jX) = Pr(Y ) (2.8)
When X and Y are independent to each other, their covariance cov[X;Y ] van-
ishes and is equal to 0. This means X and Y vary independently. When X and
Y are not independent, we use Pearson's product-moment coecient, a normalized
representation of covariance, to denote how related they are.
x;y =
cov[x; y]p
var(x)
p
var(y)
=
Ex;y[(x  E[x])(y   E[y])]
E[(x  E[x])2]E[(y   E[y])2] (2.9)
2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory
The Dempster-Shafer theory begins with the familiar idea of using a number
between zero and one to indicate the degree of support a body of evidence provides
for a proposition. But unlike past attempts to develop this idea, the theory does
not focus on the act of judgment by which such a number is determined. It focuses
instead on something more amenable to mathematical analysis: the combination of
degrees of belief or support based on one body of evidence with those based on an
entirely distinct body of evidence. The heart of the theory is Dempster's rule for
eecting this combination.
Mathematically, Dempster's rule is simply a rule for computing, from two or more
belief functions over the same set , a new belief function called their orthogonal sum.
The burden of this theory is that this rule corresponds to the pooling of evidence: if
the belief functions being combined are based on entirely distinct bodies of evidence
and the set  discerns the relevant interaction between those bodies of evidence, then
the orthogonal sum gives degrees of belief that are appropriate on the basis of the
combined evidence.
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In Dempster-Shafer theory, propositions are represented as subsets of a given set.
Suppose  is a nite set, and let 2 denote the set of all subsets of .  will
acquire its meaning from what we know or think we know. In order to emphasize this
epistemic nature of the set of possibilities ,  will be called frame of discernment.
When a proposition corresponds to a subset of a frame of discernment, it is said that
the frame discerns that proposition.
If  is a frame of discernment, then a function m : 2 ! [0; 1] is called a basic
probability assignment whenever
m() = 0 (2.10)
and X
A
m(A) = 1 (2.11)
The quantity m(A) is called A's basic probability number, and it is understood
to be the measure of the belief that is committed exactly to A. Condition (1) reects
the fact that no belief ought to be committed to , while (2) reects the convention
that one's total belief has measure one. To obtain the measure of the total belief
committed to A, one must add to m(A) the quantities m(B) for all proper subsets B
of A.
A function Bel : 2 ! [0; 1] is called a belief function over  if it is given by (3)
for some basic probability assignment m : 2 ! [0; 1].
Bel(A) =
X
BA
m(B) (2.12)
Given several belief functions over the same frame of discernment but based on
distinct bodies of evidence, Dempster's rule of combination enables us to compute
their orthogonal sum, a new belief function based on the combined evidence. Suppose
Bel1 and Bel2 are belief functions over the same frame , with basic probability
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assignments m1 and m2. Then the function m : 2
 ! [0; 1] dened by m() = 0 and
m(A) =
X
Ai
T
Bj=A
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
1 
X
Ai
T
Bj=
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
(2.13)
for all non-empty A   is a basic probability assignment.
2.3 Markov Models
Markov models are used to treat sequential data by assuming it has Markov prop-
erty. Markov property states that the conditional probability distribution of future
states of the process depends only the most recent states, not on the sequence of
events that preceded them. Assume x1; :::; xN are N consecutive states of a pro-
cess, Pr(x1; :::; xN) represents the joint probability for a sequence of observations.
According to the product rule, we have
Pr(x1; :::; xN) =
NY
n=1
Pr(xnjx1; :::; xn 1) (2.14)
If we assume the process has rst-order Markov property, which means only the
most recent state contributes to the future state. We can rewrite the joint probability
for a sequence of observations to
Pr(x1; :::; xN) = Pr(x1)
NY
n=2
Pr(xnjxn 1) (2.15)
Transition matrix is a matrix used to describe the transitions of a Markov chain.
Each of its entries is a nonnegative real number representing a probability. Taking
rst-order Markov model as an example, Pr(ijj) = pi;j is the probability of state
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moving from j to i. The transition matrix looks like
P =
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
p1;1 p1;2    p1;j   
p2;1 p2;2    p2;j   
...
...
. . .
...   
pi;1 pi;2    pi;j   
...
...
...
...
. . .
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
(2.16)
for which jpi;j = 1.
2.4 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines are decision machines that became popular for solv-
ing problems in classication, regression, and detection. Support vector machine
approaches the problem of classication through the concept of margin, which is
dened as the smallest distance between the decision boundary and any of the sam-
ples. In support vector machines, the decision boundary, that is determined by model
parameters, is chosen to be the one for which the margin is maximized. Therefore,
determination of the model parameters is transformed to a convex optimization prob-
lem.
There are many support vector machine variants.Here we only discuss C-support
vector classication. Given l training vectors fxi; yig; i = 1; :::; l in two classes, where
each vector is represented as xi, and a class label yi with one of two values f-1j1g.
The SVM requires the solution of the following optimization problem Boser et al.
(1992); Cortes and Vapnik (1995); Chang and Lin (2011):
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min
w;b;
1
2
wTw + C
lX
i=1
i
Subject to yi(w
T(xi) + b)  1  i;
i  0 (2.17)
where feature vectors xi are mapped to higher dimensional space by a function  and
C > 0 is the penalty parameter of the error term. In SVM, K(xi;xj) = (xi)
T(xi),
called the kernel function, determines how the feature vector maps data to higher
dimensional space.
We list some popular kernel functions here. The rst is radial basis function
(RBF). A RBF kernel takes the form of
K(xi;xj) = exp(  k xi   xj k2);  > 0 (2.18)
Therefore, there are two parameters to tune: the penalty parameter C and .
Linear function. A linear function takes the form of
K(xi;xj) = x
T
i xj (2.19)
Therefore, the only parameter for tuning is C.
Sigmoid function. A sigmoid function takes the form of
K(xi;xj) = tanh(x
T
i xj + r);  > 0 (2.20)
Therefore, there are three parameters to tune: the penalty parameter C,  and r.
Polynomial function. A polynomial function takes the form of
K(xi;xj) = (x
T
i xj + r)
d;  > 0 (2.21)
Therefore, there are four parameters to tune: the penalty parameter C, , r, and d.
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Chapter 3
DETECTING AND ATTRIBUTING SHELLCODE
3.1 Introduction
Malicious code injection is still an unsolved problem that threatens critical net-
centric production systems. According to the recent report from SANS, fteen out of
twenty-ve most widespread and dangerous software errors could lead to remote code
injection and execution attacks Mitre (2011). Even though research eorts have been
invested on such a devastating issue, production systems, where known vulnerabilities
are not mitigated and potential vulnerabilities are introduced with newly-deployed
modules, remain highly vulnerable to these threats.
The targets of code injection attacks could be both script and native language
interpreters which depends on the type of the inserting code. HTML injection, cross-
site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, and PHP inclusion fall into the rst category
where the corresponding language interpreter, such as browser, JavaScript engine,
database management system and etc., is a software application. Therefore, code
injection in this catalog is also called script injection, which could result in malicious
manipulation of privileges and resources accessible within the environment, such as
session record and account information Vogt et al. (2007).
Compared with script injection, binary code injection is the most destructive
injection attack. A successfully exploited system gives the direct control of its CPU,
the binary code interpreter, to the adversaries that have all the privileges of the
subverted processes One (1996). If the underlying operating system or privileged
processes are broken down, adversaries could take full control of the entire system
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which renders all the active services unreliable and distrust. The injected malicious
binary code is also known as shellcode since they used to return a command shell to
the attackers.
Misuse of informational data as executable code is the root cause of code injection
attacks. Sanitization techniques that remove and escape reserved characters in the
corresponding programming language are proven to be eective and ecient in script-
ing languages Weinberger et al. (2011). However, these techniques are less successful
in defending against binary code injection attacks due to the fact that there is no spe-
cial meaningful token in binary to dierentiate code from data. For instance, in IA-32
instruction set, the only invalid byte to start an instruction is 0xF1 and all other 255
possible values could be interpreted as the starting byte of a valid encoding Chinchani
and Van Den Berg (2006).
One research body in defeating malicious code injection is concerned about the
prevention of its execution in an architectural way rather than the detection of its
existence. Instruction set randomization Barrantes et al. (2003), data execution pre-
vention, and address space layout randomization, and structural exceptional handler
overwrite protection all fall into this category by disrupting the successful running of
shellcode. Data execution prevention (DEP) is intended to prevent a process from
executing code from non-executable memory regions, such as process stack and sys-
tem heap Microsoft (2006). Address space layout randomization (ASLR) randomly
arranges the locations of data sections such as position of libraries, stack and heap
for each process and makes it dicult for injected code to execute itself Shacham
et al. (2004). Even if these prevention solutions are eective, widely supported by
modern hardware, and popularly adopted in state-of-the-art operating systems, they
could only be triggered after the attack event occurred. There is no way for these
techniques to predict and detect exploit attempts before it reaches the real attack
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surface. The reason behind this shortcoming is that these solutions are not able to
address the aforementioned root cause of code injection attacks. Although they could
serve as the last line of code injection defense, it is imperative to have other defense
techniques which are able to gather tactical intelligence for future shellcode detection
and response.
Although signature-based methods remain the most eective ways to defeat known
malware, they could be eective only when malicious samples have been acquired and
signatures have been obtained. It is less useful against new samples and may be vul-
nerable to code encoding techniques, such as polymorphism and metamorphism. Sev-
eral static analysis solutions Toth and Kruegel (2002a); Christodorescu et al. (2005);
Chinchani and Van Den Berg (2006); Wang et al. (2006b) construct some distinguish-
able criteria, such as the length of the instruction sequence, to identify previously
unknown malicious code. Since the heuristics in these methods are dependent on the
existing knowledge of shellcode, they fail to accommodate the new trends of shell-
code evolution. There also exist some discussions about utilizing both sequential and
distributional byte patterns to model malicious code Wang et al. (2006a); Kolter and
Maloof (2006). However, statistically modeling the byte patterns is vulnerable to
deliberate byte cramming Detristan (2003) and blending attacks Fogla et al. (2006).
Moreover, quantitative analysis of the byte strength of dierent shellcode engines pre-
sented in Song et al. (2007) concludes that modeling the byte patterns in shellcode is
infeasible.
Besides all the investments on binary code detection, it is important to discover
binary code attribution that automatically attributes binary code to its originating
tools. Encoded shellcode attribution that tells whether the newly-captured shellcode
sample is generated by a known shellcode engine provides security analysts and prac-
titioners with more intelligence about the attack event and the adversaries behind the
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scene than simplistic detection approaches. However, existing work on this topic Kong
et al. (2011) that utilize byte characteristics still face the same challenges as binary
code detection with byte anomaly analysis does.
Consequently, systematic techniques that can confront the root cause of code in-
jection, detect unseen malicious attacks and attribute newly-detected malicious code
samples are imperative to cope with emerging rogue code threats and gather tactical
intelligence for a more comprehensive knowledge base on cyberattacks. These solu-
tions should be resilient to known attacks, such as byte cramming and blending, that
undermine existing techniques. To achieve these goals, in this chapter, we propose a
novel solution based on static analysis and supervised machine learning techniques.
Instead of using byte patterns, we propose instruction sequence abstraction to extract
coarse-grained but distinguishable features from disassembled instruction sequence.
We design a Markov-chain-based model and apply support vector machines for
unknown shellcode detection and classication. The rest of this chapter is organized
as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the background. Section 3.3 discusses the observed
motivating instruction patterns. Section 3.4 presents the overview of our approach
to extract and use instruction patterns. Section 3.5 illustrates instruction sequence
abstraction to automatically extract instruction patterns. In Section 3.6, we propose
two learning models for shellcode detection and attribution. Section 3.7 discusses the
implementation details and automated identied instruction patterns. We show our
experimental results in Section 3.8 and discuss some research issues in Section 3.9.
Section 3.10 overviews the related work and Section 3.11 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Background
In this section, we address the theoretical limit in dierentiating code from data
in IA-32 architecture. We then briey describe the instruction encoding method of
IA-32. We discuss why byte pattern analysis on this architecture is dicult.
3.2.1 Dierentiating Code from Data
Accurate and robust methodology for dierentiating code from data in a static
way has a profound value for both programming language and computer security
research. Disassembler and decompiler could use such technique to determine the
boundary between code and data in le and memory for better understanding of
programs without source code. Intrusion detection system could also make use of it
to alert unseen cyberattack. For some computer architectures, this problem is triv-
ial due to their instruction representations and memory alignments. However, some
CISC architectures, such as IA-32, adopt variable-length instruction sets and permit
interleaving of code and data. That is, instructions and data are stored together in
the memory and have indistinguishable representations. The problem is even harder
to solve when we consider self-modifying code and indirect jump (jmp eax){a control
transfer approach whose destination can only be calculated at execution time{in bi-
nary. Therefore, statically separating code from data in such architectures may lead
to the halting problem that is undecidable in general Cifuentes and Fraboulet (1997);
Wartell et al. (2011); Horspool and Marovac (1980); Landi (1992).
A major reason for the failure of byte pattern analysis on binary code is that
even a slight change on assembly syntax would cause tremendous changes in byte
syntax. Consequently, pattern detection and recognition on byte level is not resilient
to assembly-level syntax change that is prevalent in shellcode encoding. For example,
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dierent shellcode instances from the same metamorphic engine could use dierent
general registers to perform semantically equivalent operations. While one could use
two instructions pop edx; mov ebx, [edx] (byte sequence: 5A8B1A) to move a value
from memory to register for computing, another may use pop eax; mov esi, [eax]
(byte sequence: 588B30). Even though the instruction sequences look similar, the
byte sequences only share one single byte (8B). With more sophisticated encoding
technique, this shared byte could be further avoided.
3.2.2 IA-32 Instruction Format
We briey discuss the instruction encoding scheme in IA-32 architecture that
serves as the cornerstone of our analysis. IA-32 instructions follow the encoding ap-
proach shown in Figure 3.1. Each instruction consists of up to 4 prex bytes, up to
3 opcode bytes, and up to 10 operand bytes. The prex bytes determine modiers
of this instruction, such as lock (F0h) and repeat (F2h). The opcode bytes dene
the operation of this instruction, such as mov or add. The operands part consists
of optional ModR/M (Address-Form specier), SIB (Scale-Index-Base), displacement
and immediate that are used to specify the operand combinations. ModR/M byte
contains elds of information to specify the address form of following operands: If re-
quired, a SIB byte follows to detail the scale, index, and base elds of base-plus-index
and scale-plus-index addressing form. A displacement or an immediate follows if re-
quired. For instance, instruction imul [ebp+esi+20], 616D2061 references a signed
integer multiplication operation. The addressing mode species a base-plus-index
form. A displacement 20 and immediate 616D2061 appear in this instruction as well.
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Instruction 
Prefixes
Opcode ModR/M SIB Displacement Immediate
Operand
0 - 4 bytes 1 - 3 bytes 0 - 1 byte 0 - 1 byte 0 - 4 bytes 0 - 4 bytes
Figure 3.1: IA-32 Architecture Instruction Format
3.3 Motivating Examples of Instruction Patterns
We describe several motivating patterns observed in both benign and malicious
binary samples as shown in 3.2. Dierent from previous solutions that concentrate
on byte patterns, we pay more attention on the instruction patterns shown in dis-
assembly. We address instruction patterns of both sequences and distributions. For
patterns in the sequence, we focus on the ones that are found in binary code but less
likely to be found in text string, video les, or any other forms of data. For patterns
of distributions, we concentrate on the ones that are found across dierent shellcode
instances generated by the same encoder. Note that these patterns only serve as the
motivation of our approach that is not dependent on any specic pattern mentioned
in this section, but has the ability to extract human-observable and unobservable
patterns in binary disassembly.
A push-call sequential pattern consists of several push instructions followed by a
call instruction. In IA-32 architecture, the parameters to a function call are stored
temporarily on stack usually by a push operation. Depending on the prototype of the
function, it is obvious to observe several push instructions before a call instruction.
Therefore, in a valid sequence of instructions, the subsequent instruction of push is
more likely to be another push or call. SigFree Wang et al. (2006b) used the number
of push-call in the instruction sequence as threshold to determine whether a package
has code.
A function-prologue sequential pattern normally exists in bp-based function, a
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push [ebp+20h]
push eax
push ecx
call edx
(a) push-call pattern
xor [eax], edx
ror dword ptr [eax], 0BEh
xor [eax], edx
rol dword ptr [eax], 92h
sub dword ptr [eax], 0E2B3D1A9h
(b) group-of-arithmetic pattern
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
add esp, 0FFFFFFECh
(c) function prologue pattern
cmp edi, ebx
ja 40CA2Ah
test al, al
jnz 40E722h
(d) test-jmp pat-
tern
push eax
push ecx
call 40E712h
pop ecx
pop ecx
mov [ebp+20h], eax
(e) function epilogue pat-
tern
call 7h
pop esi
(f) getPC
pattern
Figure 3.2: Motivating Examples of Instruction Patterns
procedure that uses ebp as the frame pointer to mark the bottom of stack for the
called function and esp as the stack pointer to track the top of stack. Therefore, as
the prologue of bp-based function, the frame pointer of the caller function is stored on
stack by push ebp and then updated to the current frame pointer by mov ebp, esp.
25
Frequently, an add esp, immediate is followed to reserve bytes for local variables in
this pattern.
A function epilogue pattern exists in _cdecl calling conventions. In _cdecl calling
conventions, it is the caller's responsibility to clean the stack and maintain stack
balance. Therefore, in this sample we observe that there are equal bytes of parameters
pushed on stack before calling and popped from stack after calling. Also in IA-32,
the return value of a function is normally stored in EAX, which is why EAX is access
after function call.
A group-of-arithmetic-shift distributional pattern groups several bitwise and arith-
metic instructions, such as xor (exclusive or) and sub (subtraction), to perform some
sophisticated calculations. Instances of this pattern are mostly found in decryption
routines that contain the inordinate number of such instructions to decode protected
resources Caballero et al. (2009).
In a test-jmp pattern, there is a comparison or test instruction rst, such as cmp,
test which sets the corresponding bits of the EFLAGS register. Then, a conditional
jump instruction, such as ja (jump if above), jnz (jump if not zero), is followed which
transfers the control to dierent destinations based on the bit pattern set in EFLAGS.
A getPC pattern is widely adopted in shellcode Polychronakis et al. (2007). Since
there is no way to predict the absolution address a shellcode would be located, shell-
code always need methods to get its location in runtime. However, IA-32 does not
provide any build-in method to retrieve the value of EIP, adversaries devise some
techniques to get this value in runtime. In this example, call 7h pushes the abso-
lute address of pop esi on stack, then pop esi stores this value to esi and restores
stack balance at the same time.
A alphabet pattern is mostly found in shellcode generated by English shellcode Ma-
son et al. (2009) and alpha mixed encoder engines, whose outputs only consist of dis-
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the Approach of Using Instruction Patterns to Detect and
Attribute Shellcode
playable ASCII values, such as English letters, blank space and punctuation marks.
Because of the narrow choices these engines have, generated shellcode have signi-
cantly more unconditional jumps, stack and arithmetic operations than samples gen-
erated by other encoders.
However, there are several obstacles in using these instruction observations di-
rectly in statistical models. For example, the trained model may overt instruction
patterns shown in the training set. Adversaries and encoding engines could eas-
ily choose other semantically-equivalent instructions to replace existing ones which
render the modeling of any specic instruction ineective. In order to solve these
challenges, we propose instruction sequence abstraction, a coarse-grained feature ex-
traction method, to tackle the problem of overtting by mapping high-dimensional
byte sequence representations to low-dimensional instances.
3.4 Overview of Extracting and Using Instruction Patterns
Our approach is based on static analysis and supervised machine learning as shown
in Figure 3.3. Our solution consists of three major components: i) input processor,
that is presented in Section 3.5, preprocesses binary code or suspicious data with cus-
tomized linear disassembly that outputs the instruction sequence; ii) feature extrac-
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tor, that is presented in Section 3.5, reveals distinguishable features from the instruc-
tion sequence and outputs its two corresponding data representations named opcode
mnemonic sequence and binary nite-dimensional representation; and iii) trainer,
that is presented in Section 3.6, utilizes Markov-chain-based model and support vec-
tor machines to train detection and classication models based on training set and
classiers that use trained models to detect and classify suspicious data.
3.5 Automatic Extraction of Instruction Patterns
In this section, we propose customized linear sweep disassembly algorithm. To
remove any confusion between byte and instruction characteristics that hinder pre-
vious research eorts, we then present our feature selection and instruction sequence
abstraction to extract representative characteristics from the instruction sequence.
3.5.1 Customized Linear Sweep Disassembly
The rst step of our approach is to disassemble binary, a method that extracts se-
mantics out of binary code and outputs machine-understandable disassembly. There
exist two basic disassembly algorithms: i) linear sweep disassembly and ii) recursive
descent disassembly. Linear sweep disassembly decodes new instruction at the loca-
tion where the previous one ends. If the current byte could not be decoded as a valid
starting byte of the instruction, linear sweep disassembly stops. The disadvantage
of linear sweep disassembly is that it may mistakenly disassemble data as code if
the starting location is wrong. Recursive descent disassembly determines whether a
location should be decoded with the references by other instructions. In other words,
recursive descent disassembly follows the control ow of the instruction sequence. Re-
cursive descent disassembly stops when it could not determine the location of the next
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instruction, such as when an indirect jump is encountered. The major disadvantage
of recursive descent disassembly is that it cannot cover the entire code section.
In our solution, we need the most comprehensive coverage of disassembly. There-
fore, we modify linear sweep disassembly and propose a customized linear sweep
disassembly CLSD : (b1; :::; bn)! (i1; :::; im) as shown in Algorithm 1. Unlike linear
sweep disassembly, CLSD does not stop when it reaches an undecodable address. In-
stead, it moves to the next address and perform linear sweep until it reaches the end
of le. The complexity of this algorithm is O(n). Although CLSD may mistakenly
decode some data section, such as encrypted payload in polymorphic shellcode, and
incorrectly disassemble some instructions with a wrong starting location, this algo-
rithm would disassemble the major portion of code over the data stream with the
help of the self-repairing ability of IA-32 instruction set Linn and Debray (2003).
3.5.2 Feature Selection
In this section, we present our coarse-grained feature extraction method to re-
veal representative features from the instruction sequence (i1; :::; im) generated from
CLSD. We try to introduce as many features as possible to reduce the possibility
that the learned model is over-tting the training dataset. We inspect both opcode
and operand of an instruction as the sources for features. The opcode part of an in-
struction reveals the functionality of the disassembly statement, while operand part
tells which object the eect is enforced on. We design opcode features based on two
aspects: functionality and origin. Functionality captures the basic behavior and ef-
fect of a given opcode, and origin describes the source of instruction set that a given
opcode was rst introduced. Although the operand part of an instruction includes
several elds such as addressing form and immediate, for simplicity, we only analyze
the usage of eight general purpose registers in an instruction as representative char-
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Algorithm 1: CLSD
Input: Byte sequence b = (b1; :::; bn) with n bytes
Output: Instruction sequence i = (i1; :::; im)
1 Initially i is empty;
2 Set p = 1;
3 while p is not greater than n do
4 if bp is a valid instruction starting byte then then
5 Do linear sweep disassembly on bp;
6 When its stops, append its output (i1; :::; ik) to i;
7 Set p;
8 else
9 Set p = p+ 1;
10 end
11 end
12 return the instruction sequence i
acteristics for operand features. We also use the length of instruction as a feature
that represents the instruction in general.
Opcode functionality: We categorize each opcode into one of the following ten
groups in terms of its functionality:
1. Arithmetic. Opcodes that provide arithmetic operations, such as addition, mul-
tiplication, and some miscellaneous conversion instructions. Examples include
add, adc, sub, sbb, mul, and imul.
2. Shift, rotate and logical. Opcodes that provide shift, rotate and logical opera-
tions, such as bitwise and left shift with the carry-over. Examples include and,
or, ror, and xor.
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3. Unconditional data transfer. Operations that move data among memory loca-
tions and registers without querying ag register. Examples include mov, in,
and out;
4. Conditional data transfer. Operations that move data among memory locations
and registers based on the status indicated in a ag register. Examples include
seta and setnl;
5. Processor control. Opcodes that manipulate the status of processor by modify-
ing ag, loading and saving system registers, and synchronizing external devices.
Examples include arpl, hlt, and lgdt;
6. Stack operation. Opcodes that manipulate a program stack. Examples include
push, pop, enter, and leave;
7. Unconditional program transfer. Opcodes that change the program counter
register without querying ag register. Examples include call, int, jmp, and
ret;
8. Conditional program transfer. Opcodes that make transfer decisions based on
specic bit combinations in ag register. Examples include ja, jne, and loopw;
9. Test and compare. Opcodes that compare the values of operands and store the
result in some predened register. Examples include test, cmp, and scas;
10. Other operation. Opcodes that are not included in the aforementioned cate-
gories.
Opcode origin: We also categorize each opcode into one of the following six in-
struction sets:
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1. 8086 set, a group of instructions that were introduced with 8086 family CPUs In-
tel (1979);
2. 80286, 80386, and 80486 sets. We combine these three instruction sets together
because there do not exist many instances in each of these instruction sets;
3. Pentium and Pentium II sets ;
4. 80387 and MMX, instruction sets that control and manipulate oating point
coprocessors and MMX processors;
5. Pentium III and Pentium IV ; and
6. Other sets.
General register usage: For each instruction i in the instruction sequence, we
analyze whether any of the eight general registers or any part of them is explicitly
used in this instruction. These eight general registers are: 1) eax; 2) ebx; 3) ecx;
4) edx; 5) esi; 6) edi; 7) ebp; and 8) esp. For instance, in an instruction pop eax,
the only explicitly mentioned general register is eax. We do not count the usage of
esp because it is not explicitly mentioned in the operand part. For an instruction
mov esi, [eax], both esi and eax appear in this statement. For an instruction
add al, ch, we count one occurrence for both eax and ecx in this statement for the
reason that al is part of eax and ch is part of ecx.
Length of instruction: For each instruction i in the instruction sequence, we cal-
culate its length. This feature is necessary because even instructions with the same
opcode may vary in length. We split instructions into eight categories: Instructions
are categorized into the rst seven categories by using the length as an identier if
their lengths are not greater than seven bytes and instructions with longer than seven
bytes fall into the eighth category. For example, mov ebp, esp (8BEC) is 2-byte long
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and classied in category `two', and mov dword ptr [eax+ebp+14h], 0CCCCCCCCh
(C7442814CCCCCCCC) is 8-byte long and falls into category `eight'.
3.5.3 Instruction Sequence Abstraction
We now present instruction sequence abstraction which includes two represen-
tation methods to model instruction sequence: opcode mnemonic sequence (OMS)
and binary nite-dimensional representation (BFR). Since both methods map n-byte
data sequence into much lower dimensional space as coarse-grained feature extraction
approaches, they are abstractions of the original byte and the instruction sequence.
While OMS maps instances in 256n byte sequence space to their counterparts in am
space (a is the number of mnemonics in IA-32 instruction set and m is the length
of the instruction sequence), BFR represents instances in Z32 space. For the mathe-
matical notations, we use lower case bold roman letters such as f to denote vectors,
subscript such as fi to denote the i-th component of f , superscript such as f
(i) to
denote the i-th sample in dataset, and f
(i)
j to denote the i-th sample's j-th compo-
nent. We assume all vectors to be column vectors and a superscript T to denote the
transposition of a matrix or vector.
Denition 3.1. Opcode Mnemonic Sequence (OMS). For a given instruction se-
quence i = (i1; :::; im), its opcode mnemonic sequence is represented as o
T = (o1; :::; om),
where ok 2 faaa, aad, ...g, which is the valid opcode mnemonic set of IA-32 archi-
tecture.
Denition 3.2. Binary Finite-dimensional Representation (BFR). For a given in-
struction sequence i = (i1; :::; im), its binary nite-dimensional representation is a
32-dimensional vector fT = (f1; :::; f32), where fi, i 2 f1; :::; 10g, is the number of
instructions in the i-th opcode functionality category, fi, i 2 f11; :::; 16g, is the num-
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8BEC
8B7608
85F6
743B
8B7E0C
09FF
7434
31D2
(a) Byte sequence
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+08]
test esi, esi
je 401045
mov edi, dword ptr [ebp+0c]
or edi, edi
je 401045
xor edx, edx
(b) Instruction sequence
oT = (push;mov;mov; test; je;mov; or; je; xor)
(c) OMS
fT = (0; 2; 3; 0; 0; 1; 0; 2; 1; 0; 9; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0;
0; 0; 0; 2; 3; 3; 4; 1; 1; 5; 2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0)
(d) BFR
Figure 3.4: Instruction Sequence Abstraction Example
ber of instructions from the corresponding opcode origins, fi, i 2 f17; :::; 24g, is the
occurrence of corresponding general register, and fi, i 2 f25; :::; 32g, is the number
of instructions with the corresponding length. Figure 3.4(b) shows the CLSD output
of the byte sequence shown in Figure 3.4(a), and Figures 3.4(c) and 3.4(d) show the
OMS and BFR representations of the example.
3.6 Using Instruction Patterns to Detect and Attribute Shellcode
In this section, we articulate our approach to detect and attribute suspicious
byte sequences. We propose two classiers for shellcode detection and attribution,
respectively.
34
3.6.1 Detecting Shellcode
Based on the observation that certain instruction sequences are more likely to exist
in some binary code rather than others, we propose to use the existence possibility of
opcode mnemonic sequence to identify whether the suspicious byte stream contains
shellcode. We choose rst-order Markov chain, which is a discrete random process,
to model the opcode mnemonic sequence by assigning each opcode mnemonic as a
Markov state and computing the transition matrix of this Markov chain.
Like other supervised machine learning techniques, our method has training and
evaluation phases. Given OMSs of l shellcode training samples fo(i)g; i = f1; :::; lg,
a transition matrix P 2 Raa can be trained, with the (i; j)-th element of P implies
pij = Pr(ok+1 = jjok = i) indicating the probability of opcode state transition from
ok to ok+1. In the evaluation phase, we calculate shellcode probability score (S-score)
of suspicious data stream, which is dened in Denition 3 and determine whether it
contains shellcode based on a threshold value t, which is also learned from the training
set.
Denition 3.3. Shellcode Probability Score ( S-score). Given the transition matrix
P trained from shellcode dataset and a suspicious OMS oT = (o1; :::; om), the S-score
of this OMS is dened as follows:
S-score(o) = k
vuut max
i=1;:::;m k
i+kY
j=i
Pr(oj+1joj) (3.1)
where k is the length of calculation window. To calculate the S-score of o, a value
for each of m   k opcode mnemonic subsequences with k-length is computed as the
multiplications of the transition probabilities. Then, the maximum value among all
m   k opcode mnemonic subsequences is chosen whose k-th root is dened as the
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Table 3.1: Shellcode Dataset Comparison
PPPPPPPPPPPPPP
Criteria
Projects
styx SigFree Song STILL SA3 Our Work
# of shellcode engines 2 2 6 10 6 14
# of shellcode samples 2 200 60,000 12,000 N/A 13,176
S-score of o. If S-score(o) > t, we say the byte sequence where o is generated from
is a shellcode and vice versa.
Our shellcode detection approach is length-independent and location-independent
on the byte sequence for two reasons: i) CLSD outputs the most comprehensive
coverage of code, hence it has the ability to disassemble most shellcode bytes in a
package, no matter where it is started; and ii) only the subsequent k instructions
are used to calculate the S-score, hence the length of the byte sequence is not vital.
Therefore, our approach is able to monitor on-line data stream, where the length and
location of interesting points are unknown.
3.6.2 Attributing Encoded Shellcode
We propose to use support vector machines (SVM) to attribute encoded shell-
code's BFR to its originating encoding engine. SVM maps feature vectors into a
higher dimensional space and computes a hyperplane to separate instances from dif-
ferent groups by maximizing the margin between them. Therefore, SVM is the largest
margin classier. The problem of attributing shellcode to its originating engine is a
multi-class classication problem. However, the basic SVM only supports binary clas-
sication problems. Therefore, we use algorithms that supports a one-vs-all approach
to extend SVM for classifying multi-class problems. Here, we only discuss how to use
SVM for the binary classication problem that checks whether a shellcode sample is
from a specic engine e.
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Given l shellcode training samples ff (i); y(i)g; i = 1; :::; l, where each sample is
denoted by its BFR that has 32 features, represented as f (i), and a class label yi with
one of two values f-1j1g. -1 means it is not generated by an engine e, while 1 con-
rms a specic engine. The SVM requires the solution of the following optimization
problem Boser et al. (1992); Cortes and Vapnik (1995); Chang and Lin (2011):
min
w;b;
1
2
wTw + C
lX
i=1
i
Subject to yi(w
T(f (i)) + b)  1  i;
i  0 (3.2)
where feature vectors f (i) are mapped to higher dimensional space by a func-
tion  and C is the penalty parameter of the error term. In SVM, K(f (i); f (j)) =
(f (i))T(f (i)), called the kernel function, determines how the feature vector maps
data to higher dimensional space. It can be noted that the kernel function maps fea-
ture vectors into higher dimensional space only to search for a separate hyperplane
so it does not rebuild more complicated features. Hence, it does not conict with our
approach to abstract features from the instruction sequence.
3.7 Implementation
We rst discuss the data collection and implementation details of our proof-of-
concept system. Then, we present the automatically identied sequential instruction
patterns in shellcode.
3.7.1 Data Collection and Implementation
We utilized Metasploit Moore (2009){a penetration framework that hosts exploits
and tools from a variety of sources{to collect shellcode samples. We collected 140
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Figure 3.5: Encoded Shellcode Samples Collection
unencoded shellcode samples, all of which are executable on IA-32 architecture, across
dierent operating system platforms including Windows (85), Unix (11), Linux (21),
FreeBSD (10), OSX (12), and Solaris (1). These samples are used to train our Markov-
chain-based model and test the eectiveness of our approach. For the evaluation of
encoded shellcode attribution, we chose 21 dierent payloads that are targeted at
Windows, then used 14 dierent engines to encode these payloads (see Table 3.3
for the full list of engines). We tried to generate 50 unique shellcode instances for
each pair of payload and encoder. Even though some payloads are not compatible
with specic encoders, we successfully collected 13,176 encoded shellcode samples
for attribution analysis. Compared with existing research bodies in both shellcode
detection and attribution Chinchani and Van Den Berg (2006); Wang et al. (2006b);
Song et al. (2007); Wang et al. (2008); Kong et al. (2011), our shellcode dataset
covers a more comprehensive set of samples in term of underlying platform, payload
functionality, and encoder class.
We implemented the customized linear sweep disassembly algorithm and feature
extractor as an IDA Pro Rescue (2006) plug-in that outputs the OMS and BFR in
separate les for each byte sequence input. We also developed the shellcode detection
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module with Matlab and shellcode attribution module with LIBSVM Chang and Lin
(2011).
3.7.2 Instruction Patterns Identication
In the learning phase, we trained our Markov model with aforementioned shellcode
samples to generate the transition matrix of opcode. The top 50 highest opcode
transition probabilities are shown in Table 3.2. Some transition patterns, such as
Pr(xor|aaa)= 1:00, Pr(push|push)= 0:61, Pr(jz|test)= 0:57, and Pr(jnz|cmp)=
0:56, can be human-observable as we mentioned in Section 2.3 but other patterns
cannot be easily identied. The results show that our approach is able to extract
underlying and implicit machine code characteristics.
3.8 Evaluation
We show shellcode detection and attribution results followed by an analysis ap-
proach for measuring the strength of 14 popular shellcode encoding engines. We
conclude our evaluation with the performance of our system.
3.8.1 Evaluation of Detecting Shellcode
In the detection phase, S-score uses a calculation window k to compute the shell-
code probability of the given input. A threshold value t is also used to determine
if a given byte sequence is executable or not. To nd out the appropriate length
of calculation window and threshold value, we tested 140 shellcode samples, 1,280
random data samples, 250 gif les, 250 png les, and 660 benign code pieces (we split
ntoskrnl.exe which is the kernel image of Windows NT into 660 pieces). For a given
sample, its S-score decreases as the calculation window increases, because Pr(oj+1joj)
is always less than or equal to 1. We calculated the S-score of all of the collected
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Table 3.2: Top 50 Opcode Transition Patterns
Top 1 - 17 Top 18 - 34 Top 35 - 50
Pr(xor|aaa) 1.00 Pr(adc|fst) 1.00 Pr(push|jp) 0.71
Pr(push|aam) 1.00 Pr(cmps|fistp) 1.00 Pr(cld|in) 0.67
Pr(sal|cwde) 1.00 Pr(cmp|fadd) 1.00 Pr(into|iret) 0.67
Pr(std|clc) 1.00 Pr(in|fsubr) 1.00 Pr(outs|jbe) 0.67
Pr(sbb|cmps) 1.00 Pr(in|fdivp) 1.00 Pr(cdq|sal) 0.67
Pr(jmp|hlt) 1.00 Pr(fstenv|fldpi)1.00 Pr(jmp|sti) 0.67
Pr(std|idiv) 1.00 Pr(xor|fstenv) 1.00 Pr(xchg|stos) 0.67
Pr(dec|jecxz) 1.00 Pr(add|ror) 0.92 Pr(push|xchg) 0.66
Pr(add|jg) 1.00 Pr(sub|jl) 0.89 Pr(pop|popa) 0.64
Pr(outs|jge) 1.00 Pr(xor|movzx) 0.87 Pr(push|shl) 0.62
Pr(outs|jle) 1.00 Pr(push|lea) 0.86 Pr(push|push) 0.61
Pr(cli|loope) 1.00 Pr(push|jns) 0.86 Pr(in|retf) 0.61
Pr(push|mul) 1.00 Pr(call|out) 0.80 Pr(jnz|scas) 0.60
Pr(loope|neg) 1.00 Pr(mov|pusha) 0.78 Pr(jz|test) 0.57
Pr(push|or) 1.00 Pr(add|nop) 0.78 Pr(cld|retn) 0.57
Pr(cli|sgdt) 1.00 Pr(push|jno) 0.75 Pr(jnz|cmp) 0.56
Pr(cmc|fcomip) 1.00 Pr(push|loop) 0.72
samples with the length of calculation windows from 8 to 40 to nd the appropriate
value.
Figure 3.6 presents the S-score distribution of each sample category with three
dierent values of the calculation window length. Figure 3.6(a) shows that if the
length of calculation window k is set to 8, all shellcodes' S-score is greater than 0.1,
and a signicant portion of shellcode have S-score greater than 0.3. However, only
a small number of random data samples have S-score greater than 0 as shown in
Figure 3.6(d). Figures 3.6(g),(j) show the S-score distribution of gif and png les,
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Figure 3.6: The S-score Distribution with Dierent k
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where only a small portion of samples have S-score greater than 0.1. By comparing
Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(m), it is clear that benign code samples have much lower
S-score than shellcode. Figure 3.6(b) shows that if the length of calculation window k
is set to 20, the S-score of every shellcode reduces. But, most shellcode samples still
have S-score greater than 0.1. However, as shown in Figure 3.6(c), if the length of
calculation window is set to 28, 3 shellcode samples have S-score with `null'. On the
other hand, the S-score of all other samples are reduced close to 0 if k is greater than
20, as shown in Figure 3.6. The results suggest that the combination of calculation
window length k = 28 and threshold t = 0:1 be sucient to identify shellcode with
97.9% accuracy and 0.82% false positive rate in our dataset.
3.8.2 Evaluation of Attributing Encoded Shellcode
We evaluate our shellcode representation and attribution analysis technique from
several dierent aspects including visualization, correlation analysis of selected fea-
tures, accuracy of attributing, and quantication of encoder strength.
Data Visualization
The visualization of shellcode samples could tell us the dierences of shellcode gen-
erated from various engines in an intuitive way. We propose to visualize shellcode
sample in BFR form with a radar chart graph, in which a circle is equally divided
by 32 invisible lines. Each of these 32 lines represents an axis for each corresponding
feature in BFR form, where the center of circle represents 0 and the periphery rep-
resents 1. Since, in the BFR form, a shellcode sample is represented as f 2 Z32, we
used data scaling on all the samples in our dataset to transform each feature into the
range of [0; 1]. The value of each feature is marked by a dot on its corresponding line.
42
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1123
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
(a) alpha mixed
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1123
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
(b) alpha upper
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1123
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
(c) avoid utf8 tolower
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Figure 3.7: Shellcode Radar Charts
Then, the dots from each pair of consequent features are connected together and the
contained area is marked black.
Figure 3.7 shows six radar charts of instances from six dierent shellcode engines.
As we can notice, the shellcode generated by alpha mixed has strong similarity with
the shellcode generated by alpha upper. They both generate shellcode with longer
instructions (features 25 to 32). Shellcode generated by context time or fnstenv mov
has more unconditional data transfer instructions than others (feature 3). fnstenv mov
tends to use registers esi, edi and ebp more often (features 21, 22, and 23), while
alpha mixed prefers eax, ecx, and edx (feature 17, 19, and 20). Because the data
scaling is performed over the whole dataset, we could also notice that the size of
black area diers signicantly. The major reason behind this phenomenon is that
some engines tend to generate much longer data sequence even if the input payload is
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the same. Obviously, the shellcode generated by call dword xor or avoid utf8 tolower
is smaller than its counterpart generated by alpha mixed in size.
Eectiveness of Feature Selection
In order to prove our feature selection approach in BFR is eective and the extracted
features are not redundant, we utilize Pearson product-moment correlation coecient
to measure the linear relationships between each pair of features in BFR form. Given
two features fi and fj in BFR, the correlation coecient fi;fj is a measure of the
linear dependency between them that is dened as fi;fj =
E[(fi fi )(fj fj )]
fifj
, where fi
is the mean and fi is the standard deviation of this feature value over our dataset.
The maximum value for correlation coecient, which is 1, represents a perfect
positive correlation between two variables, and the minimum value -1 indicates a
perfect negative correlation. If jfi;fj j is close to 1, it means one of the selected features
could be linearly represented by another one, hence it clearly indicates redundancy.
We calculated the correlation coecient for each pair of features over our dataset, and
computed the average of their absolute values dened as P =
P
i 6=j jfi;fj j
496
, where 496
is the number of feature pairs (32 31)=2. The result was P = 0:3428 that indicates
our feature selection is not redundant.
Parameter Tuning
In the SVM model, the factors that aect the classication result include the penalty
parameter C, the kernel function, and corresponding parameters in the kernel func-
tion. We randomly divided our shellcode dataset into a training set and a testing
set, which is a standard approach in machine learning. The training set has 60% of
samples from each class and the testing set consists of the rest of samples, 40% of
samples. To nd the best kernel function and parameters, we used a grid-search for
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Figure 3.8: Attribution Accuracy with Four Kernel Functions
possible parameter combinations on the training set to learn SVM model with four
popular kernel functions Chang and Lin (2011) and to evaluate it on the testing set.
Radial basis function (RBF): A RBF kernel takes the form of K(f (i); f (j)) =
exp(  k f (i)   f (j) k2);  > 0. Therefore, there are two parameters to tune: the
penalty parameter C and . We used a grid-search to test exponentially growing
sequence of C = 2 3; 2 2; :::; 28 and  = 2 7; 2 6; :::; 25. Figure 3.8(a) shows the ac-
curacy of testing when dierent parameter combinations are used. The results show
that, when C is xed, the best r is in the range [2 4; :::; 2 2]. On the other hand,
when r is xed, the best C is above 8. We found the best (C; ) combination (8; 0:25)
with the accuracy of 85:02% in attributing testing samples to its class;
Linear function: A linear function takes the form ofK(f (i); f (j)) = f (i)T f (j). There-
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fore, the only parameter for tuning is C. We tested C = 2 3; :::; 25 and found the
best penalty parameter C = 8 with 82:11% accuracy as shown in Figure 3.8(b);
Sigmoid function: A sigmoid function takes the form of K(f (i); f (j)) =
tanh(f (i)T f (j) + r);  > 0. We found the best (C; ; r) combination (2 4; 2 5; 2 3)
with the accuracy of 63:70% in attributing testing samples to its class as shown in
Figure 3.8(c);
Polynomial function: A polynomial function takes the form of K(f (i); f (j)) =
(f (i)T f (j) + r)d;  > 0. We evaluated the combinations of C = 2 1; :::; 23,  =
2 5; :::; 2 1, r = 2 3; :::; 2 1 and d = 2; 3; 4. We found the best (C; ; r; d) combi-
nation (4; 0:25; 0:125; 3) with the accuracy of 84:57% as shown in Figure 3.8(d). In
summary, our results suggest that RBF, linear, and polynomial kernels be appropri-
ate for attributing shellcode samples in terms of accuracy. However, the computation
cost for each kernel is dierent. We discuss the system performance using dierent
kernels in Section 3.8.4.
The Hardness of Multi-class Attributing
We tested a radius basis function{the kernel function with the highest accuracy{with
parameter combination C = 8;  = 0:25 in subsets of our dataset to nd out whether
increasing the number of shellcode engines for the classication makes the problem
harder to solve. We performed the same testing procedure mentioned in the previous
section to test the accuracy of our model for 2; :::; 13 shellcode classes. Our model
can achieve 100% classication accuracy for up to 6 shellcode engines and 95.0%
classication accuracy for 11 classes, which is higher than previous eorts Kong et al.
(2011). Note that, compared with Kong et al. (2011) in which a specic model is
built for each shellcode class, our approach only use one model to classify instances
46
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Number of Shellcode Classes
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
 
RBF C=8 gamma=0.25
Figure 3.9: Accuracy with Increasing Number of Shellcode Classes
from all kinds of classes, hence does not need dierent parameter settings for each
model.
3.8.3 The Strength of Encoding Engines
In Song et al. (2007), the authors introduced variation strength, propagation
strength and overall strength on the byte sequence of shellcode to measure poly-
morphic engines' strength. We redene these measures to accommodate our binary
representation form.
Variation strength: The variation strength of an encoding shellcode engine mea-
sures the engine's ability to generate shellcodes that span a suciently large portion
of 32-dimensional BFR space. We make use of covariance matrix to recover the
hyper-ellipsoidal bound on the dataset of each engine. The matrix is dened as
(e) = 1
N
PN
i=1(f
(i)   )(f (i)   )T , where N is the number of samples generated
by an engine e in our dataset.  2 R3232 describes the shape of a 32-dimensional
ellipsoid. Then, the problem of calculating the spanned set is transformed to an
eigenvector decomposition problem. Thus, v and , such as v = v, are recov-
ered where  is a 32-dimensional vector. We dene 	(e) = 1
32
P32
i=1
pjij as the
variation strength of an encoder e; Euclidean distance: Given two BFRs f (i) and f (j)
which represent two samples in our dataset, the Euclidean distance between these
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Table 3.3: The Strength of Encoders
Engine Variation Propagation Overall
Strength Strength Strength
alpha mixed 1.91 26.07 49.91
alpha upper 1.42 22.50 31.86
avoid utf8 tolower 1.29 14.53 18.70
call4 dword xor 2.17 25.82 55.96
context cpuid 0.27 4.66 1.25
context stat 0.93 12.53 11.65
context time 0.94 12.51 11.73
countdown 0.80 10.42 8.33
fnstenv mov 2.29 26.11 59.71
jmp call additive 1.46 15.74 22.91
nonalpha 0.74 9.91 7.36
nonupper 0.98 11.93 11.71
shikata ga nai 1.58 16.78 26.46
single static bit 1.22 15.87 19.34
random data generator 3.31 49.07 162.59
BFRs is dened as (f (i); f (j)) =
qP32
k=1(f
(i)
k   f (j)k )2; Propagation strength: Given
N samples labeled as outputs of an engine e, the propagation strength of this en-
gine describes the average Euclidean distance between all sample pairs dened as
(e) = 2
N(N 1)
P
i 6=j (f
(i); f (j)); Overall strength: The overall strength of an encoder
e is dened as the multiplication of its variation strength and propagation strength
(e) = (e)  	(e). The higher overall strength of an engine indicates that its
shellcode instances are more obscured and harder to be correctly attributed.
In order to remove the dierences introduced by dierent payloads, we only took
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Table 3.4: Shellcode Attribution Time Cost (millisecond)
Kernel Function Parameter Training1 Classication2
Combination Time Time
Radial Basis function C = 8;  = 0:25 2,760 1,720
Linear function C = 8 1,840 1,320
Sigmoid function C = 2 4;  = 2 5 15,640 7,240
r =  2 3
Polynomial function C = 8;  = 0:25 3,120 1,230
r = 0:125; d = 3
1 Training set includes 7,906 shellcode samples
2 Testing set includes 5,270 shellcode samples
the shellcode instances generated by dierent engines from the same payload into
account. Table 3.3 shows the strength of these engines based on our metrics. ran-
dom data generator refers to a generator that outputs a group of randomly generated
strings with the value of each byte in f0; :::; 255g. The lengths of these strings are
also randomly generated with the value from 160 to 400 bytes, which is the length
range of shellcode we mostly observed. It is not surprising to discover that ran-
dom data generator is the strongest `encoder' with the overall strength of 162:59.
Among all the encoders, we also noticed that fnstenv mov and call4 dword xor are
two of strongest engines based on our metrics, while context cpuid is the weakest one.
alpha mixed (49.91) is stronger than alpha upper (31.86), because it could output
both upper and lower case alphabets. However, the strength is not doubled because
the size of output character set is doubled. Similar observation can be found between
nonalpha and nonupper where nonupper shows a little bit stronger obfuscation.
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3.8.4 Performance Evaluation
We conducted experiments on a machine with Intel Core2 Duo CPU 3.16 GHz 3.25
GB RAM running Windows 7, IDA Pro 5.6 and Matlab R2010a. We used Windows
API GetTickCount to measure the performance of our program in C language and
cputime to measure the elapsed time in Matlab program. The training phase of
Markov-chain-based model only took less than 15 milliseconds to learn from 140
shellcode samples. The detection phase with the calculation window length of 20
took less than a second to calculate the S-score of 1,200 data streams with variable-
length from 160 bytes to 400 bytes.
Table 3.4 shows the time cost for shellcode attribution in training and testing
with dierent kernel functions. We evaluated the performance of the parameter com-
bination with the accuracy of each kind of kernel function. Linear function is the
most ecient kernel with 1,840 milliseconds in training for 7,906 samples and 1,320
milliseconds in classifying 5,270 samples. Radial basis function that has 85.02% ac-
curacy in classifying 14 shellcode classes is also ecient, taking 2,760 milliseconds in
training and 1,720 milliseconds in classication.
3.9 Discussion
In this section, we discuss other possible ways to model, detect, and attribute
shellcode samples.
3.9.1 The Feasibility of Using One Model
It is possible to use one unied model to detect and attribute encoded shellcode
in a single step. However, we choose not to adopt such an approach due to the
following issues: i) the problem of dierentiating code from data and the problem of
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attributing detected attack are two separate issues. By separating these two research
issues, we could achieve the most accurate results for each group. However, we have
to balance the detection rate and attribution rate if these two problems are mixed
together; ii) we only consider sequential information to detect and attribute shellcode
and we use Markov-chain-based model to fulll this requirement. In the training
phase, we need to train a specic sequential model for each shellcode class instead
of modeling all shellcode samples together. Correspondingly, in the detection phase,
the given suspicious data stream has to be evaluated by all trained models. With the
increased number of shellcode class, the evaluation process will be slow and infeasible
for on-line detection; and iii) we also consider a standard classier, such as SVM and
neural networks, to perform detection and attribution. Most standard classiers do
not support modeling of sequential knowledge that may render valuable `ordering'
information useless.
3.9.2 Using Opcode Functionality Sequence to Detect Shellcode
In our experimental evaluation, we also considered to use opcode functionality
sequence to detect shellcode instead of opcode mnemonic sequence. For a given
instruction sequence i = (i1; :::; im), its opcode functionality sequence is represented
as sT = (s1; :::; sm), where sk 2 f1; :::; 10g that is the set of the opcode functionality
category. While opcode mnemonic sequence maps encoded shellcode instances into a
am dimensional space, opcode functionality sequence maps them into an even lower
dimensional space, 10m. However, the evaluation results show that both false negative
and false positive rate are high with this representation. We believe the reason is that
the 10m dimensional space is not sucient to capture the dierence between code and
data.
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3.9.3 The Arms Race and Future Work
It is possible for malicious code distributors to disturb our shellcode detection
method by permutating the locations of instructions in a sequence. For instance,
the sequence 1: mov eax, 1; 2: add eax, 1; 3: mov ebx, 1; 4: add ebx, 1 has
dierent transition probabilities from the sequence 3; 1; 2; 4. However, their permu-
tation choices are limited in which the semantics of the instruction sequence has to be
maintained. For example, permutation to 2; 4; 3; 1 is not possible. To cope with this
potential arms race, we could integrate machine code slicing Cifuentes and Fraboulet
(1997) into our approach. The previous example could be sliced into two independent
pieces 1; 2 and 3; 4, and only intra-piece transition probabilities are considered for
learning and detection. In addition, higher order Markov chain may be utilized to
enhance the accuracy of our approach but might need to minimize unexpected perfor-
mance overhead. For the attribution part, attackers may deliberately cram garbage
instructions to interfere the distribution patterns used in BFR. Fortunately, this is-
sue is easier to solve than byte cramming attacks with the awareness of semantics in
disassembly. We could perform data ow analysis Wang et al. (2006b) on machine
code rst to prune useless instructions in a sequence to handle this challenge.
3.10 Related Work
On the signature generation side, Newsome et al. Newsome and Song (2005)
proposed TaintCheck that performs dynamic taint analysis by implementing binary
rewrite at run time. Newsome et al. introduced Polygraph Newsome et al. (2005), a
mechanism that is robust to generate signatures for polymorphic code. Li et al. Li
et al. (2006) proposed Hamsa, a noise-tolerant and attack-resilient network-based
automated signature generation system for polymorphic worms. Approaches to gen-
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erate vulnerability-based signatures Brumley et al. (2006); Li et al. (2007) were also
proposed on the network level without any host-level analysis of execution. However,
Chung et al. Chung and Mok (2007) showed that all of these signature generation
schemes are vulnerable to advanced allergy attacks.
Several emulation and execution-based approaches were proposed to detect ex-
ploit, shellcode, and worm. Polychronakis et al. Polychronakis et al. (2007) proposed
a heuristic detection method to execute and monitor suspicious data stream captured
in network trac. However, setting up such a runtime environment that ts every
exploit and shellcode is extremely dicult. To solve this problem, Gu et al. Gu et al.
(2010) proposed to dump the process's virtual memory before any input data are
consumed and use the dumped image to instantiate a runtime environment that em-
ulates the target process's input data consumption to monitor shellcode behaviors.
In addition, Spector Borders et al. (2007) used symbolic execution to reveal high-level
application programming interface calls from shellcode for a better understanding of
what it does.
APE Toth and Kruegel (2002a) calculated the maximum execution length of
a byte sequence, and learned threshold for detecting possible malicious packages.
Stride Akritidis et al. (2005) complemented the previous eort by adding new criteria
including non-privileged instruction in a byte sequence to identify sled in shellcode.
Chinchani et al. Chinchani and Van Den Berg (2006) and Kruegel et al. Kruegel et al.
(2006) proposed to utilize the control and data ow information in binary to detect
polymorphic code. Wang et al. Wang et al. (2006b) rst used data ow anomaly to
prune useless instructions then compared the number of useful instructions with a
certain threshold to determine if it has any code.
Wang et al. Wang et al. (2006a) compared the byte frequency of normal net-
work packages with malicious ones to gure out the byte patterns that could lead to
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attack detection. However, their solutions were vulnerable to byte cramming Detris-
tan (2003) and polymorphic blending attacks Fogla et al. (2006). Recently, Kong et
al. Kong et al. (2011) proposed to take advantage of semantic analysis and sequen-
tial models on n-gram data bytes to analyze the attribution of exploits. Wartell et
al. Wartell et al. (2011) developed machine learning-based algorithms to dierentiate
code from data. Rosenblum et al. Rosenblum et al. (2010) proposed to use condi-
tional random eld to extract compiler provenance from code. While most of these
work focus on the byte patterns identied in binary code, Song et al. Song et al.
(2007) presented quantitative analysis of the byte strength of polymorphic shellcode
and claimed that modeling the byte patterns in shellcode is infeasible.
Besides the aforementioned research eorts, several new binary encoding schemes
were proposed in recent years. Mason et al. Mason et al. (2009) proposed English
shellcode engine that transforms arbitrary shellcode to a representation that is similar
to English prose. Wu et al. Wu et al. (2010) proposed mimimorphism to transform
binary into mimicry counterpart that exhibits high similarity to benign programs in
terms of statistical properties and semantic characteristics.
3.11 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a technique for modeling shellcode detection and
attribution through a novel feature extraction method, called instruction sequence
abstraction, that extracts distinguishable features from suspicious data stream by
reducing the size of input data dimension and removing ambiguous byte patterns.
We also presented a Markov-chain-based model for shellcode detection and adopted
support vector machines for shellcode attribution. Our experiments showed that our
approach does not require any signature and is only based on static analysis and
supervised machine learning. The evaluation results also suggested that our solution
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detect and attribute shellcode to its originating engines with high accuracy and lower
false positive rate.
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Chapter 4
MITIGATING MANET ROUTING ATTACKS
4.1 Introduction
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are utilized to set up wireless communication
in improvised environments without a predened infrastructure or centralized admin-
istration. Therefore, MANET has been normally deployed in adverse and hostile
environments where central authority point is not necessary. Another unique char-
acteristic of MANET is the dynamic nature of its network topology which would be
frequently changed due to the unpredictable mobility of nodes. Furthermore, each
mobile node in MANET plays a router role while transmitting data over the network.
Hence, any compromised nodes under an adversary's control could cause signicant
damage to the functionality and security of its network since the impact would prop-
agate in performing routing tasks.
Several work Sun et al. (2006b); Refaei et al. (2010) addressed the intrusion re-
sponse actions in MANET by isolating uncooperative nodes based on the node repu-
tation derived from their behaviors. Such a simple response against malicious nodes
often neglects possible negative side eects involved with the response actions. In
MANET scenario, improper countermeasures may cause the unexpected network
partition, bringing additional damages to the network infrastructure. To address
the above-mentioned critical issues, more exible and adaptive response should be
investigated.
The notion of risk can be adopted to support more adaptive responses to routing
attacks in MANET Cheng et al. (2007). However, risk assessment is still a non-
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trivial, challenging problem due to its involvements of subjective knowledge, objective
evidence and logical reasoning. Subjective knowledge could be retrieved from previous
experience and objective evidence could be obtained from observation while logical
reasoning requires a formal foundation. Wang et al. Wang et al. (2007) proposed a
nave fuzzy cost-sensitive intrusion response solution for MANET. Their cost model
took subjective knowledge and objective evidence into account but omitted a seamless
combination of two properties with logical reasoning. In this chapter, we seek a way
to bridge this gap by using Dempster-Shafer mathematical theory of evidence (D-S
theory), which oers an alternative to traditional probability theory for representing
uncertainty Shafer (1976).
D-S theory has been adopted as a valuable tool for evaluating reliability and
security in information systems and by other engineering elds Sun et al. (2006a); Mu
et al. (2008), where precise measurement is impossible to obtain or expert elicitation
is required. D-S theory has several characteristics. First, it enables us to represent
both subjective and objective evidence with basic probability assignment and belief
function. Second, it supports Dempster's rule of combination to combine several
evidence together with probable reasoning. However, as identied in Sentz and Ferson
(2002); Zadeh (1984); Yager (1987); Wu et al. (2002); Zhao et al. (2010, 2012c),
Dempster's rule of combination has several limitations, such as treating evidence
equally without dierentiating each evidence and considering priorities among them.
To address these limitations in MANET intrusion response scenario, we introduce
a new Dempster's rule of combination with a notion of importance factors in D-S
evidence model.
In this chapter, we propose a risk-aware response mechanism to systematically
cope with routing attacks in MANET, and propose an adaptive time-wise isolation
method. Our risk-aware approach is based on the extended D-S evidence model.
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In order to evaluate our mechanism, we perform a series of simulated experiments
with a proactive MANET routing protocol, Optimized Link State Routing Protocol
(OLSR) Clausen and Jacquet (2003). In addition, we attempt to demonstrate the
eectiveness of our solution.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 overviews a MANET
routing protocol OLSR and routing attacks against OLSR. Section 4.3 describes
how our extended D-S evidence model can integrate importance factors. Section 4.4
overviews our risk-aware response mechanism to cope with MANET routing attacks.
Section 4.5 illustrates how to assess the risk by leveraging routing table change evi-
dence. Section 4.6 illustrates how to adaptively make risk mitigation decisions. The
evaluations of our approach are discussed in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 provides the
related work in MANET intrusion detection and response systems, also reviews risk-
aware approaches in dierent elds. Section 4.9 concludes this paper.
4.2 Background
In this section, we overview the OLSR and routing attacks on OLSR.
4.2.1 OLSR Protocol
The major task of the routing protocol is to discover the topology to ensure that
each node can acquire a recent map of the network to construct routes to its desti-
nations. Several ecient routing protocols have been proposed for MANET. These
protocols generally fall into one of two major categories: reactive routing protocols
and proactive routing protocols. In reactive routing protocols, such as Ad hoc On De-
mand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol Perkins et al. (2003), nodes nd routes only
when they must send data to the destination node whose route is unknown. In con-
trast, in proactive routing protocols, such as OLSR, nodes obtain routes by periodic
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exchange of topology information with other nodes and maintain route information
all the time.
OLSR protocol is a variation of the pure Link-state Routing (LSR) protocol and
is designed specically for MANET. OLSR protocol achieves optimization over LSR
through the use of multipoint relay (MPR) to provide an ecient ooding mechanism
by reducing the number of transmissions required. Unlike LSR, where every node
declares its links and forwards messages for their neighbors, only nodes selected as
MPR nodes are responsible for advertising, as well as forwarding an MPR selector
list advertised by other MPRs.
In OLSR, a node selects its MPR set that can reach all its two-hop neighbors.
In case there are multiple choices, the minimum set is selected as an MPR set. A
node learns about its one-hop and two-hop neighbors from its one-hop neighbors'
HELLO messages. HELLO message is used for neighbor discovery and MPR selection.
In OLSR, each node generates a HELLO message periodically. A node's HELLO
message contains its own address and the list of its one-hop neighbors. By exchanging
HELLO messages, each node can learn a complete topology up to two hops. HELLO
messages are exchanged locally by neighbor nodes and are not forwarded further to
other nodes. In addition to HELLO message, Topology Control (TC) message is used
for route calculation. In OLSR, each MPR node advertises TC messages periodically.
A TC message contains the list of the sender's MPR selector. Only MPR nodes are
responsible for forwarding TC messages. Upon receiving TC messages from all of the
MPR nodes, each node can learn the network topology and then build a route to
every node in the network.
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4.2.2 Routing Attack on OLSR
Based on the behavior of attackers, attacks against MANET can be classied
into passive or active attacks. Attacks can be further categorized as either outsider
or insider attacks. With respect to the target, attacks could be also divided into
data packet or routing packet attacks. In routing packet attacks, attackers could not
only prevent existing paths from being used, but also spoof non-existing paths to
lure data packets to them. Several studies Deng et al. (2002); Hu and Perrig (2004);
Kannhavong et al. (2007); Karlof and Wagner (2003) have been carried out on model-
ing MANET routing attacks. Typical routing attacks include black-hole, fabrication,
and modication of various elds in routing packets (route request message, route
reply message, route error message, etc.). All these attacks could lead to serious
network dysfunctions.
In terms of attack vectors, a malicious node can disrupt the routing mechanism in
the following simple ways: rst, it changes the contents of a discovered route, modies
a route reply message and causes the packet to be dropped as an invalid packet; then
it validates the route cache in other nodes by advertising incorrect paths, and refuses
to participate in the route discovery process; and nally, it modies the contents of
a data packet or the route via which the data packet is supposed to travel or behave
normally during the route discovery process but is dropped.
In OLSR, any node can either modify the protocol messages before forwarding
them, or create false messages or spoof an identity. Therefore, the attacker can abuse
the properties of the selection algorithm to be selected as MPR. The worst case is
the possible selection of the attacker as the only MPR of a node. Or, the attackers
can give wrong information about the topology of a network (TC message) in order
to disturb the routing operation.
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Typical routing attacks methods against OLSR are:
 Link spoong attack. A malicious node advertises it has a direct link, which
does not really exist, with non-neighbors to disrupt routing and application
data operations related to this node. In OLSR, an attacker can advertise a fake
link with a victim's two-hop neighbors. This results in the victim node selecting
the attacker as its MPR. As an MPR node, the attacker can manipulate routing
trac and data later on by modifying, dropping, recording and delaying.
 Link withholding attack. A malicious node refuses to advertise the existing link
to specic nodes or a group of nodes, which can make these nodes unreachable
for others. Specic to OLSR, the malicious node may disclaim the existence of
its one-hop neighbors by modifying its HELLO message.
 Replay attack. A malicious node could record other nodes' valid routing con-
trol message and replay them later. Because of the unpredictable mobility of
MANET nodes, replaying control massage could advertise some topology which
does not exist anymore, and then cause network routing chaos.
 Colluding misrelay attack. Multiple attackers collude to modify or drop routing
packets to disrupt MANET routing process. This kind of attack can disrupt up
to 100% data packets in OLSR.
4.3 Extended Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
The Dempster-Shafer mathematical theory of evidence is both a theory of evidence
and a theory of probable reasoning. The degree of belief models the evidence, while
Dempster's rule of combination (DRC) is the procedure to aggregate and summarize
a corpus of evidence. However, previous research eorts identify several limitations
of the Dempster's rule of combination:
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1. Associative. For DRC, the order of the information in the aggregated evidence
does not impact the result. As shown in Yager (1987), a non-associative combination
rule is necessary for many cases.
2. Non-weighted. DRC implies that we trust all evidence equally Wu et al. (2002).
However, in reality, our trust on dierent evidence may dier. In other words, it means
we should consider various factors for each evidence.
Yager Yager (1987) and Yamada et al. Yamada and Kudo (2004) proposed rules
to combine several evidence presented sequentially for the rst limitation. Wu et
al. Wu et al. (2002) suggested a weighted combination rule to handle the second limi-
tation. However, the weight for dierent evidence in their proposed rule is ineective
and insucient to dierentiate and prioritize dierent evidence in terms of security
and criticality. Our extended Dempster-Shafer theory with importance factors can
overcome both of the aforementioned limitations.
4.3.1 Importance Factors and Belief Function
In D-S theory, propositions are represented as subsets of a given set. Suppose 
is a nite set of states, and let 2 denote the set of all subsets of . D-S theory calls
, a frame of discernment. When a proposition corresponds to a subset of a frame
of discernment, it implies that a particular frame discerns the proposition. First, we
introduce a notion of importance factors.
Denition 4.1. Importance factor (IF ) is a positive real number associated with
the importance of evidence. IFs are derived from historical observations or expert
experiences.
Denition 4.2. An evidence E is a 2-tuple hm; IF i, where m describes the basic
probability assignment Shafer (1976). Basic probability assignment function m is
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dened as follows:
m() = 0 (4.1)
and X
A
m(A) = 1 (4.2)
According to Shafer (1976), a function Bel : 2 ! [0; 1] is a belief function over
 if it is given by (3) for some basic probability assignment m : 2 ! [0; 1].
Bel(A) =
X
BA
m(B) (4.3)
for all A 2 2, Bel(A) describes a measure of the total beliefs committed to the
evidence A.
Given several belief functions over the same frame of discernment and based on
distinct bodies of evidence, Dempster's rule of combination, which is given by (4.4),
enables us to compute the orthogonal sum, which describes the combined evidence.
Suppose Bel1 and Bel2 are belief functions over the same frame , with basic
probability assignments m1 and m2. Then the function m : 2
 ! [0; 1] dened by
m() = 0 and
m(C) =
X
Ai\Bj=C
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
1 
X
Ai\Bj=
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
(4.4)
for all non-empty C  , m(C) is a basic probability assignment which describes
the combined evidence.
Suppose IF1 and IF2 are importance factors of two pieces of independent evidence
named E1 and E2 respectively. The combination of these two pieces of evidence
implies that our total belief to these two pieces of evidence is 1, but in the same time,
our belief to either of evidence is less than 1. This is straightforward since if our
belief to one evidence is 1, it would mean our belief to the other is 0, which models
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meaningless evidence. And we dene the importance factors of the combination result
equals to (IF1 + IF2)=2.
Denition 4.3. Extended D-S evidence model with importance factors: Suppose E1 =
hm1; IF1i and E2 = hm2; IF2i are two pieces of independent evidence. Then, the
combination of E1 and E2 is E = hm1 m2; (IF1 + IF2)=2i, where  is Dempster's
rule of combination with importance factors.
4.3.2 Expected Properties for Our Dempster's Rule of Combination with
Importance Factors
The proposed rule of combination with importance factors should be a superset
of Dempster's rule of combination. In this section, we describe four properties that
a candidate Dempster's rule of combination with importance factors should follow.
Property 1 and Property 2 ensure that the combined result is valid evidence. Prop-
erty 3 guarantees that the original Dempster's Rule of Combination is a special case
of Dempster's Rule of Combination with importance factors, where the combined
evidence have the same priority. Property 4 ensures that importance factors of the
evidence are also independent from each other.
Property 4.1. No belief ought to be committed to  in the result of our combination
rule.
m0() = 0 (4.5)
Property 4.2. The total belief ought to be equal to 1 in the result of our combination
rule. X
A
m0(A) = 1 (4.6)
Property 4.3. If the importance factors of each evidence are equal, our Dempster's
rule of combination should be equal to Dempster's rule of combination without im-
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portance factors.
m0(A; IF1; IF2) = m(A); if IF1 = IF2 (4.7)
for all A 2 , where m(A) is the original Dempster's Combination Rule.
Property 4.4. Importance factors of each evidence must not be exchangeable.
m0(A; IF1; IF2) 6= m0(A; IF2; IF1) if(IF1 6= IF2) (4.8)
4.3.3 Dempster's Rule of Combination with Importance Factors
In this section, we propose a Dempster's rule of combination with importance
factors. We prove our combination rule follows the properties dened in the previous
section.
Theorem 4.1. Dempster's Rule of Combination with Importance Factors (DRCIF):
Suppose Bel1 and Bel2 are belief functions over the same frame of discernment ,
with basic probability assignments m1 and m2. The importance factors of evidence
are IF1 and IF2. Then the function m
0 : 2 ! [0; 1] dened by
m0() = 0
and
m0(C; IF1; IF2)
=
X
Ai\Bj=C
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
X
C;C 6=
X
Ai\Bj=C
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
for all non-empty C  , m0 is a basic probability assignment for the combined
evidence.
65
It is obvious that our proposed DRCIF holds Property 1 and Property 4. We
prove our proposed DRCIF also holds Property 2 and Property 3 here.
Property 2: X
A
m0(A; IF1; IF2)
=
X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
=
X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF2 m2(Bj)
IF2
IF1 ]
= 1
Property 3:
m0(A; IF1; IF1)
=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF1 m2(Bj)
IF1
IF1 ]
X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai)
IF1
IF1 m2(Bj)
IF1
IF1 ]
=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai) m2(Bj)]X
A;A 6=
X
Ai\Bj=A
[m1(Ai) m2(Bj)]
=
X
Ai\Bj=A
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
1 
X
Ai\Bj=
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
= m(A)
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Our proposed DRCIF is non-associative for multiple pieces of evidence. Therefore,
for the case in which sequential information is not available for some instances, it
is necessary to make the result of combination consistent with multiple pieces of
evidence. Our combination algorithm supports this requirement and the complexity
of our algorithm is O(n), where n is the number of pieces of evidence. It indicates our
extended Dempster-Shafer theory demands no extra computational cost compared
to a nave fuzzy-based method. The algorithm for combination of multiple pieces of
evidence is constructed as follows:
Algorithm 2: MUL-EDS-CMB
Input: Evidence pool Ep
Output: One evidence
1 j Ep j = sizeof(Ep);
2 while j Ep j> 1 do
3 Pick two pieces of evidence with the least IF in Ep, named E1 and E2;
4 Combine these two pieces of evidence, E = hm1 m2; (IF1 + IF2)=2i;
5 Remove E1 and E2 from Ep;
6 Add E to Ep;
7 end
8 return the evidence in Ep
4.4 Overview of Risk-Aware Response Mitigation for MANET Routing Attacks
In this section, we articulate an adaptive risk-aware response mechanism based
on quantitative risk estimation and risk tolerance. Instead of applying simple binary
isolation of malicious nodes, our approach adopts an isolation mechanism in a tem-
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poral manner based on the risk value. We perform risk assessment with the extended
D-S evidence theory introduced in Section 4.5 for both attacks and corresponding
countermeasures to make more accurate response decisions illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Because of the infrastructure-less architecture of MANET, our risk-aware response
system is distributed, which means each node in this system makes its own response
decisions based on the evidence and its own individual benets. Therefore, some nodes
in MANET may isolate the malicious node, but others may still keep in cooperation
with due to high dependency relationships. Our risk-aware response mechanism is
divided into the following four steps shown in Figure 4.1.
Evidence Collection. In this step, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) gives an at-
tack alert with a condence value, and then Routing Table Change Detector (RTCD)
runs to gure out how many changes on routing table are caused by the attack.
Risk Assessment. Alert condence from IDS and the routing table changing in-
formation would be further considered as independent evidence for risk calculation
and combined with the extended D-S theory. Risk of countermeasures is calculated
as well during a risk assessment phase. Based on the risk of attacks and the risk of
countermeasures, the entire risk of an attack could be gured out.
Decision Making. The adaptive decision module provides a exible response deci-
sion making mechanism, which takes risk estimation and risk tolerance into account.
To adjust temporary isolation level, a user can set dierent thresholds to fulll her
goal.
Intrusion Response. With the output from risk assessment and decision making
module, the corresponding response actions, including routing table recovery and
node isolation, are carried out to mitigate attack damages in a distributed manner.
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Figure 4.1: Risk-Aware Response Mechanism
4.4.1 Response to Routing Attacks
In our approach, we use two dierent responses to deal with dierent attack meth-
ods: routing table recovery and node isolation.
Routing table recovery includes local routing table recovery and global routing
recovery. Local routing recovery is performed by victim nodes that detect the attack
and automatically recover its own routing table. Global routing recovery involves
with sending recovered routing messages by victim nodes and updating their routing
table based on corrected routing information in real time by other nodes in MANET.
Routing table recovery is an indispensable response and should serve as the rst
response method after successful detection of attacks. In proactive routing protocols
like OLSR, routing table recovery does not bring any additional overhead since it pe-
riodically goes with routing control messages. Also, as long as the detection of attack
is positive, this response causes no negative impacts on existing routing operations.
Node isolation may be the most intuitive way to prevent further attacks from
being launched by malicious nodes in MANET. To perform a node isolation response,
the neighbors of the malicious node ignore the malicious node by neither forwarding
packets through it nor accepting any packets from it. On the other hand, a binary
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node isolation response may result in negative impacts to the routing operations, even
bringing more routing damages than the attack itself.
Figure 4.2: An Example of Link Spoong Attack
For example, in Figure 4.2, Node 1 behaves like a malicious node. However,
if every other node simply isolates Node 1, Node 6 will be disconnected from the
network. Therefore, more exible and ne-grained node isolation mechanism are
required. In our risk-aware response mechanism, we adopt two types of time-wise
isolation responses: temporary isolation and permanent isolation, which are discussed
in Section 4.6.
4.5 Risk Assessment Based on Routing Table Change Patterns
Since the attack response actions may cause more damages than attacks, the
risks of both attack and response should be estimated. We classify the security
states of MANET into two categories: fSecure, Insecureg. In other words, the frame
of discernment would be f, fSecureg, fInsecureg, fSecure, Insecuregg. Note that
fSecure, Insecureg means the security state of MANET could be either secure or
insecure, which describes the uncertainty of the security state. BelfInsecureg is
used to represent the risk of MANET.
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4.5.1 Discovering Routing Table Change Patterns
Our evidence selection approach considers subjective evidence from experts' knowl-
edge and objective evidence from routing table modication. We propose a unied
analysis approach for evaluating the risks of both attack (RiskA) and countermeasure
(RiskC).
We take the condence level of alerts from IDS as the subjective knowledge in
Evidence 1. In terms of objective evidence, we analyze dierent routing table modi-
cation cases. There are three basic items in OLSR routing table (destination, next
hop, distance). Thus, routing attack can cause existing routing table entries to be
missed, or any item of a routing table entry to be changed. We illustrate the possi-
ble cases of routing table change and analyze the degrees of damage in Evidence 2
through 5.
Evidence 1: Alert Condence. The condence of attack detection by the IDS is
provided to address the possibility of the attack occurrence. Since the false alarm is a
serious problem for most IDSs, the condence factor must be considered for the risk
assessment of the attack. The basic probability assignments of Evidence 1 are based
on three equations 4.9{4.11:
m(Insecure) = c; c is confidence given by IDS (4.9)
m(Secure) = 1  c (4.10)
m(Secure; Insecure) = 0 (4.11)
Evidence 2: Missing Entry. This evidence indicates the proportion of missing
entries in routing table. Link withholding attack or node isolation countermeasure
can cause possible deletion of entries from routing table of the node.
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Evidence 3: Changing Entry Type I. This evidence represents the proportion of
changing entries in the case of next hop being the malicious node. In this case, the
malicious node builds a direct link to this node. So it is highly possible for this node
to be the attacker's target. Malicious node could drop all the packages to or from the
target node, or it can behave as a normal node and wait for future attack actions.
Note that isolating a malicious node cannot trigger this case.
Evidence 4: Changing Entry Type II. This evidence shows the proportion of
changed entries in the case of dierent next hop (not the malicious node) and the
same distance. We believe the impacts on the node communication should be very
minimal in this case. Both attacks and countermeasures could cause this case.
Evidence 5: Changing Entry Type III. This evidence points out the proportion of
changing entries in the case of dierent next hop (not the malicious node) and the
dierent distance. Similar to Evidence 4, both attacks and countermeasures could
result in this evidence. The path change may also aect routing cost and transmission
delay of the network.
Basic probability assignments of Evidence 2 to 5 are based on Equations 4.12, 4.13
and 4.14. Equations 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 are piecewise linear functions, where a, b,
c, and d are constants and determined by experts. d is the minimum value of the
belief that implies the status of MANET is insecure. On the other hand, 1-d is the
maximum value of the belief that means the status of MANET is secure. a, b, and
c are the thresholds for minimum belief or maximum belief for each respective mass
function.
m(Insecure) =
8>>>><>>>>:
d x 2 [0; a]
(1 2d
c a )(x  a) x 2 (a; c]
1  d x 2 (c; 1]
(4.12)
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m(Secure) =
8><>: 1  d+ (
2d 1
b
)x x 2 [0; b]
d x 2 (b; 1]
(4.13)
m(Secure; Insecure) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 2d
b
x x 2 [0; a]
d  2d 1
b
x 
(1 2d
c a )(x  a) x 2 (a; b]
1  b 
(1 2d
c a )(x  a) x 2 (b; c]
0 x 2 (c; 1]
(4.14)
4.5.2 Combination of Evidence
For simplicity, we call the combined evidence for an attack, EA and the combined
evidence for a countermeasure, EC . Thus, BelA(Insecure) and BelC(Insecure) repre-
sent risks of attack (RiskA) and countermeasure (RiskC), respectively. The combined
evidence, EA and EC are dened in Equations 4.15 and 4.16. The entire risk value
derived from RiskA and RiskC is given in Equation 4.17.
EA = E1  E2  E3  E4  E5 (4.15)
EC = E2  E4  E5 (4.16)
where  is Dempster's rule of combination with important factors dened in The-
orem 1.
Risk = RiskA  RiskC = BelA(Insecure) BelC(Insecure) (4.17)
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4.6 Adaptive Decision Making
Our adaptive decision making module is based on quantitative risk estimation
and risk tolerance, which is shown in Figure 4.3. The response level is additionally
divided into multiple bands. Each band is associated with an isolation degree, which
presents a dierent time period of the isolation action. The response action and band
boundaries are all determined in accordance with risk tolerance and can be changed
when risk tolerance threshold changes. The upper risk tolerance threshold (UT ) would
be associated with permanent isolation response. The lower risk tolerance threshold
(LT ) would remain each node intact. The band between the upper tolerance threshold
and lower tolerance threshold is associated with the temporary isolation response, in
which the isolation time (T ) changes dynamically based on the dierent response
level given by Equations 4.18 and 4.19, where n is the number of bands and i is the
corresponding isolation band.
i = dRisk   LT
UT   LT  ne; Risk 2 (LT; UT ) (4.18)
T = 100 i (milliseconds) (4.19)
We recommend the value of lower risk tolerance threshold be 0 initially if no
additional information is available. It implies when the risk of attack is greater
than the risk of isolation response, the isolation is needed. If other information is
available, it could be used to adjust thresholds. For example, node reputation is one
of important factors in MANET security, our adaptive decision making module could
take this factor into account as well. That is, if the compromised node has a high
or low reputation level, the response module can intuitively adjust the risk tolerance
thresholds accordingly. In the case that LT is less than 0, even if the risk of attack
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Figure 4.3: Adaptive Decision Making
is not greater than the risk of isolation, the response could also perform an isolation
task to the malicious nodes.
The risk tolerance thresholds could also be dynamically adjusted by other factors,
such as attack frequency. If the attack frequency is high, more severe response action
should be taken to counter this attack. Our risk-aware response module could achieve
this objective by reducing the values of risk tolerance threshold and narrowing the
range between two risk tolerance thresholds.
4.7 Case Study and Evaluation
In this section, we rst explain the methodology of our experiments and the met-
rics considered to evaluate the eectiveness of our approach. Then, we demonstrate
the detailed process of our solution with a case study and also compare our risk-
aware approach with binary isolation. In addition, we evaluate our solution with ve
random network topologies considering dierent size of nodes. The results show the
eectiveness and scalability of our approach.
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Des Next Dis Des Next Dis Des Next Dis
1 4 2 1 1 1 2 4 2
2 4 2 2 1 2 3 4 3
3 4 3 3 1 3 4 4 1
4 4 1 4 4 1 5 4 3
5 4 3 5 1 2
6 4 3 6 1 2
Before attack After attack After isolation
(a) Routing Table of Node 0
Des Next Dis Des Next Dis Des Next Dis
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 1 2 2 1 3 2 2
3 2 2 3 2 2 5 2 2
5 2 2 5 2 2
6 1 2 6 1 2
Before attack After attack After isolation
(b) Routing Table of Node 4
Des Next Dis Des Next Dis Des Next Dis
0 1 3 0 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2 1 2
3 1 3 3 1 3
4 1 2 4 1 2
5 1 2 5 1 2
Before attack After attack After isolation
(c) Routing Table of Node 6
Figure 4.4: Routing Tables
4.7.1 Methodology and Metrics
The experiments were carried out using NS-2 as the simulation tool from VINT
Project Fall and Varadhan (2010) with UM-OLSR Ros (2007). NS-2 is a discrete
event network simulator which provides a detailed model of the physical and link layer
behavior of a wireless network and allows arbitrary movement of nodes within the
network. UM-OLSR is an implementation of Optimized Link State Routing protocol
for the NS-2, which complies with Clausen and Jacquet (2003) and supports all core
functionalities of OLSR plus the link-layer feedback option. In our experiments,
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we constructed MANET scenarios in a topology of 1000m1000m area. The total
simulation time was set to 1200 seconds, and the bandwidth was set to 2 Mbps.
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) trac was used to send 512 byte-UDP packets between
nodes. The queuing capacity of every node was set to 15. We adopted a random
trac generator in the simulation that chose random pairs of nodes and sent packets
between them. Every node kept track of all packets sent by itself and the entire
packet received from other nodes in the network.
In order to evaluate the eectiveness of our adaptive risk-aware response solution,
we divided the simulation process into three stages and compared the network perfor-
mance in terms of six metrics. The following describes the activities associated with
each stage:
Stage 1 - Before attack: random packets were generated and transmitted among
nodes without activating any of them as attackers. This simulation can present the
trac patterns under the normal circumstance.
Stage 2 - After attack: specic nodes were set as attackers which conducted ma-
licious activities for their own prots. However, any detection or response is not
available in this stage. This simulation process can present the trac patterns under
the circumstance with malicious activities.
Stage 3 - After response: response decisions for each node were made and carried
out based on three dierent mechanisms.
We computed six metrics Hu et al. (2005) for each simulation run:
 Packet Delivery Radio: The ratio between the number of packets originated by
the application layer CBR sources and the number of packets received by the
CBR sink at the nal destination.
 Routing Cost : The ratio between the total bytes of routing packets transmitted
77
during the simulation and the total bytes of packets received by the CBR sink
at the nal destination.
 Packet Overhead : The number of transmitted routing packets; for example, a
HELLO or TC message sent over four hops would be counted as four packets
in this metric.
 Byte Overhead : The number of transmitted bytes by routing packets, counting
each hop similar to Packet Overhead.
 Mean Latency : The average time elapsed from \when a data packet is rst sent"
to \when it is rst received at its destination."
 Average Path Length: This is the average length of the paths discovered by
OLSR. It was calculated by averaging the number of hops taken by each data
packet to reach the destination.
4.7.2 Case Study
Figure 4.2 shows our case study scenario, where packets from Node 5 to Node 0 are
supposed to go through Node 2 and Node 4. Suppose a malicious Node 1 advertises it
has a direct link (fake link) to Node 0 and it would cause every node to update its own
routing table accordingly. As a result, the packets from Node 5 to Node 0 traverse
Node 1 rather than Node 2 and Node 4. Hence, Node 1 can drop and manipulate
the trac between Node 5 and Node 0. We assume, as Node 1's one-hop neighbors,
Node 0, Node 4 and Node 6 get the intrusion alerts with 80% condence from their
respective IDS modules. Figures 4.4(a)-(c) show the routing tables of Node 0, Node
4 and Node 6 before the attack, after the attack and after the isolation, respectively.
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(a) Packet Delivery Ratio (b) Routing Cost
(c) Packet Overhead (d) Byte Overhead (Bytes)
(e) Mean Latency (Seconds) (f) Average Path Length
Figure 4.5: Performance Results in Three Stages Comparing DRCIF with Binary
Isolation and DRC
We set a = 0:2, b = 0:7, c = 0:8, d = 0:05, IF1 = 5, IF2 = 7, IF3 = 10, IF4 = 3,
IF5 = 3, LT =  0:0017, UT = 1, and n = 5 in our experiments.
We examine binary isolation approach, risk-aware approach with DRC, and risk-
aware approach with DRCIF to calculate the response decisions for Node 0, Node
79
Table 4.1: Risk Assessment and Decision Making
Node
Approaches Index 0 4 6
BINARY Decision isolation isolation isolation
DRC
RiskA 0.00011 0.0000057 0.0000057
RiskC 0.00164 0.00164 0.0144
Risk -0.00153 -0.00163 -0.0143943
Decision isolation isolation no isolation
DRCIF
RiskA 0.467 0.00355 0.00355
RiskC 0.0136 0.0136 0.1
Risk 0.4534 -0.01005 -0.096
Decision isolation no isolation no isolation
T ime 300 ms 0 0
4 and Node 6. As shown in Table 4.1, binary isolation suggests all nodes to isolate
the malicious one since it does not take countermeasure risk into account. With our
risk-aware response mechanism based on our extended D-S theory, Node 1 should be
isolated only by Node 0 while the original D-S theory would suggest that both Node
0 and Node 4 isolate Node 1.
In Figure 4.5(a), due to routing attacks, the packet delivery ratio decreases in
Stage 2. After performing binary isolation and DRC risk-aware response in Stage 3,
the packet delivery ratio even decreases more. This is because these two response
mechanisms largely destroy the topology of network. However, the packet delivery
ratio using our DRCIF risk-aware response in Stage 3 is higher than those of the
former two response mechanisms.
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Figure 4.6: Performance Results in Five Random Topologies Comparing DRCIF
with Binary Isolation and DRC
In Figure 4.5(b), the routing attacks increase the routing cost in Stage 2. Rather
than recovering the routing cost in Stage 3, binary isolation and DRC risk-aware
responses increase the routing cost. DRCIF risk-aware response, however, decreases
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the routing cost. Compared with other two response mechanisms, it indicates our
DRCIF risk-aware response eectively handles the attack.
Figures 4.5(c) and 4.5(d) show the packet and byte overhead, respectively. Since
the routing attacks do not change the network topology further in the given case, the
packet overhead and byte overhead remain almost the same in Stage 2. In Stage 3,
however, they are higher when our DRCIF risk-aware response mechanism is applied.
This result meet our expectation, because the number of nodes which isolate malicious
node using binary isolation and DRC risk-aware response are greater than those of
our DRCIF risk-aware response mechanism. As shown in Table 4.1, the number of
isolated nodes for each mechanism varies.
In Figure 4.5(e), as a consequence of the routing attacks, the mean latency in-
creases in Stage 2. After response, we notice the mean latencies in Stage 3 for three
dierent response mechanisms have approximately the same results.
In Figure 4.5(f), the average path length decreases in Stage 2 due to the malicious
action claiming a shorter path performed by Node 1. After response, the average
path length using binary isolation is higher than those of the other two response
mechanisms because more nodes isolated the malicious node based on the nature
of binary isolation. Hence, some packets may be retransmitted by more hops than
before.
4.7.3 Evaluation with Random Network Topologies
In order to test the eectiveness and scalability of our solution, we evaluated
our risk-aware approach with DRCIF on ve random network topologies. These ve
topologies have 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 nodes respectively.
Figure 4.6 shows the performance results in these random network topologies of
our risk-aware approach with DRCIF, risk-aware approach with DRC and binary
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isolation approach. In Figure 4.6(a), as the number of nodes increases, the packet
delivery ratio also increases because there are more route choices for the packet trans-
mission. Among these three response mechanisms, we also notice the packets deliv-
ery ratio of our DRCIF risk-aware response is higher than those of the other two
approaches.
In Figure 4.6(b), we can observe that the routing cost of our DRCIF risk-aware
response is lower than those of the other two approaches. Note that the uctuations
of routing cost shown in Figure 4.6(b) are caused by the random trac generation
and random placement of nodes in our realistic simulation.
In our DRCIF risk-aware response, the number of nodes which isolate the malicious
node is less than the other two response mechanisms. As shown in Figures 4.6(c) and
4.6(d), that is the reason why we can also notice that as the number of nodes increases,
the packet overhead and the byte overhead using our DRCIF risk-aware response are
slightly higher than those of the other two response mechanisms.
In Figure 4.6(e), the mean latency using our DRCIF risk-aware response is higher
than those of the other two response mechanisms, when the number of nodes is smaller
than 20. However, when the number of nodes is greater than 20, the mean latency
using our approach is less than those of the other two response mechanisms.
4.8 Related Work
Intrusion Detection and Response in MANET. Some research eorts have been
made to seek preventive solutions Hu et al. (2005); Levine et al. (2002); Hu et al.
(2003); Awerbuch et al. (2008) for protecting the routing protocols in MANET. Al-
though these approaches can prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network,
they introduce a signicant overhead for key exchange and verication with the lim-
ited intrusion elimination. Besides, prevention-based techniques are less helpful to
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cope with malicious insiders who possess the legitimate credentials to communicate
in the network.
Numerous IDSs for MANET have been recently introduced. Due to the nature
of MANET, most IDS are structured to be distributed and have a cooperative ar-
chitecture. Similar to signatured-based and anomaly-based IDS models for the wired
network, IDSs for MANET use specication-based or statistics-based approaches.
Specication-based approaches, such as DEMEM Tseng et al. (2006b) and Tseng
et al. (2006a); Mohammed et al. (2011); Felix et al. (2011), monitor network activ-
ities and compare them with known attack features, which are impractical to cope
with new attacks. On the other hand, statistics-based approaches, such as Watch-
dog Marti et al. (2000), and Kurosawa et al. (2006), compare network activities with
normal behavior patterns, which result in higher false positives rate than specication-
based ones. Because of the existence of false positives in both MANET IDS models,
intrusion alerts from these systems always accompany with alert condence, which
indicates the possibility of attack occurrence.
Intrusion response system (IRS) Hu et al. (2004) for MANET is inspired by
MANET IDS. In Sun et al. (2006b) and Refaei et al. (2010), malicious nodes are
isolated based on their reputations. Their work fails to take advantage of IDS alerts
and simple isolation may cause unexpected network partition. Wang et al. Wang et al.
(2007) brought the concept of cost-sensitive intrusion response which considers topol-
ogy dependency and attack damage. The advantage of our solution is to integrate
evidence from IDS, local routing table with expert knowledge, and countermeasures
with a mathematical reasoning approach.
Risk-aware Approaches. When it comes to make response decisions Toth and
Kruegel (2002b); Strasburg et al. (2009), there always exists inherent uncertainty
which leads to unpredictable risk, especially in security and intelligence arena. Risk-
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aware approaches are introduced to tackle this problem by balancing action benets
and damage tradeos in a quantied way. Cheng et al. Cheng et al. (2007) presented
a fuzzy logic control model for adaptive risk-based access control. Teo et al. Teo
et al. (2003) applied dynamic risk-aware mechanism to determine whether an access
to the network should be denied or permitted. Jing et al. Jing et al. (2014) presented
continuous and automated risk assessment of mobile applications.
However, risk assessment is still a non-trivial challenging problem due to its in-
volvements of subjective knowledge, objective evidence and logical reasoning. Wang
et al. Wang et al. (2007) proposed a nave fuzzy cost-sensitive intrusion response solu-
tion for MANET. Their cost model took subjective knowledge and objective evidence
into account but omitted a seamless combination of two properties with logical reason-
ing. Mu et al. Mu et al. (2008) adopted Dempster-Shafer theory to measure the risk of
attacks and responses. However, as identied in Sentz and Ferson (2002), their model
with Dempster's rule treats evidence equally without dierentiating them from each
other. To address this limitation, we propose a new Dempster's rule of combination
with a notion of importance factors in D-S evidence model.
4.9 Summary
We have proposed a risk-aware response solution for mitigating MANET routing
attacks. Especially our approach considered the potential damages of attacks and
countermeasures. In order to measure the risks of both attacks and countermeasures,
we extended Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence with a notion of importance factors.
Based on several metrics, we also investigated the performance and practicality of
our approach and the experiment results clearly demonstrated the eectiveness and
scalability of our risk-aware approach.
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Chapter 5
GUESSING PICTURE PASSWORDS
5.1 Introduction
Using text-based passwords that include alphanumerics and symbols on touch-
screen devices is unwieldy and time-consuming due to small-sized screens and the
absence of physical keyboards. Consequently, mobile operating systems, such as iOS
and Android, integrate a numeric PIN and a draw pattern as alternative authenti-
cation schemes to provide user-friendly login services. However, the password spaces
of these schemes are signicantly smaller than text-based passwords, rendering them
less secure and easy to break with some knowledge of device owners Bonneau et al.
(2012).
To bring a fast and uid login experience on touch-screen devices, the Windows
8 operating system comes with a picture password authentication system, namely
picture gesture authentication (PGA) Johnson (2012), which is also an instance of
background draw-a-secret (BDAS) schemes Dunphy and Yan (2007). This new au-
thentication mechanism hit the market with miscellaneous computing devices includ-
ing personal computers and tablets. At the time of writing, over 60 million Windows
8 licenses have been sold Foley (2013) and it is estimated that 400 million computers
and tablets will run Windows 8 with this newly introduced authentication scheme
in one year Ovide (2012). Consequently, it is imperative to examine and explore po-
tential attacks on picture gesture authentication in such a prevalent operating system
for further understanding user experiences and enhancing this commercially popular
picture password system.
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Many graphical and gesture-based password schemes{including DAS Jermyn et al.
(1999), Face Brosto and Sasse (2000), Story Davis et al. (2004), PassPoints Wieden-
beck et al. (2005) and BDAS Dunphy and Yan (2007){have been proposed in the past
decade (for more, please refer to Dhamija and Perrig (2000); Thorpe and Van Oorschot
(2004b); Suo et al. (2005); Chiasson et al. (2007); Gao et al. (2008); Bicakci et al.
(2009); Biddle et al. (2011); Chiasson et al. (2012); Li et al. (2013c,b,a)). Amongst
these schemes, click-based schemes, such as PassPoints, have attracted considerable
attention and some research has analyzed the patterns and predictable characteristics
shown in their passwords Chiasson et al. (2009); van Oorschot and Thorpe (2011).
Furthermore, harvesting characteristics from passwords of a target picture and ex-
ploiting hot-spots and geometric patterns on the target picture have been proven ef-
fective for attacking click-based schemes Dirik et al. (2007); Thorpe and van Oorschot
(2007); Salehi-Abari et al. (2008). However, PGA allows complex gestures other than
a simple click. Moreover, a new feature in PGA, autonomous picture selection by
users, makes it unrealistic to harvest passwords from the target pictures for learning.
In other words, the target picture is previously unseen to any attack models. All
existing attack approaches lack a generic knowledge representation of user choice in
password selection that should be abstracted from specic pictures. The absence of
this abstraction makes existing attack approaches impossible or abysmal (if possible)
to work on previously unseen target pictures.
In this chapter, we provide an empirical analysis of user choice in PGA based on
real-world usage data, showing interesting ndings on user choice in selecting back-
ground picture, gesture location, gesture order, and gesture type. In addition, we
propose a new attack framework that represents and learns users' password selec-
tion patterns from training datasets and generates ranked password dictionaries for
previously unseen target pictures. To achieve this, it is imperative to build generic
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knowledge of user choice from the abstraction of hot-spots in pictures. The core of
our framework is the concept of a selection function that simulates users' selection
processes in choosing their picture passwords. Our approach is not coupled with
any specic pictures. Hence, the generation of a ranked password list is then trans-
formed into the generation of a ranked selection function list which is then executed
on the target pictures. We present two algorithms for generating the selection func-
tion list: one algorithm is to appropriately develop an optimal guessing strategy for a
large-scale training dataset and the other deals with the construction of high-quality
dictionaries even when the size of the training dataset is small. We also discuss the
implementation of our attack framework over PGA, and evaluate the ecacy of our
proposed approach with the collected datasets.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview
of picture gesture authentication. Section 5.3 discusses our empirical analysis on
picture gesture authentication. In Section 5.4, we illustrate our attack framework.
Section 5.5 presents the implementation details and automated identied PoIs and
gestures. Section 5.6 presents the evaluation results of the proposed attack framework.
We discuss several research issues in Section 5.7 followed by the related work in
Section 5.8. Section 5.9 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Background: Picture Gesture Authentication
Like other login systems, Windows 8 Picture Gesture Authentication has two
independent phases, namely registration and authentication. In the registration stage,
a user chooses a picture from his or her local storage as the background. PGA does
not force users to choose pictures from a predened repository. Even though users
may choose pictures from common folders, such as the Picture Library folder in
Windows 8, the probability for dierent users to choose an identical picture as the
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background for their passwords is low. This phenomenon requires potential attack
approaches to have the ability to perform attacks on previously unseen pictures.
PGA then asks the user to draw exactly three gestures on the picture with his or
her nger, mouse, stylus, or other input devices depending on the equipment he or
she is using. A gesture could be viewed as the cursor movements between a pair of
`nger-down' and `nger-up' events. PGA does not allow free-style gestures, but only
accepts tap (indicating a location), line (connecting areas or highlighting paths), and
circle (enclosing areas) Pace (2011a). If the user draws a free-style gesture, PGA
will convert it to one of the three recognized gestures. For instance, a curve would
be converted to a line and a triangle or oval will be stored as a circle. To record
these gestures, PGA divides the longest dimension of the background image into 100
segments and the short dimension on the same scale to create a grid, then stores
the coordinates of the gestures. The line and circle gestures are also associated with
additional information such as directions of the nger movements.
Once a picture password is successfully registered, the user may login the system
by drawing corresponding gestures instead of typing his or her text-based password.
In other words, PGA rst brings the background image on the screen that the user
chose in the registration stage. Then, the user should reproduce the drawings he or she
set up as his or her password. PGA compares the input gestures with the previously
stored ones from the registration stage. The comparison is not strictly rigid but shows
tolerance to some extent. If any of gesture type, ordering, or directionality is wrong,
the authentication fails. When they are all correct, an operation is further taken to
measure the distance between the input password and the stored one. For tapping,
the gesture passes authentication if the predicate 12 d2  0 satises, where d denotes
the distance between the tap coordinates and the stored coordinates. The starting
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and ending points of line gestures and the center of circle gestures are measured with
the same predicate Pace (2011a).
The dierences between PGA and the rst BDAS scheme proposed in Dunphy and
Yan (2007) include: i) in PGA, a user uploads his or her picture as the background
instead of choosing one from a predened picture repository; ii) a user is only allowed
to draw three specic types of gestures in PGA, while BDAS takes any form of strokes.
The rst dierence makes PGA more secure than the previous scheme, because a
password dictionary could only be generated after the background picture is acquired.
However, the second characteristic reduces the theoretical password space from its
counterpart. Pace et al. Pace (2011a) quantied the size of the theoretical password
space of PGA which is 230:1 with current length-three conguration in Windows 8.
For more details, please refer to Pace (2011a).
5.3 User Choice Patterns in Picture Gesture Authentication Passwords
In this section, we present an empirical analysis on user choice in PGA by ana-
lyzing data collected from our user studies. Our empirical study is based on human
cognitive capabilities. Since human cognition of pictures is limited in a similar way
to their cognition of texts, the picture passwords selected by users are probably con-
strained by human cognitive limits which would be similar to the ones in text-based
passwords Yuille (1983).
5.3.1 Experiment Design
For the empirical study, we developed a web-based PGA system for conducting
user studies. The developed system resembles Windows 8 PGA in terms of its
workow and appearance. The dierences between our implementation and Windows
8 PGA include: i) our system works with major browsers in desktop PCs and
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tablets whereas Windows 8 PGA is a stand-alone program; ii) some information,
such as the criterion for circle radius comparison, is not disclosed. In other words, our
implementation and Windows 8 PGA dier in some criteria (we regard radiuses the
same if their dierence is smaller than 6 segments in grid). In addition, our developed
system has a tutorial page that includes a video clip educating how to use the system
and a test page on which users can practice gesture drawings.
Our study protocol, including the type of data we plan to collect and the ques-
tionnaire we plan to use, was reviewed by our institution's IRB. The questionnaire
consisted of four sections: i) general information of the subject (gender, age, level of
education received, and race); ii) general feeling toward PGA (is it easier to remember,
faster to input, harder to guess, and easier to observe than text-based password); iii)
selection of background picture (preferred picture type); and iv) selection of password
(preferred gesture location and type).
We started user studies after receiving the IRB approval letter in August 2012
and compiled two datasets from August 2012 to January 2013 using this system.
Dataset-1 was acquired from a testbed of picture password used by an undergrad-
uate computer science class. Dataset-2 was produced by advertising our studies in
schools of engineering and business in two universities and Amazon's Mechanical
Turk crowdsourcing service that has been used in security-related research work Kel-
ley et al. (2012). Turkers who had nished more than 50 tasks and had an approval
rate greater than 60% were qualied for our user study.
For registration, subjects in Dataset-1 were asked to provide their student IDs
for a simple verication after which they were guided to upload a picture, register
a password and then use the password to access class materials including slides,
homework, assignments, and projects. Subjects used this system for the Fall 2012
semester which lasted three and a half months at our university. If subjects forgot
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Figure 5.1: Background Pictures Used in Dataset-2
their passwords during the semester, they would inform the teaching assistant who
reset their passwords. Subjects were allowed to change their passwords by clicking
a change password link after login. There were 56 subjects involved in Dataset-1
resulting in 58 unique pictures, 86 registered passwords, and 2,536 login attempts.
Instead of asking subjects to upload pictures for Dataset-2, we chose 15 pictures
in advance from the PASCAL Visual Object Classes Challenge 2007 dataset Ever-
ingham et al. (2007). Figure 5.1 shows the 15 images that are used in Dataset-2
as the background pictures for password selection. We chose these pictures because
they represent a diverse range of pictures in terms of category (portrait, wedding,
party, bicycle, train, airplane and car) and complexity (pictures with few and plenti-
ful stand-out regions). Subjects were asked to choose one password for each picture
by pretending that it was protecting their bank information. The 15 pictures were
presented to subjects in a random order to reduce the dependency of password selec-
tion upon the picture presentation order. 762 subjects participated in the Dataset-2
collection resulting in 10,039 passwords. The number of passwords for each picture
in the Dataset-2 varies slightly, with an average of 669, because some subjects quit
the study without setting up passwords for all pictures.
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Table 5.1: Survey Question: Which of the following best describes what you are
considering when you choose locations to perform gestures?
Multi-choice Answers
Dataset
1 2 Overall
I try to nd locations where special ob-
jects are, such as face, eye, clock, car,
badge, etc.
24
(72.7%)
389
(59.6%)
413
(60.3%)
I try to nd locations where some special
shapes are, such as circle and line, etc.
8 (24.2%) 143
(21.9%)
151
(22.1%)
I try to nd locations where colors are dif-
ferent from their surroundings, such as a
red apple in a green lemon pile, etc.
0 (0%) 57 (8.7%) 57 (8.3%)
I randomly choose a location to draw with-
out thinking about the background pic-
ture.
1 (3.0%) 66
(10.1%)
67 (9.8%)
For both datasets, subjects were asked to nish the aforementioned questionnaire
to help us understand their experiences. We collected 685 (33 for Dataset-1, 652
for Dataset-2 ) copies of survey answers in total. According to the demographic-
related inquiries in the exit survey, 81.8% subjects in Dataset-1 are self-reported
male and 63.6% are between 18 and 24 years old. While participants in Dataset-2
are more diverse with 64.4% male, 37.2% among 18 to 24 years old, 45.4% among
25 - 34, and 15.0% among 35 - 50. Even though the subjects in our studies do not
represent all possible demographics, the data collected from them represents the most
comprehensive PGA usage so far. Their tendencies could provide us with signicant
insights into the user choice in PGA.
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5.3.2 Findings
This section summarizes our empirical analysis on the above-mentioned datasets
by presenting ve ndings.
Finding 1: Relationship Between Background Picture and User's Identity,
Personality, or Interests
We analyzed all unique pictures in Dataset-1, and the background pictures chosen
by subjects range from celebrity to system screenshot. We categorize them into six
classes: i) people (27/58), ii) civilization (7/58), iii) landscape (3/58), iv) computer-
generated picture (14/58), v) animals (6/58), and vi) others (1/58).
For the category of `people', 6 pictures were categorized as `me'; 12 pictures were
subjects' families; 4 were pictures of subjects' friends; and 5 were celebrities. The
analysis of answers to the survey question \Could you explain why you choose such
types of pictures?" revealed two opposite attitudes towards using picture of people.
The advocates for such pictures considered: i) it is more friendly. e.g. \The image
was special to me so I enjoy seeing it when I log in"; ii) it is easier for remembering
passwords. e.g. \Marking points on a person is easier to remember"; and iii) it makes
password more secure. e.g. \The picture is personal so it should be much harder for
someone to guess the password". However, other participants believed it may leak his
or her identity or privacy. e.g. \revealing myself or my family to anyone who picks up
the device". They preferred other types of pictures because \less personal if someone
gets my picture" and \landscape usually doesn't have any information about who you
are".
14 pictures in Dataset-1 could be categorized as computer-generated pictures
including computer game posters, cartoons, and some geometrical graphs. 24.1%
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(14/58) of such pictures were observed in Dataset-1 but the survey results indicated
6.4% (42/652) of participants were in such a usage pattern in Dataset-2 based on
the following survey question: \Please indicate the type of pictures you prefer to use
as the background". We concluded the population characteristics (male, age 18-24,
college students) in Dataset-1 were the major reason behind this phenomenon. The
answers to \Could you explain why you choose such types of pictures?" in Dataset-1
supported this conjecture: \computer game is something I am interested [in] it" and
\computer games picture is personalized to my interests and enjoyable to look at".
It is obvious that pictures with personally identiable information may leak per-
sonal information. However, it is less obvious that even pictures with no personally
identiable information may provide some clues which may reveal the identity or per-
sona of a device owner. Traditional text-based password does not have this concern
as long as the password is kept secure. Previous graphical password schemes, such
as Face and PassPoints, do not have this concern either because pictures are selected
from a predened repository.
Finding 2: Gestures on Points of Interest
The security of background draw-a-secret schemes mostly relies on the location distri-
bution of users' gestures. It is the most secure if the locations of users' gestures follow
a uniform distribution on any picture. However, such passwords would be dicult to
remember and may not be preferable by users. By analyzing the collected passwords,
we notice that subjects frequently chose standout regions (points of interest, PoIs)
on which to draw. As shown in Table 5.1, only 9.8% subjects claimed to choose
locations randomly without caring about the background picture. The observation
is supported by survey answers to \Could you explain the way you choose locations
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Table 5.2: Attributes of Most Frequently Used PoIs
Attributes # Gesture # Password # Subject
Eye 36 20 19
Nose 21 13 10
Hand/Finger 6 5 4
Jaw 5 3 3
Face (Head) 4 2 2
to perform gestures?": \If I have to remember it; it [would] better stand out." and
\Something that would make it easier to remember".
Even though the theoretical password space of PGA is larger than text-based
passwords with the same length, a background picture aects user choice in gesture
location, reducing the feasible password space tremendously. We summarize three
popular ways that subjects used to identify standout regions: i) nding regions with
objects. e.g. \I chose eyes and other notable features" and \I chose locations such
as nose, mouth or whole face"; ii) nding regions with remarkable shapes. e.g. \if
there is a circle there I would draw a circle around that"; and iii) nding regions with
outstanding colors. The detailed distribution of these selection processes is shown in
Table 5.1. 60.3% of subjects prefer to nd locations where special objects catch their
eyes while 22.1% of subjects would rather draw on some special shapes.
Finding 3: Similarities Across Points of Interest
We analyzed the attributes of PoIs that users preferred to draw on. We paid more
attention to the pictures of people because it was the most popular category. In the 31
registered passwords for the 27 pictures of people uploaded by 22 subjects in Dataset-
1, we analyzed the patterns of PoI choice. As shown in Table 5.2, 36 gestures were
drawn on eyes and 21 gestures were drawn on noses. Other locations that attracted
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Two Versions of Starry Night and Corresponding Passwords
subjects to draw included hand/nger, jaw, face (head), and ear. Interestingly, 19
subjects out of 22 (86.3%) drew on eyes at least once, while 10 subjects (45.4%)
performed gestures on noses. The tendencies to choose similar PoIs by dierent
subjects are common in other picture categories as well. Figure 5.2 shows another
example where two subjects uploaded two versions of Starry Night in Dataset-1. The
passwords they chose show strikingly similar patterns with three taps on stars, even
if there is no single gesture location overlap.
Finding 4: Directional Patterns in PGA Password
Salehi-Abari et al. Salehi-Abari et al. (2008) suggest many passwords in click-based
systems follow some directional patterns. We are interested in whether PGA pass-
words show similar characteristics. For simplicity, we consider the coordinates of tap
and circle gestures as their locations and the middle point of the starting and ending
points of line as its location. If the x or y coordinate of a gesture sequence follows
a consistent direction regardless of the other coordinate, we say the sequence follows
a LINE pattern. We divide LINE patterns into four categories: i) H+, denoting
left-to-right (xi  xi+1); ii) H-, denoting right-to-left (xi  xi+1); iii) V+, denoting
top-to-bottom (yi  yi+1); and iv) V-, denoting bottom-to-top (yi  yi+1). If a se-
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Table 5.3: Numbers of Gesture-order Patterns
H+ H- V+ V- DIAG Others
Dataset-1 43
50.0%
5
5.8%
16
18.6%
4
4.6%
22
25.5%
18
20.9%
Dataset-2 3144
31.3%
1303
12.9%
1479
14.7%
887
8.8%
2621
26.1%
3326
33.1%
quence of gestures follows a horizontal pattern and a vertical pattern at the same
time, we say it follows a DIAG pattern.
We examined the occurrence of each LINE and DIAG pattern in the collected
data. As shown in Table 5.3, more than half passwords in both datasets exhibited
some LINE patterns, and a quarter of them exhibited some DIAG patterns. Among
four LINE patterns, H+ (drawing from left to right) was the most popular one with
50.0% and 31.3% occurrences in Dataset-1 and Dataset-2, respectively. And, V+
(drawing from top to bottom) was the second most popular with 18.6% and 14.7%
occurrences in two datasets, respectively. This nding shows it is reasonable to use
gesture-order patterns as one heuristic factor to prioritize generated passwords.
Finding 5: Time Disparity among Dierent Combinations of Gesture
Types
We analyzed all registered passwords to understand the gesture patterns and the
relationship between gesture type and input time. For 86 registered passwords (258
gestures) in Dataset-1, 212 (82.1%) gesture types were taps, 39 (15.1%) were lines, and
only 7 (2.7%) were circles. However, the corresponding occurrences for 10,039 regis-
tered passwords (30,117 gestures) in Dataset-2 were 15,742 (52.2%), 10,292 (34.2%),
and 4,083 (13.5%), respectively. Obviously, subjects in Dataset-2 chose more di-
verse gesture types than subjects in Dataset-1. As shown in Table 5.4, there was
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Table 5.4: Numbers of Gesture Type Combinations and Average Time Spent on
Creating Them
3t 3l 3c 2t+l 2t+c
Dataset-1
# 60 3 0 9 1
Average Time (Seconds) 5.74 12.39 N/A 10.12 21.56
Dataset-2
# 3438 1447 253 1211 380
Average Time (Seconds) 4.33 7.11 9.96 6.02 6.14
2l+t 2l+c 2c+t 2c+l t+l+c
Dataset-1
# 7 1 0 0 5
Average Time (Seconds) 11.17 17.51 N/A N/A 11.22
Dataset-2
# 1000 622 192 442 1054
Average Time (Seconds) 7.72 9.98 8.78 10.19 9.37
a strong connection between the time subjects spent on reproducing passwords and
the gesture types they chose. Three taps, the most common gesture combination,
appeared in both datasets with the lowest average time (5.74 seconds and 4.33 sec-
onds in corresponding dataset). On the other hand, the passwords with two circles
and one line took the longest average input time (10.19 seconds in Dataset-2 ). In
the user studies, subjects in Dataset-2 were asked to set up the passwords by pre-
tending they were protecting their bank information. However, subjects in Dataset-1
actually used these passwords to access the class materials which they accessed more
than four times a week on average. This may be a reason why subjects in Dataset-1
prefer passwords with simpler gesture type combinations that are easier to reproduce
in a timely manner.
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Figure 5.3: Memorability and Usability
5.3.3 Memorability and Usability Analysis
The tolerance introduced in PGA is a trade-o between security and usability.
In order to quantify this tradeo, we calculate the distance between input PGA
passwords with the registered ones. When the types or directions of gestures do not
match, we regard input passwords incomparable with the registered ones. Otherwise,
the distance is dened as the average distance of all gestures. We denote the password
presented for the i-th attempt ~(i) and ~(0) as the password registered for the same
picture.
In the 2,536 login attempts collected in Dataset-1, 422 are unsuccessful in which
146 are type or direction errors and 276 are distance errors. Figure 5.3(a) shows the
distance distribution for the password whose distance is less than 10 and the red line
denotes the threshold for being classied as successful. The result shows the current
setup in our system is quite reasonable to capture most closely presented passwords.
Figure 5.3(b) shows the average time in seconds that subjects spent on registering,
conrming, and reproducing passwords. x = 1 denotes the registration, x = 2 denotes
the conformation, and all others denote the later login attempts. As we can notice,
the average time for the registration is 7.43 seconds while 4.53 seconds are taken for
the conrmation. With subjects getting used to the picture password system, the
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average time spent for successful logins is reduced to as low as 2.51 seconds. On the
other hand, the average time spent on all unsuccessful login attempts is 5.86 seconds.
5.4 Using User Choice Patterns to Attack PGA Passwords
In this section, we present an attack framework on Windows 8 picture gesture
authentication, leveraging the ndings addressed in Section 5.3. Our attack frame-
work takes the target picture's PoIs, a set of learning pictures' PoIs and corresponding
password pairs as input, and produces a list of possible passwords, which is ranked
in the descending order of the password probabilities.
Next, we rst discuss the attack models followed by the representations of pic-
ture password and PoI. We then illustrate the idea of a selection function and its
automatic identication. We also present two algorithms for generating a selection
function sequence list and describe how it can generate picture password dictionaries
for previously unseen target pictures.
5.4.1 Attack Models
Depending on the resources an attacker possesses, we articulate three dierent
attack models: i) Pure Brute-force Attack : an attacker blindly guesses the picture
password without knowing any information of the background picture and the users'
tendencies. The password space in this model is 230:1 in PGA Pace (2011a). ii) PoI-
assisted Brute-force Attack : an attacker assumes the user only performs drawings
on PoIs of the background picture and this model randomly guesses passwords on
identied PoIs. The password space for a picture with 20 PoIs in this model is
227:7 Pace (2011a). Salehi-Abari et al. Salehi-Abari et al. (2008) designed an approach
to automatically identify hot-spots in a picture and generate passwords on them. iii)
Knowledge-based PoI-assisted Attack : in addition to the assumption for PoI-assisted
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brute-force attack, an attacker ought to have some knowledge about the password
patterns learned from collected picture and password pairs (not necessarily from the
target user or picture). The guessing space in this model is the same as the one in
PoI-assisted brute-force attack. However, the generated dictionaries in this model are
ranked with the higher possibility passwords on the top of the list.
Attack schemes could also be divided into two categories based on whether or
not an attacker has the ability to attack previously unseen pictures. The method
presented in Salehi-Abari et al. (2008) is able to attack previously unseen pictures
for click-based graphical password. It uses click-order heuristics to generate partially
ranked dictionaries. However, this approach cannot be applied directly to background
draw-a-secret schemes because the gestures allowed in such schemes are much more
complex and the order-based heuristics could not capture users' selection processes
accurately. In contrast, our attack framework could abstract generic knowledge of
user choice in picture password schemes. In addition, as a working knowledge-based
PoI-assisted model, it is able to generate ranked dictionaries for previously unseen
pictures.
5.4.2 Password and PoI Representations
We rst formalize the representation of a password in PGA with the denition of
a location-dependent gesture which represents a single gesture on some locations in
a picture.
Denition 5.1. A location-dependent gesture (LdG) denoted as  is a 7-tuple hg; x1
; y1; x2 ; y2; r; di that consists of gesture's type, location, and other attributes.
In this denition, g denotes the type of LdG that must be one of tap, line, and
circle. A tap LdG is further represented by the coordinates of a gesture hx1; y1i. A
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line LdG is denoted by the coordinates of the starting and ending points of a gesture
hx1; y1i and hx2; y2i. A circle LdG is denoted by the coordinates of its center hx1; y1i,
radius r, and direction d 2 f+; g (clockwise or not). We dene the password space
of location-dependent gesture as  = tap
S
line
S
circle. A valid PGA password is
a length-three sequence of LdGs denoted as ~, and the PGA password space could
be denoted as ~.
A point of interest is a standout region in a picture. PoIs could be regions
with semantic-rich meanings, such as face (head), eye, car, clock, etc. Also, they
could stand out in terms of their shapes (line, rectangle, circle, etc.) or colors (red,
green, blue, etc.). We denote a PoI by the coordinates of its circumscribed rect-
angle and some describing attributes. A PoI is a 5-tuple hx1; y1; x2; y2; Di, where
hx1; y1i and hx2; y2i are the coordinates of the top-left and bottom-right points of
the circumscribed rectangle, and D  2D is a set of attributes that describe this
PoI. D has three sub-categories Do;Ds and Dc and four wildcards o; s; c; and
, where Do = fhead, eye, nose, ...g, Ds = fline, rectangle, circle, ...g, and Dc =
fred, blue, yellow, ...g. Wildcards are used when no specic information is available.
For example, if a PoI is identied with objectness measure Alexe et al. (2012) that
gives no semantics about the identied region, we mark the PoI's describing attribute
as .
5.4.3 Location-dependent Gesture Selection Functions
A key concept in our framework is the location-dependent gesture selection func-
tion (LdGSF) which models and simulates the ways of thinking that users go through
when they select a gesture on a picture. The motivation behind this abstraction is
that the set of PoIs and their locations dier from picture to picture, but the ways
that users think to choose locations for drawing a gesture exhibit certain patterns.
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LdGSF 1: Circle a head
i.e., s(circle, {head}, Ф)
LdGSF 2: Line two noses
i.e., s(line, {nose}, {nose})
LdGSF 3: Tap a nose
i.e., s(tap, {nose}, Ф)
Gesture 1: Circle my father’s head
Gesture 2: Connect my little 
sister’s nose to my older sister’s 
nose
Gesture 3: Tap my mother’s nose
1
2
3
Selection processes [29] LdGSF
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.4: (a) Background Picture and Password (b) User's Selection Processes
that Were Taken From Pace (2011b) (c) Corresponding LdGSFs that Simulate User's
Selection Processes
This conjecture is supported by our observations from collected data and surveys
discussed in Section 5.3. With the help of LdGSF, the PoIs and corresponding pass-
words in training pictures are used to generalize picture-independent knowledge that
describes how users choose passwords.
Denition 5.2. A location-dependent gesture selection function (LdGSF) is a map-
ping s : G 2D  2D ! 2 which takes a gesture, two sets of PoI attributes, and
a set of PoIs in the learning picture as input to produce a set of location-dependent
gestures.
The universal set of LdGSF is dened as S. A length-three sequence of LdGSF
is denoted as ~s, and a set of length-three LdGSF sequences is denoted as ~S. s(tap; fred;
appleg;?; k) is interpreted as `tap a red apple in the picture pk' and s(circle; fheadg;?; k)
as `circle a head in pk'. Note that, no specic information of the locations of `red ap-
ple' and `head' is provided here which makes the representations independent from
actual locations of objects in the picture.
One challenge we face is some PoIs may be big enough to take several unique
gestures. Let us consider a picture with a big car image in it. Simply saying `tap
a car' could result in lots of distinct tap gestures in the circumscribed rectangle of
the car. One solution to this problem is to divide the circumscribed rectangle into
a grid with the scale of toleration threshold. However, this solution would result
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LdG 1: <circle, 33, 15, 0, 0, 9, - >
LdG 2: <line, 54, 34, 79, 27, 0, 0>
LdG 3: <tap, 16, 35, 0, 0, 0, 0>
PoI 1: <4, 23, 21, 46, {head}>
PoI 2: <23, 3, 43, 28, {head}>
PoI 3: <46, 19, 63, 43, {head}>
PoI 4: <71, 12, 90, 35, {head}>
PoI 5: <13, 33, 18, 37, {nose}>
PoI 6: <32, 17, 34, 19, {nose}>
PoI 7: <51, 31, 56, 35, {nose}>
PoI 8: <76, 24, 81, 28, {nose}>
$ $ ...
1
2
3
PoIs Password
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.5: (a) Background Picture and Identied PoIs (b) Identied PoIs (c) Pass-
word Representations (Colors are used to indicate the connections between the PoIs
in (b) and LdGs in (c))
in too many password entries in the generated dictionary. For simplicity, we intro-
duce ve inner points for one PoI, namely center, top, bottom, left, and right that
denote the center of the PoI and four points of the center of two consecutive cor-
ners. Any gesture that falls into the proximities of these ve points of a PoI would
be considered as an action on this PoI. For some PoIs that are big enough to take
an inner line gesture, we put ? as the input of the second set of PoI attributes.
s(line; fmouthg;?; k) denotes `line from the left(right) to the right(left) on the same
mouth'. While, s(line; fmouthg; fmouthg; k) means `connect two dierent mouths'.
Figure 5.4 shows an example demonstrating how LdGSF simulates a user's selec-
tion processes that were taken from Pace (2011b). In reality, a user's selection process
on a PoI and gesture selection may be determined by some subjective knowledge and
cognition. For example, `circle my father's head' and `tap my mother's nose' may
involve some undecidable computing problems. One solution to handle this issue is
to approximate subjective selection processes in objective ways by including some
modiers. `circle my father's head' may be transformed into `circle the uppermost
head' or `circle the biggest head'. However, it is extremely dicult, if not impossi-
ble, to accurately approximate subjective selection processes in this way, and it may
bring serious over-tting problems in the learning stage. Instead, we choose to ignore
subjective information by abstracting `circle my father's head' to `circle a head'. A
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drawback of this abstraction is that an LdGSF may return more than one LdG and
we have no knowledge to rank them directly, as they come from the same LdGSF.
Using Figure 5.4(a) as an example, `circle a head' outputs four dierent LdGs on
each head in the picture. The LdGSF sequence shown in Figure 5.4(c) generates
4  (4  3)  4 = 192 passwords. To cope with this issue, we use gesture-order to
rank the passwords generated by the same LdGSF sequence that will be detailed in
Section 5.4.5. Next, we present an automated approach to extract users' selection
processes from the collected data and represent them with LdGSFs.
Figure 5.5 shows an example demonstrating that how to extract users' selection
processes from PoIs automatically. First, PoIs in the background picture are identied
using mature computer vision techniques such as face detection and recognition Zhang
and Li (2010, 2012), object detection Canny (1986), and objectness measure Alexe
et al. (2012). Then, each LdG in a password is compared with PoIs based on their
coordinates and sizes. If a match between PoIs and LdGs is found, a new LdGSF
is created as the combination of the LdG's gesture type and PoI's attributes. For
instance, the location and size of LdG 1 in Figure 5.5(c) matches PoI 2 in Figure 5.5(b)
(the locations of the circle gesture and PoI center are compared rst; then, the radius
of the circle is compared with 1/2 of PoI's height and width). Then, an LdGSF
s(circle; fheadg;?) is created which is equivalent to the LdG shown in Figure 5.4(c).
To choose a password in PGA, the user selects a length-three LdGSF sequence.
With the denition of LdGSF, the generation of ranked password list is simplied
into the generation of the ranked LdGSF sequence list. Let order: ~S ! f1::j~Sjg be
a bijection which indicates the order LdGSF sequences should be performed. The
objective of generating ranked LdGSF sequence list is to nd such a bijection.
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5.4.4 LdGSF Sequence List Generation and Ordering
Now we present our approach to nd the aforementioned bijection that indicates
the order that the LdGSF sequences should be performed on a target picture for
generating the password dictionary. Our framework is not dependent on certain rules,
but is adaptive to the tendencies shown by users who participate in the training set.
The characteristic of adaptiveness helps our framework generate dedicated guessing
paths for dierent training data. Next, we present two algorithms for obtaining such
a feature.
BestCover LdGSF Sequence List Generation
We rst propose an LdGSF sequence list generation algorithm named BestCover that
is derived from Bmssc Feige et al. (2004) and Bemts Zhang et al. (2010). The objective
of BestCover LdGSF sequence list generation is to optimize the guessing order for the
sequences in the list by minimizing the expected number of sequences that need to
be tested on a random choice of picture in the training dataset.
The problem is formalized as follows: Instance: The collection of LdGSF sequences
~s1; :::; ~sn and corresponding picture password ~1,..., ~n, for which ~si(i) 3 ~i; i 2 f1::ng
and 1; ::; n are the sets of PoIs in pictures p1; ::; pn. Question: Expected Min Selec-
tion Search (emss): The objective is to nd order so as to minimize E(minfi : ~si(r) 3
~rg, where ~si = order 1(i) and the expectation is taken with respect to a random
choice of r  f1::ng. We use coveremss(k) = min~s:~s(k)3 ~k(orderemss(~s)) to compute
the number of required guesses to break ~k. Therefore, E(minfi : ~si(r) 3 ~rg is
equivalent to E(coveremss(r)).
The hardness of this problem is that dierent LdGSFs and LdGSF sequences may
generate the same list of LdGs and passwords. For instance, `tap a red object' and
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`tap an apple' turn out the same result on a picture in which there is a red apple.
An overlap in dierent LdGSF results is similar to the coverage characteristics in
the set cover problem. We can prove the NP-hardness of emss by reducing from
mssc Feige et al. (2004); Zhang et al. (2010). Min Sum Set Cover (mssc) is formalized
as follows: Given is a set U and a collection C of subsets of U where SC2C = U . Let
ordermssc : C ! f1::jCjg be a bijection, and let covermssc : U ! f1::jCjg be dened
by covermssc(j) = minC3j(ordermssc(C)). The problem is called min sum, because the
object is to minimize
P
j2Ucovermssc(j).
Given any instance (U; C) of mssc, denote U = f1::ng. We create a set of PoIs j
and a picture password ~j for each j 2 U . j and ~j must be dierent from k and ~k
respectively for any k 6= j . For each C 2 C, we create an LdGSF sequence ~sC such
that ~sC(j) 3 ~j if j 2 C and such that ~sC(j) =  if j 62 C. We can always construct
such an LdGSF sequence for each C by combining all j; j 2 C as a new PoI type
in a wildcard representation. The set ~S consists of the set of ~sC for dierent C. Set
ordermssc(C) orderemss( ~sC), then
E(coveremss(r))
=
nX
i=1
i Pr(coveremss(r) = i)
=
nX
i=1
i jk 2 f1::ng : coveremss(k) = ij
n
The number of picture passwords that are
cracked for the rst time at the ith guess
divided by the total number of picture
passwords
=
nX
i=1
i jj 2 U : covermssc(j) = ij
n
=
X
j2U
covermssc(j)
n
Therefore, orderemss minimizes E(coveremss(r)) if and only if ordermssc minimizes
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P
j2U covermssc(j). We give an approximation algorithm for emss in Algorithm 8 that
is a modication from Bmssc Feige et al. (2004) and Bemts Zhang et al. (2010). The
time complexity of BestCover is O(n2 + j~S 0jlog(j~S 0j)).
Algorithm 3: BestCover((~s1; ::; ~sn),( ~1,..., ~n))
1 for i = 1::n do
2 T~si  fk : ~si(k) 3 ~kg;
3 end
4 ~S0  f~s : jT~sj > 0g;
5 for i = 1::j~S0j do
6 order 1(i) ~sk, that T ~sk has most elements that are not included inS
i0<iorder
 1(i0);
7 end
8 return order
BestCover is good for a training dataset that consists of comprehensive and large
scale password samples, because it assumes the target passwords exhibit same or at
least very similar distributions to the training data. However, if the training dataset
is small and biased, the results from BestCover may over-t the training data and fail
in testing data.
Unbiased LdGSF Sequence List Generation
The over-tting problem in BestCover is brought about by the biased PoI attribute
distributions in training data. For example, we have a training set with 9 pictures of
apples and 1 picture of a car, and 5 corresponding passwords have circles on apples
and 1 has a circle on car. In the generated LdGSF sequence list, BestCover will
put sequences with `circle an apple' prior to the ones with `circle a car', because the
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former ones have an LdGSF that was used in more passwords. However, we can see
the probability for users to circle car (1/1) is higher than apples (5/9) if we consider
the occurrences of apple and car in pictures.
Unbiased LdGSF sequence list generation copes with this issue by considering
the PoI attribute distributions. It removes the biases from the training dataset by
normalizing the occurrences of LdGSFs with the occurrences of their corresponding
PoIs. Let D ~sk   denote the event that  contains enough PoIs that have attributes
specied in ~sk. If a PoI with a specic type of attributes does not exist in a picture,
the probability that a user select the PoI with such an attribute on this picture to
draw a password is 0, denoted as Pr(~skjD ~sk  ) = 0, e.g. a user would not think
and perform `tap a red apple' on a picture without the existence of the red apple. We
assume each LdGSF in a sequence is independent of each other and approximately
compute Pr(~skjD ~sk  ) with Equation 5.1.
Pr(~skjD ~sk  )
= Pr(s1s2s3jDs1   ^Ds2   ^Ds3  )
= Pr(s1jDs1  ) Pr(s2jDs2  ) Pr(s3jDs3  )
(5.1)
For each si 2 S, we compute Pr(sijDsi  ) with Equation 5.2:
Pr(sijDsi  ) =
Pn
j=1 count(Dsi ; ~j)Pn
j=1 count(Dsi ; j)
(5.2)
where
Pn
j=1 count(Dsi ; ~j) denotes the number of LdGs in passwords of the training
set that share the same attributes with si, and
Pn
j=1 count(Dsi ; j) denotes the num-
ber of PoIs in the training set that share the same attributes with si. Pr(sijDsi  )
describes the probability of using a certain LdGSF when there are enough PoIs with
the required attributes.
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The Unbiased algorithm generates an LdGSF sequence list by ranking Pr(~skjD ~sk 
) instead of Pr(~sk) in descending order as shown in Algorithm 10. The time com-
plexity of Unbiased is O(njSj+ j~Sjlog(j~Sj)). The Unbiased algorithm would be better
for the scenarios where fewer samples are available or samples are highly biased.
Algorithm 4: Unbiased(S)
1 for s 2 S do
2 Compute Pr(sjDs  ) with Equation 5.2;
3 end
4 for ~s 2 ~S do
5 Compute Pr(~sjD~s  ) with Equation 5.1;
6 end
7 for i = 1::j~Sj do
8 order 1(i) ~sk, that Pr(~skjD ~sk  ) holds the i-th position in the descending
ordered Pr(~sjD~s  ) list;
9 end
10 return order
5.4.5 Password Dictionary Generation
The last step in our attack framework is to generate the password dictionary for a
previously unseen target picture. First, the PoIs in the previously unseen picture are
identied. Then, a dictionary is acquired by applying the LdGSF sequences on the
PoIs, following the order created by the BestCover or Unbiased algorithm. Obviously,
the passwords generated by an LdGSF sequence that holds a higher position in the
LdGSF sequence list will also be in higher positions in the dictionary. However, as
addressed earlier, BestCover and Unbiased algorithms do not provide extra information
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to rank the passwords generated by the same LdGSF sequence. Inspired by using the
click-order patterns as the heuristics for dictionary generation Salehi-Abari et al.
(2008), we propose to rank such passwords generated by the same LdGSF sequence
with gesture-orders. In the training stage, we record the gesture-order occurrence
of each LINE and DIAG pattern and rank the patterns in descending order. In the
attack stage, for the passwords generated by the same LdGSF sequence, we reorder
them with their gesture-orders in the order of LINE and DIAG patterns. Passwords
that do not belong to any LINE or DIAG pattern hold lower positions.
5.5 Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of our proof-of-concept sys-
tem.
5.5.1 PoI Identication
We chose OpenCV Intel (2014) as the computer vision framework for our imple-
mentation and collected several feature detection tools for automatically identifying
PoIs in background pictures. The computer vision techniques we adopted include:
i) object detection: the goal of object detection is to nd the locations and sizes of
semantic objects of a certain class in a digital image. Viola-Jones object detection
framework Viola and Jones (2004) is the rst computationally aordable online ob-
ject detection framework that utilizes Haar-like features instead of image intensities.
Each learned classier is represented and stored as a haar cascade. We collected
30 proven haar cascades from Reimondo (2008) for 8 dierent object classes includ-
ing face (head), eye, nose, mouth, ear, head, body, and clock. ii) low-level feature
detection: due to the high positive and high negative rates of object detection, we
also resorted to some low-level feature detection algorithms that identify standout
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 5.6: PoI Identication on Example Pictures in Dataset-2 : (a) Original Pic-
tures (b) Circle Detection with Hough Transform (c) Contour Detection (d) Object-
ness Measure (e) Object Detection
regions without extracting semantics. To identify regions whose colors are dierent
from their surroundings, we rst converted the color pictures to black and white, then
found the contours using algorithms in Suzuki et al. (1985). For the circle detection,
we used Canny edge detector Canny (1986) and Hough transform algorithms Ballard
(1981). iii) objectness measure: objectness measure Alexe et al. (2012) deals with
class-generic object detection. Dierent from detecting objects in a specic class, the
objectness measure nds the locations and sizes of class-generic objects whose colors
and textures are opposed to the background images. Objectness measure could be
considered as a technique combining several low-level feature detectors together. We
used an objectness measure library from Alexe et al. (2013) that is able to locate
objects and give numerical condence values with its results.
Figure 5.6 displays the PoI detection results on four example pictures in Dataset-
2. As we can see in Figure 5.6(b), circle detection could identify both bicycle wheels
and car badge, but its false positive rate is a little high. Contour detection is the
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most robust algorithm with a low false positive rate which could locate regions whose
colors are dierent as shown in Figure 5.6(c). Objectness measure shown in Fig-
ure 5.6(d) could also identify regions whose colors and textures are dierent from
their surroundings. Since most haar cascades we used are designed for facial land-
marks, they work smoothly on portraits as does the second picture in Figure 5.6(e).
However, the results show relatively high false positive rates on pictures from other
categories. In order to identify more PoIs as accurate as possible, our approach in PoI
identication leveraged two steps. In the rst step, all possible PoIs were identied
using dierent kinds of tools. In the second step, we examined all identied PoIs
and removed duplicates by comparing their locations, sizes and attributes. Then, our
approach generated a PoI set called P 1A-40 and P
2
A-40 for each picture in Dataset-1 and
Dataset-2, respectively. Those PoI sets consisted of at most 40 PoIs with the highest
condences.
Since our attack algorithms are independent from the PoI identication algo-
rithms, we are also interested in examining how our attack framework performs with
ideal PoI annotations for pictures. Besides using the automated PoI identication
techniques, we manually annotated pictures in Dataset-2 for some outstanding PoIs
as well. To annotate the pictures, we simply recorded the locations and attributes
of at most fteen most appealing regions in the pictures without referring to any
password in the collected dataset. We call this annotated PoI set P 2L-15.
5.5.2 LdGSF Identication
We discuss the identied LdGSFs by linking PoIs and passwords in Dataset-2 with
the help of two PoI sets P 2L-15 and P
2
A-40 using our LdGSF identication algorithm
discussed in Section 5.4.3. The results from PL are closer to users' actual selection
processes, while the results from PA are the best approximations to users' selection
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processes we could get in a purely automated way with state-of-the-art computer
vision techniques.
Table 5.5: Top 10 Identied LdGSFs Using P 2L-15
Rank Pr(sk) Pr(skjDsk  )
1 (tap; fheadg;?) (tap; fnoseg;?)
2 (tap; fcg;?) (tap; fmouthg;?)
3 (tap; fcircleg;?) (tap; fcircleg;?)
4 (tap; feyeg;?) (tap; feyeg;?)
5 (circle; fheadg;?) (tap; fcg;?)
6 (tap; fnoseg;?) (tap; fheadg;?)
7 (circle; fcircleg;?) (circle; fcircleg;?)
8 (circle; feyeg;?) (tap; fearg;?)
9 (line; fcg; fcg) (line; fmouthg; fmouthg)
10 (line; feyeg; feyeg) (tap; fforeheadg;?)
The top ten identied LdGSFs using P 2L-15 are shown in Table 5.5 ordered by their
Pr(sk) and Pr(skjDsk  ). It also suggests that `tap a head' is found the most times
in the passwords, while `tap a nose' is the most popular one when there is a nose in
the picture. The result seems unreasonable at the rst glance since there is always
a nose in a head. Actually, it is because if the head in the picture is really small,
we simply annotate the circumscribed rectangle as head instead of marking the inner
rectangles with more specic attributes. Table 5.5 indicates that gestures on human
organs are the most popular selection functions adopted by subjects.
The top ten identied LdGSFs using P 2A-40 are shown in Table 5.6. By comparing
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, we could notice dierences caused by using annotated PoI
set and automated detected PoI set. The fact that s(tap; fg;?) is among the top
ten LdGSFs is an indicator that the automatic PoI identication could not classify
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Table 5.6: Top 10 Identied LdGSFs Using P 2A-40
Rank Pr(sk) Pr(skjDsk  )
1 (tap; fcircleg;?) (tap; fclockg;?)
2 (tap; fmouthg;?) (circle; fclockg;?)
3 (tap; feyeg;?) (tap; fshoulderg;?)
4 (tap; fheadg;?) (tap; feyeg;?)
5 (tap; fcg;?) (tap; fheadg;?)
6 (tap; fg;?) (tap; fbodyg;?)
7 (circle; feyeg;?) (tap; fmouthg;?)
8 (tap; fbodyg;?) (tap; fcircleg;?)
9 (circle; fcircleg;?) (tap; fg;?)
10 (circle; fheadg;?) (tap; fcg;?)
many PoIs and simply mark them as . It is surprising to nd out there are two LdGs
on clock in top ten ordered by Pr(skjDsk  ) at rst, because there is no clock in
any picture in Dataset-2. The closest guess is OpenCV falsely identied some circle
shape objects as clocks, but the number is not very big since there is no LdG on a
clock in the top ten ordered by Pr(sk).
5.6 Attack Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results of our framework for nontargeted
attacks and targetted attacks.
5.6.1 Nontargeted Attack Evaluation
In order to attack passwords from a previously unseen picture, the training dataset
excluded passwords from the target picture. More specically, to evaluate Dataset-1
(58 unique pictures), we used passwords from 57 pictures as the training data and at-
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Figure 5.7: (a) Percentage of passwords cracked vs. number of password guesses,
per condition. (b) Percentage of LdGs cracked vs. number of password guesses,
per condition. For Dataset-1, there are 86 passwords that include 258 LdGs. For
Dataset-2, there are 10,039 passwords that have 30,117 LdGs.
tacked the passwords for the last picture. To evaluate Dataset-2 (15 unique pictures),
we used passwords for 14 pictures as training data, learned the patterns exhibited in
the training data, and generated a password dictionary for the last picture. The same
process was carried out 58 and 15 times for Dataset-1 and Dataset-2, respectively, in
which the target picture was dierent in each round. The size of the dictionary was
set as 219 which is 11-bit smaller than the theoretical password space. We compared
all collected passwords for the target picture with the generated dictionary for the
picture, and recorded the number of password guesses.
Nontargeted attacks also require that the training dataset doesnot include previ-
ous passwords from the targeted user. However, it turns out very time-consuming to
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perform strict nontargeted attacks on our Dataset-2. Instead, in our analyses, train-
ing password datasets include a very small number of passwords from the targeted
subject. More specically, in our experiment there were around 9,400 training pass-
words for which only 14 came from the targeted user. Even though this may aect
the results, we believe it is less inuential. Since all training passwords were treated
equally, the inuence brought by the 0.14% training data is low.
Oine Attacks
Due to the introduction of a tolerance threshold, picture passwords may be more
dicult to store securely compared with text-based passwords that are normally saved
after salted hashing. Even though the approach that Windows 8 is adopting to store
picture passwords remains undisclosed, we could consider two attack scenarios where
picture passwords are prone to oine attacks. In the rst scenario, all passwords
which fall into the vicinity (dened by the threshold) of chosen passwords could be
stored in a le with salted hashes for comparison. An attacker who has access to
this le could perform oine dictionary attacks like cracking text-based password
systems. In the second scenario, picture passwords could be used for other purposes
besides logging into Windows 8, where no constraint on the number of attempts is
enforced. For example, a registered picture password could be transformed and used
as a key to encrypt a le. An attacker who acquires the encrypted le would like to
perform an oine attack.
In order to attack passwords from a previously unseen picture, the training dataset
excluded passwords from the target picture. More specically, to evaluate Dataset-1
(58 unique pictures), we used passwords from 57 pictures as the training data and at-
tacked the passwords for the last picture. To evaluate Dataset-2 (15 unique pictures),
we used passwords for 14 pictures as training data, learned the patterns exhibited in
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Figure 5.8: (a) Percentage of passwords cracked vs. number of password guesses,
per condition. (b) Percentage of LdGs cracked vs. number of password guesses,
per condition. Only the rst chosen password by each subject in Dataset-2 was
considered. There are 762 passwords that have 2,286 LdGs.
the training data, and generated a password dictionary for the last picture. The same
process was carried out 58 and 15 times for Dataset-1 and Dataset-2, respectively, in
which the target picture was dierent in each round. The size of the dictionary was
set as 219 which is 11-bit smaller than the theoretical password space. We compared
all collected passwords for the target picture with the generated dictionary for the
picture, and recorded the number of password guesses.
The oine attack results within 219 guesses in dierent settings are shown in
Figure 5.7. There are 86 passwords in Dataset-1, which have a total of 258 LdGs. And
10,039 passwords were collected in Dataset-2, containing a total of 30,117 LdGs. For
Dataset-1, BestCover cracks 42 (48.8%) passwords out of 86 while Unbiased cracks 40
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Figure 5.9: (a) Percentage of passwords cracked vs. number of password guesses,
per condition. (b) Percentage of LdGs cracked vs. number of password guesses, per
condition. Only passwords for pictures 243, 1116, 2057, 4054, 6467, and 9899 were
considered. There are 4,003 passwords that have 12,009 LdGs.
(46.5%) passwords for the same dataset with P 1A-40. For Dataset-1, 178 LdGs (68.9%)
out of 258 are cracked with Unbiased and 171 (66.2%) are broken with BestCover. On
the other hand, Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks 2,953 passwords (29.4%) out of 10,039
for Dataset-2. This implies Unbiased with P 2A-40 cracking 2,418 passwords (24.0%) is
the best result for all purely automated attacks on Dataset-2. As Figure 5.7 suggests,
BestCover outperforms Unbiased slightly when ample training data is available. The
better performance of both algorithms on Dataset-1 is because the password gesture
combinations in Dataset-1 are relatively simpler than the ones in Dataset-2 as we
discussed in Section 5.3.2.
In Dataset-2, subjects may not choose all 15 passwords with the same care as
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they were eager to nish the process. To reduce this eect, we ran another analysis
in which only the rst chosen password by each subject was considered. There are
762 passwords that have 2,286 LdGs. Like previous analysis, the training dataset
excluded passwords from the target picture. As shown in Figure 5.8, results of this
analysis are not as good as previous ones. Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks 160 passwords
(21.0%) out of 762. Unbiased with P 2A-40 cracking 123 passwords (16.1%). BestCover
cracks 108 (14.2%) and 116 (15.2%) with P 2L-15 and P
2
A-40, respectively.
Since some pictures in Dataset-2 are similar, we ran an additional analysis in
which only passwords for pictures 243 (airplane), 1116 (portrait), 2057 (car), 4054
(wedding), 6467 (bicycle), and 9899 (dog) were considered. There are 4,003 passwords
that have 12,009 LdGs. Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks 1,147 passwords (28.6%) while
803 passwords (20.1%) are cracked by Unbiased with P 2A-40. BestCover cracks 829
(20.7%) and 875 (21.8%) with P 2L-15 and P
2
A-40 respectively. Results of this analysis
are not as good as results with passwords from all pictures.
Online Attacks
The current Windows 8 allows ve failure attempts before it forces users to enter
their text-based passwords. Therefore, breaking a password under ve guesses implies
the feasibility for launching an online attack. Figure 5.10 shows a rened view of the
number of passwords and LdGs cracked with the rst ve guesses per condition.
Purely automated attack Unbiased with P 2A-40 breaks 83 passwords (0.8%) with the
rst guess and cracks 94 passwords (0.9%) within the rst ve guesses, while BestCover
with P 2A-40 cracked 20 passwords (0.2%) for the rst guess and 38 passwords (0.4%)
within ve guesses. Additionally, Unbiased with P 2A-40 breaks 1,723 LdGs (5.7%) with
the rst guess. With the help of manually labeled PoI set P 2L-15, the results are even
better. For example, Unbiased breaks 195 passwords (1.9%) for the rst guess and
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Figure 5.10: Online attacks. (a) Number of passwords cracked within ve guesses,
per condition. (b) Number of LdGs cracked within ve guesses, per condition.
266 (2.6%) within the rst ve guesses. In the meantime, Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks
3,022 LdGs (10.0%) with the rst guess and 4,090 LdGs (13.5%) with ve guesses.
Eects of Training Data Size
In Figure 5.11, we show the password and LdG cracking results with dierent sizes
of training datasets. For each algorithm, we used P 2A-40 as the PoI set and performed
three analyses with 60, 600, and all available passwords (about 9,400) as training
data, respectively. The sizes of 60 and 600 represent two cases: i) a training set (60)
is ten times smaller than the target set (about 669); and ii) a training set (600) is
almost the same size as the target set (about 669). For training datasets with the
sizes of 60 and 600, we randomly selected these training passwords and performed
each analysis three times to get the averages and standard deviations.
As Figure 5.11 shows, BestCover with 60 training samples could only break an
average of 888 passwords (8.8%) out of 10,039. And the standard deviation is as
strong as 673. While Unbiased with 60 training samples can crack 2,352 passwords
(23.4%) that is almost the same as the results generated from all available training
samples. Also, the standard deviation for three trials is as low as 62. The results from
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Figure 5.11: (a) Average number of passwords cracked vs. dierent training data
sizes. (b) Average number of LdGs cracked vs. dierent training data sizes. P 2A-40 is
used for this analysis. Average over 3 analyses, with one standard deviation shown.
BestCover with 600 training samples are much better than the counterparts with 60
training samples. All these observations are expected as Unbiased could eliminate the
biases considered in BestCover. The results clearly demonstrate the benet of using
the Unbiased algorithm when a training dataset is small.
Eects on Dierent Picture Categories
We measured the attack results on dierent picture categories as shown in Figure 5.12
where each subgure depicts the number of passwords cracked versus the number of
password guesses. Each curve in a subgure corresponds to a picture as shown in
the legend. Our approach cracks more passwords for a picture, if the curve is skewed
upward. And the cracking is faster (with fewer guesses), if the curve is leaned toward
the left.
Figure 5.12(a) provides a view of the attack results on target pictures 243 and
316, each of which has only one airplane ying in the sky. Fewer PoIs in these two
pictures make subjects choose more similar passwords. Unbiased with P 2A-40 breaks
261 passwords (39.0%) for the picture 243 and 209 (31.2%) for the picture 316. The
cracking success rates are much higher than the average success rate in Dataset-2
123
under the same condition. Note that the size of generated dictionaries for these two
pictures are smaller than 219 due to the number of available PoIs.
In Figure 5.12(b), we show the results on two portrait pictures where Unbiased
with P 2A-40 cracks 389 passwords (29.0%) for both in total. The attack success rate
is much higher than the average success rate in Dataset-2. This is due to the fact
that state-of-the-art computer vision algorithms work well on facial landmarks and
subjects' tendencies of drawing on these features are high. The results show that
passwords on simple pictures with fewer PoIs or portraits, for which state-of-the-
art computer vision techniques could detect PoIs with high accuracy, are easier for
attackers to break.
Figure 5.12(c) shows the attack results on 5 pictures of people. Some of these
pictures only have very small gures of people and others have larger gures but not
big enough to be considered as a portrait. Unbiased with P 2A-40 cracks 726 passwords
(21.7%) for these 5 pictures in total, which is lower than the average success rate in
Dataset-2.
Figure 5.12(d) shows the attack results on 4 miscellaneous pictures, two of which
are bicycle pictures and the other two are car pictures. The picture, 6412.jpg, has a
bicycle leaning against the wall. Dierent colors on the bicycle and wall in this picture
make it cluttered and have lots of PoIs. Unbiased with P 2A-40 only cracks 68 passwords
(10.1%) for this picture. However, Unbiased with P 2A-40 cracked 458 (17.1%) for all 4
pictures.
Performance
We also evaluated the performance of our attack approach. Our analyses were carried
out on a computer with dual-core processor and 4GB of RAM. In Figure 5.13, we
show the average runtime for our algorithms to order the LdGSF sequences and
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Figure 5.12: (a) pictures with fewer PoIs (b) portraits (c) pictures with people in
them (d) pictures with lots of PoIs. Unbiased algorithm on P 2A-40 is used for this
analysis.
generate dictionary for a picture in Dataset-2. Each bar represents the average time
in seconds over 15 pictures with the standard deviation using dierent algorithms
and PoI sets. The results show that BestCover is much faster than Unbiased under
the same condition. The average runtime for BestCover on P 2A-40 to order LdGSF
sequences is only 0.06 seconds and to generate a dictionary is 2.68 seconds, while
Unbiased spends 18.36 and 3.96 seconds, respectively. As we analyzed in Section 5.4.4,
such a dierence is caused by the complexity of each algorithm. With such a prompt
response, BestCover could be used for online queries.
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Figure 5.13: Average runtime in seconds to order LdGSF sequences using BestCover
and Unbiased. Average over 15 pictures in Dataset-2 with one standard deviation
shown.
5.6.2 Targeted Attack Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results of our framework for targeted
attacks. Because most subjects in Dataset-1 only chose one password, Dataset-1
was excluded from these experiments. We only use the passwords of the subjects
who chose two or more passwords in Dataset-2 in these experiments. There are 697
subjects who fall into this pattern resulting in 9,974 passwords. For each of the 697
subjects, we use one of her passwords as the target and the rest of her passwords
as training data set to build the model. The average size of training data sets is
around 13, which is signicantly smaller than the size used, which is around 9,400, in
nontargeted attacks. A dictionary is generated in this way for each target password
per user. Since each subject only chose one password for each picture, a training
data set does not include passwords for the target picture. We recorded the number
of password guesses when a password is cracked. Then, we cumulated the results
for each user and each target password together in a single gure as illustrated in
Figure 5.14.
The oine attack results within 219 guesses in dierent settings are shown in
Figure 5.14(a). Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks 2,233 passwords (22.4%) out of 9,974.
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Figure 5.14: Oine attacks. There are 9,974 passwords from 697 accounts in this
experiment. The average size of training data sets is around 13. (a) Percentage of
passwords cracked vs. number of password guesses, per condition. (b) Passwords
cracked per account. Each horizontal bar represents a condition. Regions within
each bar show the fraction of accounts for which the indicated number of passwords
were cracked.
Unbiased with P 2A-40 breaks 2,123 passwords (21.3%) out of 9,974. Even though the
results are a little bit lower than nontargeted attacks, we should take the signicantly
smaller training data set sizes into account. In nontargeted attack, the training
data size is around 9,400 passwords. However, in targeted attack, the training data
sizes range from at least 1 password to at most 14 passwords with an average of
13. In other word, targeted attacks using Unbiased algorithms with around 100 times
smaller training data set could achieve almost the same results as nontargeted attacks.
BestCover with P 2L-15 and P
2
A-40 breaks 1,096 (10.9%) and 898 (9.0%) passwords,
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respectively. Due to the small training data size, the results from BestCover for
nontargeted attacks are quite lower than the counterparts for targeted attacks.
For online attacks within 5 guesses that are shown in the left-lower corner of
Figure 5.14(a), Unbiased with P 2L-15 breaks 434 passwords (4.4%) out of 9,974, and
the rst guesses could even break 380 (3.8%) passwords. Unbiased with P 2A-40 breaks
77 passwords (0.7%) out of 9,974. BestCover with P 2L-15 breaks 351 passwords (3.5%),
and BestCover with P 2A-40 breaks 70 passwords (0.7%).
Figure 5.14(b) shows the fractions of the accounts for which the indicated number
of passwords were cracked. Each bar represents one condition. Unbiased with P 2A-40
crack at least one password for 61.0% accounts, while Unbiased with P 2L-15 could crack
65.0%. Even though BestCover with P 2L-15 crack more passwords in total than with
BestCover with P 2L-15, BestCover with P
2
L-15 breaks more accounts for at least once.
Both Unbiased and BestCover with P 2L-15 cracks all 15 passwords for 4 (5.7%) out of
697 accounts.
5.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss potential usage of our attack frame work, other attack
approaches and the limitations of our work.
5.7.1 Picture-Password-Strength Meter
Our framework could enhance the security of PGA so it would eventually protect
users and their devices by providing a picture-password-strength meter. One way to
help users choose secure passwords is to enforce some composition policies, such as
`three taps are not allowed'. However, a recent eort Kelley et al. (2012) on text-
based password found that rule-based password compositions are ineective because
they can allow weak passwords and reject strong ones. The cornerstone of accurate
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strength measurement is to quantify the strength of a password. With a ranked
password dictionary, our framework, as the rst potential picture-password-strength
meter, is capable of quantifying the strength of selected picture passwords. More
intuitively, a user could be informed of the potential number of guesses for breaking
a selected password through executing our attack framework.
5.7.2 Other Attacks on PGA
Besides keyloggers that record users' nger movements, there are some other at-
tack methods that may aect the security of PGA and other background draw-a-
secret schemes. Shoulder surng, an attack where attackers simply observe the user's
nger movements, is one of them. In our survey, 54.3% participants believe the
picture password scheme is easier for attackers to observe when they are providing
their credentials than text-based password. Several new shoulder surng resistant
schemes Forget et al. (2010); Zakaria et al. (2011) were proposed recently. However,
the usability is always a major concern for these approaches. The smudge attack Aviv
et al. (2010) which recovers passwords from the oily residues on a touch-screen has
also been proven feasible to the background draw-a-secret schemes and could pose
threats to PGA.
5.7.3 Limitations of Our Study
While we took great eorts to maintain our studies' validity, some design aspects
of our studies and developed system may have caused subjects to behave dierently
from what they do on Windows 8 PGA. Subjects in Dataset-2 pretended to access
their bank information but did not have anything at risk. Schechter et al. Schechter
et al. (2007) suggest that role playing like this aects subjects' security behavior, so
passwords in Dataset-2 may not be representative of real passwords chosen by real
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users. Besides, we did not record whether a subject used a tablet with touch-screen
or a desktop with mouse. The dierent ways of input may aect the composition
of passwords. Moreover, Dataset-2 includes multiple passwords per user and this
may have impacted the results. In our analyses, training password datasets include
passwords from the targeted subject. Even though this may have aected the results,
we believe it is less inuential. Because, for each analysis, there were around 9,400
training passwords for which only 14 came from the targeted user. Since all training
passwords were treated equally, the inuence brought by the 0.14% training data is
low. As discussed in Section 5.6, even though our online attack results showed the
feasibility of our approach, it still requires more realistic and signicant attack cases.
As part of future work, we plan to integrate smudge attacks Aviv et al. (2010) into
our framework to improve the ecacy of our online attacks.
5.8 Related Work
The security and vulnerability of text-based password have attracted consider-
able attention because of several infamous password leakage incidents in recent years.
Zhang et al. Zhang et al. (2010) studied the password choices over time and proposed
an approach to attack new passwords from old ones. Castelluccia et al. Castelluccia
et al. (2012) proposed an adaptive Markov-based password strength meter by esti-
mating the probability of password using training data. Kelley et al. Kelley et al.
(2012) developed a distributed method to calculate how eectively password-guessing
algorithms could guess passwords. Even though the attack framework we presented
is dedicated to cracking background draw-a-secret passwords, the idea of abstracting
users' selection processes of password construction introduced in this chapter could
also be applicable to cracking and measuring text-based passwords.
The basic idea of attacking graphical password schemes is to generate dictionaries
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that consist of potential passwords Thorpe and Van Oorschot (2004a). However,
the lack of sophisticated mechanisms for dictionary construction aects the attack
capabilities of existing approaches. Thorpe et al. Thorpe and van Oorschot (2007)
proposed a method to harvest the locations of training subjects' clicks on pictures in
click-based passwords to attack other users' passwords on the same pictures. In the
same paper Thorpe and van Oorschot (2007), they presented another approach which
creates dictionaries by predicting hot-spots using image processing methods. Oorschot
et al. Oorschot and Thorpe (2008) cracked DAS using some password complexity
factors, such as reective symmetry and stroke-count. Salehi-Abari et al. Salehi-Abari
et al. (2008) proposed an automated attack on the PassPoints scheme by ranking
passwords with click-order patterns. However, the click-order patterns introduced
in their approach could not capture users' selection processes accurately, especially
when a background image signicantly aects user choice. Nontargeted attacks on
PGA passwords were discussed in our previous work Zhao et al. (2014).
5.9 Summary
We have presented a novel attack framework against background draw-a-secret
schemes with special attention on picture gesture authentication. We have described
an empirical analysis of Windows 8 picture gesture authentication based on our
user studies. Using the proposed attack framework, we have demonstrated that our
approach was able to crack a considerable portion of picture passwords in various
situations. We believe the ndings and attack results discussed in this chapter could
advance the understanding of background draw-a-secret and its potential attacks.
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Chapter 6
DISCOVERING UNDERGROUND INTELLIGENCE
6.1 Introduction
Today's malware-infected computers are deliberately grouped as large scale de-
structive botnets to steal sensitive information and attack critical net-centric produc-
tion systems David Anselmi (2010). A recent report by FBI IC3 shows that company
losses from the cybercrime rose from 264.6 million dollars to 559.7 million dollars IC3
(2009). The situation keeps getting worse when botnets make use of legitimate so-
cial media, such as Facebook and Twitter, to launch botnet attacks Athanasopoulos
et al. (2008); Thomas (2010). We even recently observed that the well-known social
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, could be used as platforms to launch botnet
attacks Thomas (2010). In order to cope with these emerging threats, both proactive
and passive approaches are proposed to gather and analyze information from mali-
cious code samples. Previous research eorts on countering botnet attacks could be
classied into four categories: (i) capturing malware samples Bacher et al. (2005), (ii)
collecting and correlating network and host behaviors of malwares Gu et al. (2007),
(iii) understanding the logic of malwares Chiang (2007); Porras et al. (2009), and (iv)
inltrating and taking over botnets Stone-Gross et al. (2009); Kanich et al. (2008).
Notably, most studies in the area of countering malware and botnets have been
focused on detecting bot deployment, capturing and controlling bot behaviors. How-
ever, there is little research on examining how these malicious programs are created,
rented and sold by adversaries. Even though preventive solutions against thousands
of known bots have been deployed on networked systems, and some botnets were
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even taken down by law enforcement agencies Mushtaq (2009), the majority of adver-
saries are still at large and keep threatening the Internet by developing more bots and
launching more net-centric attacks. The major reason for this phenomenon is that
previous malware-related activities{such as developing, renting and selling bots{were
occurred mostly oine, which were way beyond the scope of security analysts.
In recent years, the pursuit of more prot in underground communities leads
to the requirement for global collaboration among adversaries, which tremendously
changed the division of labor and means of communication among them Dunham
and Melnick (2008). (Un)fortunately, adversaries started to communicate with each
other, distribute and improve attack tools with the help of the Internet, which leaves
security analysts new clues for evidence acquisition and investigation on unwanted
program development and trade. Before the widespread use of online social networks
(OSNs), adversaries would communicate via electronic bulletin board systems (BBS),
forums, and Email systems Goodin (2008).
Content-rich Web 2.0, ubiquitous computing equipments, and newly emerging on-
line social networks provide an even bigger arena for adversaries. In particular, the
value of OSNs for adversaries is the capability to cooperate with destructive bot-
nets. The role of OSNs in botnet attacks is twofold: rst, OSNs are the platforms
to form online black markets, release bots, and coordinate attacks Dunham and Mel-
nick (2008); Bacher et al. (2005); Holt and Bossler. (2010); second, OSN proles act
as bots to perform malicious actions Athanasopoulos et al. (2008) or C&C server
nodes coordinates other networked bots Thomas (2010). Although our eorts in this
chapter are mainly concerned about the former case, our proposed model for online
underground social dynamics and corresponding social metrics can be also utilized to
identify compromised and suspicious OSN proles.
In the former role of OSNs for botnet attacks, a recent study Dunham and Mel-
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nick (2008) reveals that many of these online black markets operate out of eastern
Europe and Russia, and allow skilled programmers to create and prot from the sale
of new malicious codes. These markets even use eBay-style feedback systems to help
the suppliers of these services establish good business reputations. Individuals who
control existing botnets also sell access to their infected machines for a variety of at-
tacks including spamming and DDoS. As a consequence, these markets enable a great
deal of unskilled adversaries and innocent computer users to engage in cybercrime.
Given the great amount of valuable information in online social dynamics, the in-
vestigation of the relationships between online underground social communities and
network attack events are imperative to tactically cope with net-centric threats. In
this chapter, we propose a novel solution using social dynamics analysis to counter
malware and botnet attacks as a complement to existing research investments. In
order to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of our mechanism, we de-
scribe a proof-of-concept prototype with a case study on real-world data archived
from Internet. We formally model online underground social dynamics and propose
SocialImpact which is a suite of measures to help identify adversarial evidence by
examining social dynamics.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.3 presents our online
underground social dynamics model and addresses SocialImpact, which is a sys-
tematic ranking analysis suite for mining adversarial evidence based on the model.
In Section 6.4, we discuss the design and implementation of our proof-of-concept sys-
tem. Section 6.5 presents the results of applying our model and metrics on synthetic
social dynamics data. Section 6.6 presents the evaluation of our approach on real-
world underground social dynamics data followed by the related work in Section 6.7.
Section 6.8 concludes this chapter.
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Figure 6.1: Cybercrime Workow
6.2 Patterns in Cybercrime
Figure 6.1 shows a typical workow of cybercrime. In Step 1, malware program-
mers develop crafted attack tools. The most prevalent and destructive tool developed
to carry out various attacks is a set of bots. Malware programmers turn bots to bot-
herders through online black markets or oine channels. In Step 2, bot-herders deploy
a botnet through social engineering, drive-by-download or other possible vectors. In
Step 3, bot-herders rent a botnet out to other adversaries, from which bot-herders
and malware programmers prot, who have targets in mind but do not have the
technological expertise to design or administer the botnet. In Step 4, attackers, such
as spammers, take control of the botnet. A rented botnet may result in a variety of
attacks launched by multiple adversaries who might have dierent intents. In Step
5, attackers coordinate bot nodes to perform multiple attacks such as spamming,
identity theft, DDoS, phishing attacks, etc.
The power of botnets relies on their coordination and the volume of the responses
from the bot nodes. In a typical botnet, hundreds to thousands of bot nodes re-
spond to botmaster's commands. When these nodes are instructed to connect to one
webpage at the same time, the aggregated volume of the network trac would be
tremendous for most companies to handle, causing denial-of-service to the targeted
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servers. When these nodes are instructed to download banking credentials, the bot-
master receives credentials from each bot which can be thousands or even millions
in some botnets. Another critical problem caused by botnets is e-mail spamming.
Nowadays a spam causes not only a network-clogging problem, but also a means for
adversaries to distribute additional malwares.
Most signicant botnets today are constantly changing. They are evolved by
adding bots, deleting bots, changing to new channels, being upgraded, etc. Attempt-
ing to discover their C&C servers may bring immediate benets but also stimulate
the evolution of botnets. Park and Reeves pointed out Park and Reeves (2009), it is
also important to monitor botnets for an extended time to learn the purpose of the
botnets to develop more eective countermeasures. A good example of this is what
happened after the takedown of the largest spamming botnet in the world, the Mc-
Colo botnet. In November 2008, the major spamming botnet command and control,
McColo was shut down. The next day the spam volume was nearly cut in half, but
by the end of 2009 the volume was increased higher than ever. Experts agree that the
explosion in spamming is a result of the botmasters in charge of McColo regrouping
and creating other botnets in which they could spread their spam once again Security
(2010).
In other words, existing approaches concentrate on Step 2, Step 4 and Step 5 in
Figure 6.1 and largely overlook Step 1 and 3. Furthermore, since malware authors
have adopted protection approaches to hide malware-related data from analysis, re-
search results on Step 2, Step 4 and Step 5 which may work smoothly for prior
malwares are ineective to accommodate the new trend of malware evolution. There-
fore, we also propose to systematically examine social dynamics to bridge the gap of
research eorts on Step 1 and Step 3 and automatically extract internal ciphertext
data from malware to complement existing eorts on Step 2, Step 4 and Step 5.
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(a) First Version by libere ton espri posted
on Underground konnekt (June 17, 2005)
(b) Appearance in Chinese site andyx.cn (June 17,
2005)
(c) Spanish Version by Polifemo
posted on indice del foro Indetecta-
bles (Nov 24, 2006)
(d) Chinese Version by ZzAge posted on
521bbs.yi.org (May 26, 2007)
Figure 6.2: Motivating Example of Malware Distribution and Evolution in Social
Dynamics (All screenshots taken from Holt (2008))
A recent study reveals that rogue programs are sold in black markets built on
top of online platforms Holt and Bossler. (2010). Individuals who control existing
botnets also sell access to their infected machines for a variety of attacks including
spamming and denial of service. As a consequence, these markets enable a great deal
of unskilled adversaries and innocent computer users to engage in cybercrime. Before
the advent of OSNs, adversaries would communicate via electronic bulletin board
systems (BBS), forums and Email systems. More seriously, newly-emerging OSNs
provide an even big arena for high-tech criminals.
In Holt (2008), researchers describe a good motivating example to show the value
of examining social dynamics for analysis of malware distribution and evolution.
Try2DDos is a standalone attack tool for distributed denial of service attack (DDos)
which was named one of top 30 DDos tools in 2008 Vaqxine (2008). As shown in
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Figure 6.2a, Try2DDos was rst released on a French forum Underground konnekt
by libere ton espri in June, 2005. On the same day, it appeared in a Chinese hacker
site without any modication as shown in Figure 6.2b. More than one year later, the
rst public variant of this tool in Spanish appeared on an Argentina hacker forum
as shown in Figure 6.2c. Almost another year later, a Chinese variant of this tool
developed by ZzAge was announced as shown in Figure 6.2d. From 2005 to 2008, this
tool and its variants spread to China, Russia, Guatemala, and Argentina and caused
damages to a large number of networked systems Holt (2008).
6.3 Using Social Interaction Patterns to Discover Intelligence
In this section, we rst address the modeling approach we utilized to represent
online underground social dynamics (OUSDs). Unlike existing OSN models Zhel-
eva and Getoor (2009); Hu et al. (2014c); Li et al. (2012); Zhao et al. (2012a); Hu
et al. (2012) which emphasize on user prole, friendship link, and user group, our
model also gives attention to user-generated contents due to the fact that a wealth
of information resides in online adversarial conversations. We also elaborate the de-
sign principles of social metrics to identify adversarial behaviors in OUSDs. Then, we
present SocialImpact, which consists of nine indices, to bring order to underground
social dynamics based on our OUSD model.
Adversaries choose online social networks which meet their special requirements
to form online underground social communities. Online Underground Social Net-
works (OUSNs) are used to share technical articles and trade malicious tools, rather
than photo-sharing or video-sharing, making them dierent from normal OSNs in the
following aspects:
 OUSNs provide a blog-like article-sharing mechanism, which has less constraints
on the length of articles a user can post. Length limitation of posts adopted
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Figure 6.3: Online Underground Social Dynamics Model: Entities and Relationships
in traditional OSNs, such as Twitter and Facebook, is unlikely suitable for
well-explained technical articles in OUSNs.
 OUSNs have less access and write constraints on posted articles. For instance,
Facebook adopts strict policies to protect its users' privacy, in which one user
has to be in the others' circle of trust to access and comment on their posts.
However, in OUSNs, a user does not need to be a friend of the article author
to read the article or give comments on it. This characteristic allows OUSNs to
disseminate more knowledge and technical discussions than OSNs.
 OUSNs do not require users to provide their real-world identities. Adversaries
prefer not to associate their real-world identities with their online proles, there-
fore OUSNs do not claim themselves as real social networks. However, OSNs
such as Facebook require users to provide their real names, education back-
grounds, and relationship statuses.
6.3.1 Online Underground Social Dynamics Model
As shown in Figure 6.3, an OUSD can be represented by six fundamental entities
and ve basic types of unidirectional relationships between them.
Users are those who have proles in the network and have the rights to join
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groups, post articles, and give comments to others. Groups are those to which users
can belong. In an OUSD, groups are mainly formed based on common interests.
Articles are posted by users who want to share them with the society. In an OUSD,
articles might introduce the latest technologies, analyze recent vulnerabilities, call
for participation of network attacks, and trade newly developed and deployed bot-
nets. In terms of the form of articles, they do not have to be literary. They could
also contain multimedia contents, such as photos and melodies. Comments are the
subsequent posts to articles. Posts are the union of articles and comments. Strings
are the elementary components of articles and comments. Strings are not necessarily
meaningful words. They could be names, URLs, and underground slangs. A user
has a relationship authorOf with each post s/he creates. A user has a relationship
followerOf with each user s/he follows. A user has a relationship memberOf with
each group s/he joins. An article has a relationship hostOf with each comment it
receives. A post has a relationship containerOf with each string it consists of.
The following formal description summarizes the above-mentioned entities and
relationships.
Denition 6.1. Online Underground Social Dynamics. A OUSD is modeled with
the following components:
 U is a set of users;
 G is a set of user groups;
 A is a set of articles;
 C is a set of comments;
 P is a set of posts. P = A [ C;
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 S is a set of strings;
 UP = f(u; p)j u 2 U; p 2 P and u has an authorOf relationship with pg is a
one-to-many user-to-post relation denoting a user and her posts;
 FL = f(u; y)j u 2 U; y 2 U and u has a followerOf relationship with yg is a
many-to-many user-to-user follow relation;
 MB = f(u; g)j u 2 U; g 2 G and u has a memberOf relationship with gg is a
many-to-many user-to-group membership relation;
 AC = f(a; c)j a 2 A; c 2 C and a has a hostOf relationship with cg is a
one-to-many article-to-comment relation denoting an article and its following
comments; and
 PS = f(p; s)j p 2 P; s 2 S and p has a containerOf relationship with sg is a
many-to-many post-to-string relation.
We focus on the main structure and activities in online underground society and
overlook some sophisticated features & functionalities, such as online chatting, pro-
vided by specic OSNs and BBS. Hence, our OUSD model is generic and can be a
reference model for most real-world OSNs and BBS. As a result, security analysts
could easily map real-world social dynamics data archived from any OSNs and BBS
to our model for further analysis and investigation.
6.3.2 Principles of Metric Design and Denitions
We also address the following critical issues related to evidence mining in under-
ground society: How can we identify adversaries among the crowd of social users?
Given the additional evidence acquired from other sources, how can we correlate
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them with underground social dynamics? How can we measure the evolution in un-
derground community? To answer these questions, we articulate several principles
that the measures for underground social dynamics analysis should follow: 1) The
measures should support identications of interesting adversaries and groups based
on both their social relationships and online conversations; 2) The measures should
be able to take external evidence into account and support interactions with security
analysts; and 3) The measures should support temporal analysis for the better un-
derstanding of the evolution in adversarial society.
To this end, we introduce several feature vectors to achieve aforementioned goals.
For the mathematical notations, we use lower case bold roman letters such as x to
denote vectors, and uppercase bold roman letters such as V to denote matrices. We
assume all vectors to be column vectors and a superscript T to denote the transposi-
tion of a matrix or vector. We also dene max() as a function to return the maximum
value of a set.
Denition 6.2. Article Inuence Vector. Given an article a 2 A, the article inu-
ence vector of a is dened as vTa = (v1; v2; v3), where v1 is the length of the article,
v2 = jfc j c 2 C and (a; c) 2 ACgj is the number of comments received by a, and v3
is the number of outlinks it has.
When stacking all articles' inuence vector together, we get the article inuence
matrix V. We assess an article's inuence by its activity generation, novelty and
eloquence Agarwal et al. (2008). More comments an article receives, more inuential
it is. The number of outlinks and length is used to approximately represent article's
novelty and eloquence without extracting its semantics. More outlinks an article has,
less novelty it has. Also, a longer article is assumed to be more eloquent.
Denition 6.3. Article Relevance Factor. Given a set of strings s = fs1; s2; :::; sng 
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S and an article a 2 A, article relevance factor, denoted as r(a; s), is dened as the
number of occurrence of strings s in the article a.
The strings s could represent an external evidence that security analysts acquired
from other sources and query keywords in which security analysts are interested. The
given strings s could represent an external evidence that security analysts acquired
from other sources and query keywords in which security analysts are interested.
Denition 6.4. User Activeness Vector. The user activeness vector of u is dened
as zTu = (z1; z2; z3), where z1 = jfp j p 2 P and (u; p) 2 UPgj is the number of
articles and comments u posted, z2 = jfy j y 2 U and (u; y) 2 FLgj is the number of
users u follows, and z3 = jfg j g 2 G and (u; g) 2 MBgj is the number of groups u
joins.
We measure a user's activeness by the number of posts s/he sends, users s/he
follows, and groups s/he joins. By aggregating all users' zu, we get user activeness
matrix Z.
Denition 6.5. Social Matrix. Social matrix, denoted as Q, is dened as a jU j jU j
square matrix with rows and columns corresponding to users. Let v be a user and
Nv be the number of users v follows. Qu;v = 1=Nv, if (v; u) 2 FL and Qu;v = 0,
otherwise.
Social matrix is similar to transition matrix for hyperlinked webpages in PageR-
ank. The sum of each column in social matrix is either 1 or 0, which depends on
whether the vth column user follows any other user.
Denition 6.6. -n Selection Vector. A -n selection vector, denoted as yn , is
dened as a boolean vector with n components and kyn k1= .
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Figure 6.4: SocialImpact: Systematic Ranking Indices
A -n selection vector is used to select a portion of elements for one set. For
example, the top 10 inuential articles of a user a could be represented by a selection
vector y
jAj
10 over the article set A. By stacking all users' -n selection vectors over the
same set together, we get the -n selection matrix Yn .
6.3.3 Ranking Metrics
As shown in Figure 6.4, SocialImpact consists of nine indices, which are clas-
sied into three categories: string & post indices, user indices, and group indices.
Each index in upper categories is computed by the indices from lower categories. For
instance, UserInuence that indicates a user's inuence in the community is calcu-
lated based on the ArticleInuence of user's articles and the social metrics Q of this
community.
To fulll Principle 1, user and group indices are devised to identify inuential,
active, and relevant users and groups. We devise personalized PageRank mod-
els Chakrabarti (2007) to calculate UserInuence and UserRelevance, since it could cap-
ture the characteristics of both user-to-user relationships and user-generated contents
in social dynamics. To accommodate Principle 2, ArticleRelevance, UserRelevance and
GroupRelevance are designed to take external strings as inputs, combine them with
existing data in social dynamics, and generate more comprehensive results. To fulll
Principle 3, all feature vectors and indices could be calculated for a given time win-
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dow and StringPrevalence could indicate the topic evolution in the society. Moreover,
we believe the combination of UserActiveness and UserInuence could also be used to
identify suspicious spam proles in online social networks.
We consider a weighted additive model Keeney and Raia (1993) when there exist
several independent factors to determine one index. To reduce the bias introduced
by dierent size of sets, we use -n selection vector to choose a portion of data in
calculation. The followings are the detailed descriptions of indices.
ArticleInuence, denoted as x1(a), represents the inuence of article a. x1(a) is
computed as vTaw1, where w1 denotes the weight vector.
By normalizing x1(a) to [0; 1] and stacking x1(a) from all articles together, we get
a vector x1.
x1 =
VTw1
maxb2A(x1(b))
(6.1)
ArticleRelevance, denoted as x2(a; s), represents the relevance of the article a to
given strings s. x2(a; s) is proportional to the occurrence of the given strings in the
article and the inuence of the article.
x2(a; s) =
r(a;s)x1(a)
maxb2A(r(b;s)x1(b))
(6.2)
By stacking x2(a; s) from all users together, we get a vector x2(s) denoting all
articles' relevance to s.
UserInuence, denoted as x3, represents the inuence of a user. x3 can be mea-
sured by two parts. One is the impact of the user's opinions, which is modeled by
ArticleInuence. The other is the user's social relationships, which is modeled by Q.
x3 is devised as a personalized PageRank function to capture both parts.
By stacking x3 from all users together, we get a vector x3.
x3 = d3Qx3 + (1  d3)YjAj x1 (6.3)
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Where d3 2 (0; 1) is the decay factor which makes the linear system stable and conver-
gent. Y
jAj
 is the    n selection matrix corresponding to all users's top  inuential
articles.
UserRelevance, denoted as x4(s), represents the relevance of a user to strings s.
By stacking x4(s) from all users together, we get a vector x4.
x4(s) = d4Qx4(s) + (1  d4)(YjAj x2(s)) (6.4)
Where d4 2 (0; 1) is the decay factor. YjAj is a    n selection matrix corresponding
to all users's top  relevant articles to s.
UserActiveness, denoted as x5, represents the activeness of a user.
x5 = Z
Tw5 (6.5)
We use the addition of a group's top  members' inuence, relevance, and ac-
tiveness to model its inuence, relevance, and activeness, respectively. As mentioned
before, this model can reduce the bias caused by the number of members.
GroupInuence, denoted as x6, represents the inuence of a group.
By stacking all x6 together, we get x6.
x6 = Y
jU j
 x3 (6.6)
Where Y
jU j
 is the -n selection matrix corresponding to all groups' top  inuential
users.
GroupRelevance, denoted as x7, represents the relevance of a group to strings s.
By stacking all x7 together, we get x7.
x7 = Y
jU j
 x4 (6.7)
Where Y
jU j
 is the -n selection matrix corresponding to all groups' top  relevant
users.
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GroupActiveness, denoted as x8, represents the activeness of a group.
By stacking all x8 together, we get x8.
x8 = Y
jU j
 x5 (6.8)
Where Y
jU j
 is the -n selection matrix corresponding to all groups' top  active users.
StringPrevalence, denoted as x9(s), represents the popularity of string s.
x9(s) =
X
pj2P
tis;pj (6.9)
where tis;pj is the term frequency-inverse document frequency Salton and Buckley
(1988) of string s in post pj.
The computations for UserInuence and UserRelevance are proven to be conver-
gent Bianchini et al. (2005). And the corresponding time complexity isO(jHjlog(1=)),
where jHj is the number of followerOf relationships in the social dynamics and  is a
given degree of precision Bianchini et al. (2005). The time complexity for calculating
StringPrevalence is O(jP jjSj), where jP j is the number of posts and jSj is the size of
string set. The complexities for all other indices are linear if the underlying indices
are calculated.
6.4 System Design and Implementation
In this section, we describe the challenges in analyzing real-world underground
social dynamics data. We address our eorts to cope with these challenges and
present the design and implementation of our proof-of-concept system.
6.4.1 Challenges from Real-world Data
The rst challenge of real-world data is its multilingual contents. The most ef-
fective way to coping with this challenge is to take advantage of machine translation
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systems. Our tool utilizes Google Translate to detect the language of the contents
and translate them into English. However, machine translation systems may fail to
generate meaningful English interpretations for the following cases: i) adversaries
may use cryptolanguages that no machine translation system could understand. For
instance, Fenya, a Russian cant language that is usually used in prisons, is identied
in online underground society Yarochki (2009); and ii) both intentional and accidental
misspellings are common in online underground society Raymond (1996). In order to
cope with this challenge, our tool maintains a dictionary of known jargons, such as
c4n as can and sUm1 as someone.
Another challenge is that the social dynamics data may not be in a consistent
format. Dierent OSNs use dierent styles in web page design. Even in one OSN, in
order to make the web page more personalized, the OSN allows users to customize the
format of their posts. Since HTML is not designed to be machine-understandable in
the rst place, extracting structural information from HTML is a tedious and heavy-
labor work. To address this problem, we rst cluster data, and then devise an HTML
parser for each cluster. We also design a light-weight semi-structure language to store
the information extracted from HTML.
Since one major component in social dynamics is the relationships between enti-
ties, storing and manipulating social dynamics data in a relational database is rela-
tively time-consuming. We choose graph database Angles and Gutierrez (2008) which
employs the concepts from graph theory, such as node, property, and edge, to realize
faster operations for associative data sets.
6.4.2 System Architecture and Implementation
Figure 6.5 shows a high level architecture of our tool. The upper level of our
tool includes several visualization modules and provides query control for security
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Figure 6.5: System Architecture of Our Tool
analysts to provide the additional evidence. In reality, such evidence could be in the
format of text, picture, video, audio or any other forms. Yet, representing multimedia
contents like pictures and videos in a machine-understandable way is still a dicult
challenge. Our tool acts like a modern web search engine in response to keyword
queries. Social graph viewer is designed to show social relationships among users and
groups. Ranking analysis viewer is used to list the ranking results based on security
analysts' queries. Content viewer can show both original and translated English web
resources.
The lower level of the architecture realizes underlying functionalities addressed
in our framework. After underground community data is crawled from Internet, the
HTML parser module extracts meaningful information from it. If the content is not
in English, our translator takes over and generates English translation. All extracted
information is stored in a graph database for the rapid retrieval. Analysis modules
have two working modes: oine and online. The oine mode generates demograph-
ical information with demographical analysis engine (DAE) and intelligence, such
as user inuence and activeness, with SocialImpact engine (SIE). When security
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(a) Social Graph (b) User Ranking (c) Article Ranking
Figure 6.6: Screenshots of Our Tool
analysts provide the additional evidence, SocialImpact engine switches to online
mode and generates analysis results, such as user relevance, based on data in graph
database and additional evidence provided by security analysts.
Our tool was implemented in Java programming language. We took advantage
of Java swing and JUNG to realize graphical user interfaces and graph visualization.
As we mentioned before, our tool uses Google Translate API to translate texts. In
most cases, Google Translate could output acceptable translations from original texts.
Our tool stores user proles, user-generated contents, and social relationships among
users in a Neo4j graph database. For each group, user, article, and comment, our
tool creates a node in the database, stores associated data{such as the birthday of
user and the content of article{in each node's properties, and assigns the relationships
among nodes.
6.4.3 Visualization Interfaces of Our Tool
Figure 6.6 depicts interfaces of our tool. As illustrated in Figure 6.6a, all users
in the social group are displayed by a circle. And their followerOf relationships are
displayed with curved arrows. It is clear to view that some users have lots of followers
while others do not. By clicking any user in the group, our tool has the ability to
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highlight this user in red and all his followers in green. In this way, our tool helps
analysts understand the social impact of any specic user. Another windows as shown
in Figure 6.6b displays the ranking results. Analysts can specify the ranking metric,
such as UserInuence and UserActiveness, to reorder the displayed rank. Clicking a
user's name which is the second column in Figure 6.6b would bring the analysts
to the list of all posted articles by the user in descending order of ArticleInuence.
Clicking the user's prole link which is the third column in Figure 6.6b would bring
the analysts to the webpage of the user's prole archived from the Internet. Analysts
could also specify some keywords in query control and our tool would display the
results in descending order of ArticleRelevance. As shown in Figure 6.6c, our tool
displays both the original and translated texts and highlights the input keywords in
red.
6.5 Experiments on Synthetic Social Dynamics Data
We rst compared our social ranking approach with a PageRank-based solu-
tion Page et al. (1999a) to evaluate the eectiveness of our social ranking mechanism.
PageRank uses numerical weights of elements that are linked together to measure
their relative importance. Although PageRank is successfully deployed in commercial
search engines, as discussed in Agarwal et al. (2008), it is not very suitable to rank
sparsely linked elements.
For simplicity, we only included a synthetic case study considering user inuence
and activeness, as shown in Figure 6.7. In this scenario with ve users, the left-
hand gure shows the relationships between users and the right-hand tables show
information from user-generated contents in ve dierent stages. David and Carl are
two of most popular users with four and three followers, respectively. While Edward
seems the most eloquent user in the stage one with six articles and twenty posted
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Figure 6.7: An OUSD Scenario
comments. Figure 6.8(a) shows the user inuence index sorted in descending order in
the stage one. Alice is ranked as the most inuential user, mainly because her four
articles received nineteen comments from the society. Note that, although David has
four followers in the society, his inuence is limited due to the fact that he initiated
few attractive conversations. Although, Edward has no followers, our model considers
he still has some inuence in the community because his contributions have attracted
other's attention. Figure 6.8(b) shows the user activeness index in the stage one. The
least inuential user Edward is ranked as the most active user not only because he is
eloquent, but also because he follows everyone in the community. Bob is ranked as the
second most active member since he contributed to many conversations. We notice
that the most inuential user Alice is ranked as the second least active user which
veries that a user does not need to speak much to make a dierence. Figure 6.8(c)
shows the PageRank-based ranking analysis results. Note that PageRank ignores
user-generated contents, and only considers user relationships for ranking analysis.
One reason for Carl being more inuential than David, even if in the case that David
has more followers than Carl, is because in PageRank analysis the value of link-votes
is divided among all outbounds. The fact that David only follows Carl indicates
Carl 's inuence in this model. PageRank fails to identify Edward 's inuence as well
merely because he has no follower. Another drawback of PageRank analysis is that it
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Rank Name Index
1 Alice 69.3
2 Bob 23.9
3 Carl 21.5
4 David 13.6
5 Edward 5.1
(a) UII according to our so-
lution
Rank Name Index
1 Edward 29
2 Bob 17
3 David 14
4 Alice 12
5 Carl 10
(b) UAI according to our so-
lution
Rank Name Index
1 Carl 1.111
2 David 0.371
3 Alice 0.075
4 Bob 0.024
5 Edward 0.000
(c) PageRank Index
Figure 6.8: Indices According to Our Solution and PageRank
cannot generate temporal patterns of the inuential users since relationships do not
change.
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of Normalized Indices for Each User
We normalize three dierent indices calculated for each adversary and show their
comparison in Figure 6.9. The signicant dierence between our solution and PageRank-
based solution shows the importance of considering user-generated contents as well
as social relationships.
6.6 A Case Study on Real-world Online Underground Social Dynamics
In this section, we present our evaluation on real-world social dynamics. We
evaluated our tool on 4GB of data crawled from Livejournal.com which is a popular
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online social network especially in the Russian-speaking countries. We anonymized
the group names and user names in this OSN for preserving privacy.
All webpages in this OSN could be roughly divided into two categories in terms
of content: i) prole and ii) article. The prole webpage contains basic information
of a user or a group, which includes name, biography, location, birthday, friends, and
members. Every article has title, author, posted time, content, and several comments
by other users. The webpages are mainly .html les, along with some .jpeg, .gif, .css,
and .js les. Our solution only considers text data from .html les.
We started to crawl group proles from six famous underground groups in this
OSN. Then we crawled all members' proles and articles of these six groups. We
also collected one-hop friends' articles of these members. Therefore, we ended up
with 29,614 articles posted by 6,364 users which are from 4,220 groups. Based on the
information in user proles, we noticed that about 32.7% and 52.7% users were born
in early and mid-late 80's. This clearly illustrates the age distribution of active users
in this community.
6.6.1 Post, User and Group Analysis
Our tool calculated all articles' ArticleInuence and identied top 50 articles over
a time window of 48 months. Since not all of these articles are related to computer
security, we checked these articles in descending order of their inuences and picked
ve articles that are highly related to malware. We could observe some popular words
related to malware, such as PE (the target and vehicle for Windows software attacks),
exploits (a piece of code to trigger system vulnerabilities), hook (a technique to hijack
legitimate control ow) and so on.
Our tool also generated each user's UserInuence and UserActiveness and group's
GroupInuence and GroupActiveness over a time window of 48 months. And, Table 6.2
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Top Five Inuential Users Top Five Active Users
User UserInuence User UserActiveness
z xx ur 49.5020 xsbxx ur 4024
andxx ur 43.7800 enkxx ur 3942
arkxx ur 34.8074 kalxx ur 3936
moxx ur 26.7700 exixx ur 3170
kyp ur 20.6292 kolxx ur 3092
Table 6.1: Top Five Inuential/Active Users
Top Five Inuential Groups Top Five Active Groups
Group GroupInuence Group GroupActivenss
b gp 344.4807 b gp 57798
c gp 79.7781 d gp 28644
d gp 45.5222 demxx gp 20846
murxx gp 26.2094 beaxx gp 20290
chrxx gp 18.6487 hoxx gp 19486
Table 6.2: Top Five Inuential/Active Groups
shows the top ve inuential/active users/groups for the entire period of our obser-
vation. We can notice that there is no overlap between the top ve inuential users
and the top ve active users, while there exists similarity for the top ve inuential
groups and the top ve active groups.
We calculated the correlation coecient (corrcoef) for the pairs of UserInuence
and UserActivenss, GroupInuence and GroupActivenss based on the results generated
from our tool. Similar to the phenomenon we identied in Table 6.2, in Figure 6.10(a)
we observed that the correlation coecient between UserInuence and UserActivenss
is around 0.52 (the maximum value for correlation coecient is 1 indicating a perfect
positive correlation between two variables), which means one user's inuence is not
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Figure 6.10: Correlation Coecient of UserActiveness & UserInuence and
GroupActiveness & GroupInuence
highly correlated to her/his activeness. This phenomenon indicates that talking more
does not make a user more inuential in a community. On the other hand, as shown
in Figure 6.10(b) we observed that the correlation coecient between GroupInuence
and GroupActivenss is around 0.90, which indicates a very strong positive correlation
between the inuence and the activeness of a group. The application of inuence and
activeness indices is not limited to identify such a social phenomenon. We could also
leverage the high UserActivenss and the low UserInuence as indicators for the analysis
of social spammers in any OSN.
The temporal patterns of the inuential/active users/groups could be observed in
Figure 6.11, where x-axis denotes the users/groups who were identied as the most
inuential/active ones for each month. For example, x = 1 denotes the most inu-
ential/active user/group of the rst month in our time window and x = 48 denotes
the most inuential/active user/group of the last month in our time window; y-axis
denotes the entire 48 months in the time window; and z-axis denotes user/group's
inuence/activeness value. As shown in Figure 6.11(a), some users maintain their
inuence status for several months. The large plain area in the right part of this
gure indicates most users come as the most inuential ones suddenly. This observa-
tion implies that a user does not need to be a veteran to be an inuential one in the
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Figure 6.11: Temporal Pattern Analysis
community. On the other side, we can see from Figure 6.11(b) that most active users
remain active before they became the most active ones. The plain area in the left
portion of Figure 6.11(b) implies that most users do not always keep active. Normally
they keep active for 15-30 months, then get relatively silent. While the smaller plain
area in the left part of Figure 6.11(a) shows once a user becomes inuential, s/he
keeps the status for a long period of time. Figure 6.11(c) shows that there are 2 or
3 groups who maintain the status of inuence during the whole 48 months and get
even more inuential as time goes on. While, other groups only keep inuential for
a relatively short period of time and just fade out. Figure 6.11(d) shows the similar
phenomenon.
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6.6.2 Evidence Mining by Correlating Social Dynamics with Adversarial Events
We present our nding with keyword queries on the same dataset in our tool.
Those keywords and attack patterns could also be automatically generated from
the approaches proposed in Zhao et al. (2011a); Zhao and Ahn (2013). For each
query, our tool returns the lists of articles, users, and groups in descending order
of ArticleRelevance, UserRelevance and GroupRelevance, respectively. The results we
present in this section are with regard to three major adversarial activities: i) botnet;
ii) identity theft and credit card fraud; and iii) vulnerability analysis and malicious
code development.
Botnet
As we mentioned before, botnet is a serious threat to all networked computers. In
order to identify adversaries and their conversations in our dataset related to botnet,
we queried the keywords shown in Table 6.3(a) in our tool. Our tool was able to
identify 490 articles related to `spam', 44 articles related to `botnet', 9 articles related
to `zeus' and 1 article about `rustock'.
Then, we checked the results returned by our tool carefully and Table 6.4 shows
several interesting articles and their information including the number of comments
they received, ArticleRelevance of each article, and authors of these articles. We rst
noticed one article titled `Rustock.C' with very high ArticleRevelance and ArticleInuence.
This article presented an original analysis of the C variant of Rustock that once ac-
counted for 40% of the spam emails in the world.
Another article titled `On startup failure to sign the drivers in Vista x64' returned
by our tool as top relevant article to `botnet' attracting our attention as well. In this
article, the author crx ur discussed about how to load unsigned driver to Windows
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Keywords Relevant Articles #
spam 490
botnet 44
zeus 9
rustock 1
mega-d 0
(a) Results for Botnet
Keywords Relevant Articles #
pin 129
credit card 93
carding 1
credit card sale 0
ssn 0
(b) Results for Identity Theft and Credit Card
Fraud
Keywords Relevant Articles #
vulnerability 418
shellcode 169
polymorphic 12
zero-day 11
cve 2
(c) Results for Vulnerability Discovery and
Malicious Code Development
Table 6.3: Results from Our Tool for Queries
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Translated Article Title # Comments x2
1 Author
Received
Rustock.C 13 135.3 swx ur
On startup failure to sign the drivers in
Vista x64
5 59.8 crx ur
video 3 35.6 zlx ur
sleepy 3 32.3 crx ur
FireEye Joins Internet2 2 27.8 eax ur
1 ArticleRelevance
Table 6.4: Selected Top Relevant Articles
Vista x64 by modifying PE le header. The corresponding author claimed that mal-
ware vendors would use this technique to build bot and infect thousands of computers.
A further investigation on this user shown in Table 6.5 reveals that s/he authored
several security-related articles. Her/his prole indicated that s/he was very active
in malicious code development and interested in several cybercrime topics, such as
rootkit, exploits, and shellcode.
Identity Theft and Credit Card Fraud
Identity theft and credit card fraud are both serious issues in nowadays Internet
transactions. Online identity theft includes stealing usernames, passwords, social
security numbers (ssn), personal identication numbers (PINs), account numbers,
and other credentials. Credit card fraud also consists of phishing (the process to steal
credit card information), carding (the process to verify whether a stolen credit card
is still valid), and selling veried credit card information.
Table 6.3(b) shows results that our tool returned when these keywords are queried.
Our tool identied one article that was authored by a user dx ur related to `carding'
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Translated Article Title # Comments x1
1 Translated Interests
Received
The old tale about security 7 79.6 malware, ring0,
rootkit, botnets,
asm, exploits,
cyber terrorism,
shellcode, viruses,
underground,
Kaspersky,
paintball
Malcode statistics 6 68.9
Cold boot attacks on encryption keys 2 37.6
Wanted Cisco security agent 2 28.1
Antirootkits bypass 1 18.7
Syser debugger 0 8.9
Termorektalny cryptanalysis 0 7.8
1 ArticleInuence
Table 6.5: Selected Articles by crx ur and Her/His Information
Translated Interests carding, banking, shells, hacking, freebie, web
hack, credit card fraud, security policy, sys-
tem administrators, live in computer bugs
# Articles Posted 1295
# Comments Posted 7294
# Comments Received 2693
Table 6.6: Information about dx ur
in the dataset. A further investigation on this user revealed that s/he was a member
of a carding interest group, which had more than 20 members around the world.
Table 6.6 shows some basic information of dx ur. Compared to crx ur, it is obvious
that dx ur has more interests in nancial security issues, such as credit card fraud,
web hack, and banking. We could also notice that dx ur was very active in posting
articles and replying others' posts.
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Vulnerability Analysis and Malicious Code Development
We analyzed several keywords related to vulnerability analysis and malicious code
development, such as polymorphism (a technique widely used in malware to change
the appearance of code, but keep the semantics), cve (a reference-method for publicly-
known computer vulnerabilities), shellcode (small piece of code used as the payload
in the exploitation of software vulnerabilities), and zero-day (previously-unknown
computer vulnerabilities, viruses and other malwares).
As shown in Table 6.3(c), the community is very active in these topics. More than
400 articles related to vulnerabilities were found. However, we noticed most of these
articles have low-ArticleInuence. We checked these low-ArticleInuence articles and
discovered that most of them were articles copied from other research blogs and kept
the links to original webpages. Our ArticleInuence index successfully identied these
articles were not very novel, thus calculated low ArticleInuence for them.
At the same time, as shown in Table 6.7, our tool also identied several high-
ArticleInuence vulnerability analysis articles. For example, the article entitled `Blind
spot' authored by arx ur which analyzed a new Windows Internet Explorer vulnera-
bility even attracted 79 replies.
6.6.3 Comparison with HITS Algorithm
In order to evaluate the eectiveness of our approach, we implemented HITS algo-
rithm Kleinberg (1999) in our tool and compared the results with our SocialImpact
metrics. HITS algorithm is able to calculate the authorities and hubs in a commu-
nity by examining the topological structure where authority means the nodes that are
linked by many others and hub means the nodes that point to many others. Note that
the fundamental dierence between SocialImpact and HITS is that SocialImpact
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Translated Article Title # Comments x2
1 Author
Received
Blind spot 79 793.2 arx ur
Seven thirty-four pm PCR 14 146.4 tix ur
HeapLib and Shellcode generator under windows 1 15.6 eax ur
Who xes vulnerabilities faster, Microsoft or Apple? 0 5.6 bux ur
FreeBSD OpenSSH Bugx 0 4.2 sux ur
1 ArticleRelevance
Table 6.7: Selected Top Relevant Articles
takes more parameters, such as user-generated content and activity, into account,
therefore ranking results are based on a more comprehensive set of social features.
Top Five Authorities Top Five Hubs
User auth User hub
zhengxx ur 0.506 zlo xx ur 0.265
crx xx ur 0.214 zhengxx ur 0.237
yuz ur 0.163 crx xx ur 0.234
t1mxx ur 0.148 yuz ur 0.205
rst ur 0.143 t1mxx ur 0.183
Table 6.8: Top Five Authorities and Hubs by HITS
Comparing the results for authorities and hubs (HITS) shown in Table 6.8 with
UserInuence and UserActiveness (SocialImpact) in Table 6.2, we can observe that
the authorities and hubs have much overlap with HITS algorithm when online con-
versations are ignored and the results generated by SocialImpact are dierent from
HITS counterparts.
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6.7 Related Work
Computer-aided crime analysis (CACA) utilizes the computation and visualiza-
tion of modern computer to understand the structure and organization of traditional
adversarial networks Xu and Chen (2005). Although CACA is not designed for the
analysis of cybercrime, its methods of relation analysis, and visualization of social
network are adopted in our work. Zhou et al. Zhou et al. (2005) studied the organiza-
tion of United State domestic extremist groups on web by analyzing their hyperlinks.
Chau et al. Chau and Xu (2007) mined communities and their relationships in blogs
for understanding hate group. Lu et al. Lu et al. (2010) used four actor centrality mea-
sures (degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector) to identify leaders in hacker
community. In contrast, our proposed solution in this dissertation and previous pa-
pers Zhao et al. (2011b, 2012b) considers both social relationships and user-generated
contents in identifying interesting posts and users for cybercrime analysis.
Systematically bringing order to a dataset has plenty of applications in both social
and computer science. With the development of web, ranking analysis in hyperlinked
environment received much attention. Kleinberg Kleinberg (1999) proposed a hubs
and authorities approach (HITS) by calculating the eigenvectors of a certain matrices
associated with the link graph. Almost at the same time, Page and Brin Page et al.
(1999b) developed PageRank that uses a page's backlinks' sum as its importance
index. However, both HITS and PageRank only consider the topological structure of
given dataset but ignore its contents Bianchini et al. (2005). Therefore, we devised
a ranking system based on personalized PageRank, which is proposed to eciently
deal with ranking issues in dierent situations Chakrabarti (2007).
In order to provide a safer platform for net-centric business and secure the internet
experience for end users, huge research eorts have been invested in defeating malware
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and designing defense systems. Hu et al. Hu et al. (2014b,a) proposed systems to
enhance rewalls to make sure malicious packets can not bypass existing detecting
systems. Gu et al. analyzed botnet C&C channels for identifying malware infection
and botnet organization Gu et al. (2007). Zhang et al. Zhang et al. (2013) investigated
using high-entropy detectors to detect botnet tracs that employ encryption. Stone-
Gross et al. Stone-Gross et al. (2009) took over Torpig for a period of ten days and
gathered rich and diverse set of data from this infamous botnet.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a novel approach to help identify adversaries
by analyzing social dynamics. We formally modeled online underground social dy-
namics and proposed SocialImpact as a suite of measures to highlight interesting
adversaries, as well as their conversations and groups. The evaluation of our proof-of-
concept system on real-world social data has shown the eectiveness of our approach.
As part of future work, we would further test the eectiveness and the usability of
our system with subject matter experts.
165
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we have proposed a pattern-based approach framework, whose
goal is to handle previously unknown security events by considering their root causes,
randomness and uncertainty and at the same time quantify the condence of decision
making. Dierent from pre-determined pattern-based approaches, our approach does
not rely on xed bit sequences, but considers randomness and uncertainty. We have
shown our approach can cope with previously unknown security events. Dierent
from statistical pattern-based approaches that leave the feature discovery to statisti-
cal methods, our pattern-based approaches focuses on using the domain knowledge in
each security problem to discover regularities and tackle root causes directly. There-
fore, the reasons for such regularities to occur are explainable and interpreted in a
security-related way. We have applied our framework to discover and use patterns in
code, network, choices, and communities to counter security challenges.
7.1 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. We proposed a framework to discover and use patterns for countering security
challenges. We have demonstrated that such a methodology can be used for
both defending and attacking in several dierent stages of the security cycle.
2. We have proposed instruction sequence abstraction as a coarse-grained approach
to extract distinguishable features from binary code. We have proposed opcode
mnemonic sequence and binary nite-dimensional representation to represent
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arbitrary shellcode sample. We have proposed a shellcode detection approach
based on Markov model and a shellcode attribution approach with support vec-
tor machines. We have investigated the feature selection methods and demon-
strate its eectiveness with our collected large set of shellcode samples. With
our developed tool, we have demonstrated the identied top opcode transition
patterns. We have evaluated the eectiveness of our shellcode detection and at-
tribution approaches with collected real-world shellcode samples. In addition,
we have compared the strengths of real-world shellcode engines with several
metrics.
3. We have proposed using routing table changes as evidence to measure the risk of
node isolation in mobile ad hoc networks. We have identied several categories
of routing table change patterns and measure the impact of each routing ta-
ble change category. We have proposed an extended Dempster-Shafer evidence
model with importance factors and articulate expected properties for Demp-
ster's rule of combination with importance factors. Our Dempster's rule of
combination with importance factors is nonassociative and weighted. We have
proposed an adaptive risk-aware response mechanism with the extended D-S
evidence model, considering damages caused by both attacks and countermea-
sures. The evaluation has shown the eectiveness of our approach in multiple
MANET attack scenarios.
4. We have performed an empirical analysis on collected PGA passwords to under-
stand user choice patterns in background picture, gesture location, gesture or-
der, and gesture type. We have proposed a selection function model which mod-
els the thinking process of users when they choose picture passwords. We have
demonstrated our approach to automatically extract picture password compo-
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sition processes with this model. We have implemented our attack framework
and evaluated its eectiveness on the collected dataset in several dierent attack
models which includes targeted attack, nontargetted attack, online attack and
oine attacks.
5. We have studied the role of underground social dynamics in the whole under-
ground economy and collected a dataset of the user interactions of an under-
ground social network. We have presented an online underground social net-
work model which takes users and their interactions into account. based on this
model, we have demonstrated our approaches to identify inuential players and
to associate security events with their behind-scene players in underground so-
cial networks. We have evaluated our approaches on a real-world underground
social network dataset and discovered intelligences of underground society from
this dataset and linked existing attack events with discussions in this social
data.
7.2 Future Work
For future work, we plan to use the proposed pattern-based framework to counter
more security challenges. For each challenge we tried to tackle in this dissertation,
we plan to explore more sophisticated models by considering more factors.
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